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This study explores how risk operates as a concept and practice in social workers’ 
interventions. Concern has been expressed within the critical social work risk 
literature that risk operates as a morally conservative and repressive construct in 
social work practice within the context of neo-liberal risk society. This thesis explores 
whether the influence of risk is necessarily as totalising of our professional identities, 
and in turn our practices, as this literature would suggest. Thus the aim of the research 
has been to identify whether spaces exist within social workers’ practice contexts that 
enable them to resist invitations into the moral conservatism of negative constructs of 
risk. My assumption has been that forearmed with this knowledge, as individual 
practitioners or collectively as a profession, we will have a greater capacity to ‘speak 
back’ to the morally conservative ethos of risk that pervades welfare discourses in 
neo-liberal risk society. To progress the aim of the study, I have asked the question 
‘How are ideas about risk constituted and integrated into social workers’ 
interventions?’.  
 
I conducted my explorations of the operations of risk in social work by considering 
how risk was spoken of by practitioners within reflective accounts of interventions 
they had implemented that were significant to them. The results demonstrate that risk 
operated as a complex and discursively persuasive concept within their reflections on 
practice. Most significantly, risk operated as a powerful constituent of client and 
practitioner risk identities. Risk was integral to how practitioners recognised their 
clients and selves, evident in their ascription of highly moralised and emotionally 
constituted ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities. Given the presence of co-existing, multiple 
risk identities within a single intervention, practitioners faced a choice about which 
risk identities they would respond to – their clients and/or their own. In taking a stand 
for clients, practitioners’ accounts indicate that the proclivity towards defensive and 
morally timid practice could be resisted. Contemplation of ethical, moral and value 
imperatives and the re-contextualisation of ideas about risk for clients and 
practitioners assisted social workers in this endeavour. The implications of this 
finding for social work knowledge, practice and education are discussed, alongside 
ideas for future research.   
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If the natural world is ruled by fate and chance, and the technical world 
by rationality and entropy, the social world can only be characterised as 
existing in fear and trembling (Daniel Bell 1980, cited in Bauman 1995, 
p. 16). 
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This introductory chapter to my thesis provides an overview of how the operations of 
risk in social work became the focus of my research. I begin the chapter by stating 
that risk has become increasingly problematised (Castel 1994) as a concept and 
practice in the emergent, rapidly developing and persuasive critical social work risk 
literature (Craddock 2004; Kelly 2001; Houston & Griffiths 2000; Kemshall 2000, 
2002; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Webb 2006). While I note that this literature 
has provided a much needed injection of theoretical interest into the discursive 
attributes of risk and their significance for social work practice, I also state that there 
is a need for further empirical research into the topic. My study attends to this need 
by exploring how risk operates as a concept and practice in social workers’ 
interventions.  
 
Having set the background to the study, I state the study’s focus, aim and the primary 
research question I have investigated. Given the elusiveness and contestability of the 
concept of risk (Adam & Van Loon 2000; Baldwin, Hutter & Rothstein n.d.; Croft 
2001; Garland 2003; Houston & Griffiths 2000; Lupton 1999, 2004; Shaw & Shaw 
2001; Stalker 2003), I dedicate additional space to clarifying the conceptualisation of 
risk that I have used in this study. This enables me to present a strong argument for 
the focus and content of the research. It also provides a context for locating the 
specific research question that has directed my investigation, that being ‘How are 
ideas about risk constituted and integrated into social workers’ interventions?’. The 
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final section of the chapter presents an outline of the structure and content of the 
thesis. 
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There is little doubt that risk has been, and continues to be, a central preoccupation of 
social work practice. As our professional history attests, the focus of social work 
activities have often been directed towards the identification of and response to 
individuals and communities at risk of harm from the many forms of personal and 
social trauma that pervade our world. However, even the most cursory glance at the 
general social work literature reveals that risk is a much disputed concept and feature 
of practice within our discipline as in others. At the heart of these arguments are 
contestations over ontological and epistemological standpoints (that is, what is the 
nature of risk and how can we know it) and the political motivations and moral 
imperatives that are embedded within the structures and measures utilised to define 
and respond to risk (Culpitt 1999; Douglas 2003; Houston & Griffiths 2000; 
Kemshall 2002; Parton 1999, 2001; Shaw & Shaw 2001). Accordingly risk can be 
understood at a theoretical level as a site of considerable discursive power (Culpitt 
1999; Kelly 2000, 2001; Sharland 2006; Søndergaard 2002; Warner 2006).  
 
In this sense, ideas about risk can be understood as ‘manufactured’ (Adam & Van 
Loon 2000; Beck 2003, 2004; Beck & Willms 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003b, 2003c) 
given that what or who is defined as ‘a risk’ or ‘at risk’ bears the markings of a 
complex interplay of competing knowledge claims, interests, politics, ideologies, 
technologies, emotions and moralities. Recognising risk as a site of competing 
definitions and practices (Adam & Van Loon 2000; Beck 2003, 2004; Lupton 1999, 
2004) engenders a disquieting awareness that little can be taken-for-granted about 
how risk is conceptualised and practiced in social work (Shaw & Shaw 2001). 
Nonetheless, until quite recently the socio-cultural and political meanings and 
functions of risk in social work remained largely unquestioned (Stalker 2003). A 
concern for ‘good’ risk assessment and management had instead been the focus of 
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risk research and literature in social work (Craddock 2004; Gillingham 2006; Green 
2004; Parton 1996, 2001; Shaw & Shaw 2001). This was particularly the case in the 
fields of practice of child protection, mental health and the care of older people 
(Kemshall 2002). However, disrupting the taken-for-granted status of risk as a 
concept and practice in social work has become a key feature of a more recent critical 
social work risk literature.  
 
This literature indicates that the risk society thesis of Beck (2003, 2004) and Giddens 
(1994, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c), and Foucault’s governmentality thesis (Culpitt 1999; 
Dean 1999; O’Malley 1996; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000) have invigorated social 
work’s interest in the ‘problematics’ of risk (Kelly 2000, 2001; Parton 1999, 2001) 
within neo-liberal risk society (Culpitt 1999; Kelly 2000, 2001; Webb 2006). In 
combination with Douglas’s (2003) cultural anthropological studies, this literature 
positions risk as a predominantly morally conservative and repressive social, political 
and cultural force in contemporary social work. It is argued that the moral 
conservatism of risk, borne out of the prudential ethos of neo-liberalism, has 
dramatically impacted upon contemporary directions in western welfare policy. Its 
influence has extended into the direct practice environments and micro aspects of 
social workers’ interventions. Parton (1996, p. 98) suggests that social work’s 
increasing preoccupation with risk speaks of ‘important changes in both the way 
social workers think about and constitute their practices and the way that social work 
is itself thought about and thereby constituted more widely’. This adds credibility to 
the tenet of the critical social work risk literature that the progressive social justice 
agenda of our profession is in peril of being laid asunder. Hence, the determination, 
fortitude and commitment of practitioners to work for social change for 
disadvantaged and marginalised individuals, groups and communities is at risk of 
being overtaken by a ‘politics of despair’ (Mullaly 2001). 
 
Arguments for the existence of the morally conservative influence of risk in social 
work are being more frequently expressed within the social work literature – and not 
without foundation. Risk is noted as operating with discursive effect in the service of 
silencing and controlling marginalised and dissenting individuals and groups (Culpitt 
1999; Fox 1999; Kelly 2001; Parton 1996, 1999; Rose 1996a, 2000; Warner 2006), 
justifying the rationalisation and refusal of services to people in need (Green 2004; 
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Kemshall 2002; Mullaly 2001) and regulating the actions of practitioners (Craddock 
2004; Kemshall 2002; Webb 2006). Risk, it is argued, is utilised to legitimise and 
promote the conservatism of the socio-economic policies and practices of neo-liberal 
governments couched within the rhetoric of security, independence and economic 
freedom (Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; Green 2004; Kemshall 2002; Moffat 1999; 
O’Malley 1996; Parton 1999; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam, 1997; Rose 1996a, 1996b). 
The political and ethical ramifications of risk within this form of governance have 
perhaps unsurprisingly come to be spoken of in negative terms within the developing 
critical social work risk literature. This literature suggests that the repressive force of 
risk has become deeply embedded within our practice landscapes and in turn has 
come to dominate the way we think about ourselves and our clients (D’Cruz 2004a, 
2004b; Goddard et al. 1999; Green 2004; Green & McClelland 2003; Houston & 
Griffiths 2000; Kemshall 2002; Mullaly 2001; Parton 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001; Parton 
& O’Byrne 2000; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Warner 2006; Webb 2003, 2006). 
That is, many of our decisions about the actions we will take in our practice are 
reliant upon the extent to which our own and clients’ actions are considered to foster 
or forestall risk. Our interventions are determined by the extent to which clients might 
be seen to be ‘at risk’ (Kelly 2000, 2001; Titterton 2006) or ‘a risk’ (Warner 2006) 
and how as practitioners we consider ourselves to be ‘at risk’ (Craddock 2004; Taylor 
2005) or ‘a risk’ (Kemshall 2002). Risk, then, is positioned within this critical 
literature as operating as a primarily negative construct in social work practice and 
the community services sector more generally.  
 
The critical social work risk literature illustrates that the operations of risk in social 
work, be they in the context of matters of the definition, substance or practices of risk, 
are not ‘innocent’ of power (Foucault 1980). However, I have wondered whether the 
conceptualisation of risk within this literature has become its own problem. 
Embedded predominantly within a critical structuralist and poststructural theoretical 
paradigm (Lupton 2004), this literature has been criticised for constructing an overly 
deterministic and negative story of risk in social work (Sharland 2006; Titterton 2006; 
Warner 2006; Zinn 2006). Within the ‘catastrophe’ narrative, social workers are at 
best presented as having been unwittingly co-opted into the conservative ‘politics of 
risk’ – we are fearful, constrained by our environments, and unable to escape the 
totalising effects of risk. At worst we are positioned as unreflective co-conspirators of 
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these politics. Thus this pessimistic view of the constitutive effect of risk upon 
practitioners identifies its conservatism as an inevitable feature of our interventions. 
There is little opportunity within this proposition to entertain an alternative social 
work practice to respond to the challenges posed by the problematics of risk. Indeed 
such a view fails to account for a more positive reading of the constitutive effect of 
risk within social work where practitioners actively engage in risk taking and sharing 
to facilitate positive outcomes for clients and themselves (Alaszewski & Alaszewski 
2002; Candlin 2002; Giddens 2003a, 2003d; Lupton 2004; Titterton 2006). Hence, 
problematising risk can itself be seen as problematic.  
 
The critical social work risk literature has provided a conceptually coherent 
framework for understanding the contemporary context of social work within neo-
liberal risk society. However, there is a lack of empirical engagement with how these 
theoretical arguments may or may not be relevant to the embodied aspects of social 
work practice. The discursive attributes of risk, though increasingly theorised, remain 
under-researched. While there is anecdotal evidence that social workers experience 
significant ethical and practical dilemmas in the face of the conservative political and 
moral impetus of risk, this lack of research means that the profession is yet to 
establish a strong link between recent theoretical developments and the micro aspects 
of its interventions. Without such investigation, the meanings and operations of risk 
that are theorised in the critical social work risk literature are subject to the claim that 
they have themselves become taken-for-granted assumptions. 
 
This thesis goes some way to addressing the gap in our profession’s knowledge base 
about how risk operates as a concept and practice in social workers’ interventions. I 
have wondered if the influence of risk is necessarily as totalising of our professional 
identities, and in turn our practices, as has been suggested by the ‘catastrophe story’ 
of risk encapsulated within the critical social work risk literature. Thus the aim of my 
research has been to identify the spaces that exist within our practice contexts that 
enable us to resist invitations into the moral conservatism of negative constructs of 
risk. My assumption has been that forearmed with this knowledge, as individual 
practitioners or collectively as a profession, we will have a greater capacity to ‘speak 
back’ to the morally conservative ethos of risk that pervades welfare discourses in 
neo-liberal risk society. To progress the aim of my study, I have asked the question, 
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‘How are ideas about risk constituted and integrated into social workers’ 
interventions?’.  
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It is startlingly apparent that there are a remarkable range of ‘entry points’ into how to 
conceptualise and theorise risk. Taxonomies, schemas, models and matrices abound 
within the numerous texts devoted to identifying the nature and utility of various risk 
perspectives (see, for example, Krimsky 1992; Rayner 1992; Renn 1992). One of the 
central debates that polarises the risk literature in social work, as in other disciplines, 
is the ontological and epistemological properties of risk. That is, it is questioned 
whether risk is a real, objective and quantifiable phenomena that exists independently 
of individual perception or whether it is a conceptual, subjective and qualitative 
phenomena that is constructed in specific social contexts and through social processes 
(Adam & Van Loon 2000; Kemshall 2002; Shaw & Shaw 2001; Slovic 1999). To add 
to this quandary, it is argued that many of the risks that are endemic to late modernity 
cannot be perceived by the senses (Beck 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004). As Adam 
and Van Loon (2000, p. 2) state, ‘the materiality of technologically constituted 
hazards always includes the virtual domain of latency, invisibility and contingency’. 
Hence while the potentially hazardous effects of various ‘risks’ are real, they can only 
be spoken of in a temporal sense as possibilities.  
 
The critical social work risk literature emphasises that the generation of risk 
knowledge is an inherently political process and that in turn the construct and uses of 
risk are political. Given the veracity and centrality of this ‘risk dispute’ to discussions 
of risk within the literature, assuming a clear and informed ontological and 
epistemological position in my conceptualisation of risk in this research has been 
important. The task has been to make risk an object of study so that consideration can 
be given to both its socio-cultural and political dimensions whilst also making it ‘real’ 
for practitioners to discuss.  
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Risk is conceptualised in this study as a discursive construct in social work, thereby 
positioning this research within an idealist and constructivist-subjectivist paradigm 
(Crotty 1998). In a sense I have regarded risk as a language artefact. That is, I have 
taken the view that meanings of risk in social work are generated by how they are 
spoken of between individuals (such as practitioners, clients and administrators) and 
within the context of wider networks of power, such as within institutional contexts, 
including the legal system and health and welfare systems (Weedon 1997, p. 105; cf. 
Sarangi & Candlin 2003). Meanings of risk in social work can thus be understood as 
being in a constant process of discursive production (Weedon 1997, p. 105; cf. 
Sarangi & Candlin 2003) whilst simultaneously discursively producing ‘social 
reality’ (Healy 2000, p. 39). Hence for the purpose of this research I have assumed 
that risk predominantly acts as an idea or ‘way of thinking’ (Parton 1996, p. 98) that 
influences how the things that come to be associated with it (such as people and 
events) are recognised and responded to. This viewpoint has enabled me to link the 
conceptual dimensions of risk, that is, the idea of risk with how it is recognised and 
experienced in embodied aspects of social workers’ interventions.  
 
Conceptualising risk as a discursive construct clarifies the affiliation of the study with 
poststructural theory. Poststructural theory emphasises the instability of meanings 
attributed to people, experiences and events (Agger 1991; Ashenden 2005; Healy 
2000, 2005; Lather 1991; Weedon 1997). The constitution and attribution of 
meanings are regarded as products of historical, social, cultural, institutional and 
political influences. Thus this theoretical perspective disputes the notion of 
essentialised qualities being considered as inherent to people, experiences and events. 
Instead the naming, categorisation and attribution of value to people, experiences and 
events are understood as processes and products of power (Alvesson 2002; Healy 
2000; Weedon 1997). Within this theoretical context risk can be understood as a 
concept that is subject to contextualised fluxes in meaning.  
 
Various social theorists have noted that meanings of risk have changed over time 
(Beck 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Bernstein 1995; Douglas 2003; Ewald 1991; Giddens 
2003c, 2003d; Hacking 1991; Luhmann 1993; Lupton 2004) as have the dominance 
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of different risk discourses (Kemshall 2002; Lupton 2004). Kemshall (2002) 
describes the most prominent of these risk discourses as the ‘risk as fate’ discourse 
which characterised pre-modern societies, the ‘risk as probability’ discourse of 
modernity, and the ‘risk as uncertainty’ discourse which has emerged as an important 
discourse in late/postmodern times. I wanted to capture this sense of the fluidity and 
nuances of meanings of risk within the context of social workers’ interventions. 
Hence a more discursive approach to the empirical study of risk has been a 
theoretically astute, though admittedly still contentious, approach for studying the 
operations of risk in social work. While such an approach is compatible with the 
theoretical dimensions of risk that are discussed in the critical social work risk 
literature, empirical research in social work, such as in the areas of risk assessment 
and management, are overwhelmingly reflective of more objectivist and realist 
conceptualisations of risk (Parton 1996, 2000; Webb 2006).  
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Viewing risk as a discursive construct had several implications for the development 
of the study. First, it enabled me to engage with risk as a multi-dimensional concept. 
This is important because the research is exploratory in nature and I wanted to 
investigate the possibility that risk might be ‘present’ in different ways in social 
workers’ practice. That is, risk might have been visible in organisational documents 
such as case notes or policy, personal feelings, practitioners’ world views, in 
relationships with clients and colleagues and so on. While it could be suggested that 
this scope for enquiry was too wide and indeed what I was engaging with was more 
than just a single risk phenomena, I did not intend to distil a unified, single layered 
concept of risk from my investigations. Instead, I operationalised risk as a multi-
faceted concept to engage with how ideas about risk operate with potency and 
relevance in practitioners’ interventions. Conceptualising risk as a discursive 
construct suited the demands of such a task. 
 
Second, conceptualising risk in these terms enabled me to be sensitive to risk 
operating as a positive and/or negative construct in social workers’ interventions. 
Most commonly risk is referred to as a negative construct in the social work risk 
literature and generally as ‘threats or dangers attributed to persons, technologies, or 
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nature’ (Ericson & Doyle 2003, p. 2). In sum it is associated with the possibility of 
something bad happening. I was particularly interested in how social workers might 
be able to escape the totalising effects of negative conceptions of risk upon their 
practice. I wondered if the means by which this might happen could have been 
through more positive understandings of risk, involving practitioners ‘taking risks’ 
(Green 2004; Parton 2001; Titterton 2006). Thus a discursive focus to the 
conceptualisation of risk enabled the study to incorporate the varied meanings of risk 
in operation within social workers’ interventions. 
 
Third, positioning risk as a discursive construct enabled me to limit the scope of my 
project. The literature pertaining to risk and risk topics is vast and expanding. Being 
interested in the discursive attributes of risk clarified the need for a particular form of 
engagement with this literature and the literature that is pertinent to the study. Hence 
this thesis focuses predominantly upon the contributions of socio-cultural and 
political risk theories for understanding risk in social work. It has also meant that the 
literature I have engaged with is predominantly theoretical given my interest in how 
concepts of risk are constituted and integrated into social workers’ general 
interventions. Furthermore, this research has not focused on specific risk practices 
such as risk assessment, perception, profiling and management. My research is 
interested in risk in more general terms as a feature of practice as opposed to it being 
a feature of particular fields of practice where assessment, profiling, perception and 
management are prominent.  
 
Fourth, a discursive focus to the study of risk provided a clear pathway for 
determining an appropriate methodology and research methods for collecting and 
analysing my data. Drawing inspiration from Søndergaard’s (2002, p. 187) 
suggestions of how to conduct poststructural empirical analysis, I conceived that ‘the 
creation and manifestation’ of the discursive construct of risk could be evidenced 
from how it was ‘spoken’ of in social workers’ interventions (Søndergaard 2002, p. 
188). Thus I conducted a series of in-depth interviews with social workers where they 
reflected upon interventions they had implemented. However, it is important to note 
that such a method was incredibly time-intensive and challenging. It required 
considerable conceptual dexterity on the part of the researcher to delineate ‘signifiers’ 
(Alvesson 2002; Crotty 1998; Healy 2000; Weedon 1997) of risk and draw these 
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together into a coherent interpretation of the operations of risk in social workers’ 
interventions. 
 
Finally, operationalising risk as a discursive construct provided a solid theoretical 
platform for linking the theory of risk with direct social work practice. While the 
concept of risk has proven elusive for those interested in it in a philosophical and 
theoretical sense, speaking of risk as a discursive construct legitimises a move away 
from ‘arriving at a “truth” about the essence of a phenomenon’ (Søndergaard 2002, p. 
188) and instead supports a focus on the ‘truth effects’ of risk through an examination 
of practice (Culpitt 1999; Foucault 1980). This approach has been particularly useful 
in discourse analyses of risk (for example, see Culpitt 1999; Kelly 2000) and in 
Warner’s (2006) study of the location and governance of risk in mental health. Thus 
social work interventions can be recognised as a site in which it is possible to witness 
the ‘truth effects’ of risk which constitute the subjectivities of clients and 
practitioners.  
 
Risk, premised as operating with discursive power (Weedon 1997), supports the focus 
in this research upon clients and practitioners being subjected to power in the 
formation of their respective subjectivities and subjects of power in which they ‘take 
up discursive practices as their own and negotiate them’ (Søndergaard 2002, p. 189). 
As Juhlia et al. (2003, p. 16) state in their discussion of the construction of client 
identities in social work: 
The reality of social work and the way in which it is continuously being 
constructed is present wherever it is spoken or written into being: when 
encountering clients, when speaking or writing of them…these practices 
become data which are used to interpret the processes of social reality in 
which multiple clienthoods are constructed. 
Thus the poststructural theoretical standpoint adopted in my research permitted an 
examination of how the materiality of risk was spoken into existence by social 
workers in reflective accounts of their interventions. The possibilities of such an 
analysis were fully realised in the conduct of this research in the finding that risk 
operates as an embodied concept in social workers’ interventions, its vehicle being 
the ascription of a number of client and practitioner ‘risk identities’.  
  
23 

Given that I conceptualised risk as a discursive construct, a concern with how risk 
operates in social workers’ practice is the focus of this research. That is, in line with 
poststructural theory that considers the constitutive power of discourse, this study 
considers how ideas about risk operate within the context of social workers’ 
interventions. As stated above, this thesis demonstrates that risk operated most 
significantly in the construction of client and social worker risk identities. The 
meaning, emotion and morality of risk are recognised as being central to how risk 
operates in practitioners’ interventions. Hence the title of this thesis is, ‘The 
operations of risk: the meaning, emotion and morality of risk identities in social work 
practice’.  
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The structure and content of this thesis is as follows. The following two chapters are 
concerned with distinct bodies of socio-cultural risk theory and social work risk 
literature. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the main aspects of the risk society 
(Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003c) and governmentality (Barry, Osborne & 
Rose 1996; Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; O’Malley 1996; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000) 
theses and Douglas’s (2003) cultural/symbolic analysis of risk. I argue in this chapter 
that each risk theory has been integral to social work being able to develop a critical 
understanding of the nature and operations of risk within the social, political and 
cultural context of neo-liberal risk society. This presentation examines how each of 
these theories engages with debates regarding the nature and operations of risk within 
contemporary society. These matters are considered in further detail in Chapter 3. 
This chapter reviews the problematics of risk that have been raised within the critical 
social work risk literature in relation to knowledge, morality and ethics, and practices, 
in social work. The chapter concludes with my assessment of the limitations of the 
‘catastrophe’ narrative of risk that dominates this perspective in the literature, 
particularly with regard to its limiting the moral agency of practitioners and 
constructing risk as a necessarily morally conservative influence upon social work 
practice. I then suggest an alternative research program for social work to disrupt the 
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taken-for-granted assumption that risk operates as a negative construct in the areas of 
social work knowledge, morality and ethics, and practice.  
These ideas are used to support the aim, question, methodology and methods of my 
research which I have introduced in this introductory chapter and which I expand 
upon in Chapter 4. In view of my discussion in Chapter 1 of how I made risk an 
object of study in my research, I clarify in Chapter 4 the theoretical paradigm that was 
adopted and its implications for the study’s methodology. I argue that a reflexive, 
iterative, qualitative research design was necessary to explore the discursive construct 
of risk in practitioners’ accounts of their interventions. This methodology was 
considered the most appropriate way of rendering the presence and specific 
operations of risk visible within the research process. The methods of data collection 
and analysis are also discussed. 
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 comprise the data chapters of the thesis. Each chapter presents the 
results of the study and each is organised within its own discrete narrative. The results 
indicate that risk operates as a complex concept in social workers’ interventions. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that the concept of risk was spoken of as a negative and 
pervasive concept within the context of practitioners’ reflections upon their 
interventions. This meaning of risk came to be embodied in various risk identities that 
were ascribed to clients and social workers. Practitioners characteristically spoke of 
their clients and themselves in terms of their being ‘at risk’ and/or ‘a risk’. These 
identities then dominated how practitioners thought of their clients and themselves. 
This typology of identities, their constitutive emotions and their configurations within 
practitioners’ interventions form the content of the chapter.  
 
Chapter 6 extends the analysis of the presence of risk identities in social workers’ 
interventions by demonstrating that they were also spoken of by social workers as 
moral identities. That is, risk identities can be understood as reflecting practitioners’ 
views of their clients and themselves as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and as ‘innocent’ or 
‘culpable’. Given that multiple and often conflicting moralised risk identities were 
apparent within practitioners’ reflective narratives, this chapter demonstrates that 
practitioners were faced with risk identity dilemmas that were experienced as moral 
dilemmas. Essentially practitioners were faced with a moral choice about whether 
they would take a stand for themselves or their clients within their interventions. 
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Hence the potential for risk to act as a conservative influence upon social workers’ 
practice is apparent within this data. An overview of the standpoints that practitioners 
assumed concludes the chapter. Chapter 7 explores the reference points social 
workers used to constitute a moral stand in response to their risk identity dilemmas. 
This chapter demonstrates how various reference points were assimilated by 
practitioners in their efforts to effect a resolution to the moral dilemmas posed by 
clients and their risk identities. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 are the discussion and conclusion chapters of my thesis respectively. 
Chapter 8 brings together the results from the three data chapters to delineate that risk 
operated in very specific ways in their interventions. This occurred primarily through 
the embodiment of risk in client and practitioner risk identities. I argue in this chapter 
that these risk identities operated as powerful signifiers of the meaning, emotion and 
morality of risk that were in evidence in social workers’ discussions about their 
interventions. I note that this research indicates that while risk was a pervasive and 
constitutive force in practitioners’ narratives, its morally conservative impetus was 
able to be resisted within the context of face-to-face encounters between clients and 
social workers. I thus conclude in Chapter 9 that my study has demonstrated that the 
relationship between ‘self and other’ – the practitioner and the client – can be 
recognised as a relationship of compassion and care even in the presence of fearsome 
risks. Drawing upon the reference points that proved useful in this exercise for 
practitioners who participated in the study I make a number of recommendations for 
social work knowledge, education and practice. In view of the limitations of the study 
I also make suggestions for future social work research.   
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This introductory chapter to my thesis has identified theoretical and methodological 
principles for conceptualising and conducting my research into the operations of risk 
in social work. The chapter has addressed why a concern with the operations of risk is 
an important research issue in social work. I have also stated the aims of the research 
and the research question. Considerable detail has also been given to the conceptual 
framework that has guided how I made risk an object of study within the research. 
  
26 
My presentation of how risk has been theorised within socio-cultural and social work 
literature in the next two chapters further supports the approach of this study.  
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Knowledge does not slowly detach itself from its empirical roots…it 
creates a progressive enslavement to its violence (Foucault 1984, cited in 
Culpitt 1999, p. 18). 
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This chapter provides a theoretical orientation for understanding the recent concern 
within the social work literature that risk operates as a morally conservative construct 
that has repressive effects in direct social work practice. In this literature it is argued 
that how risk is defined and operationalised in social work reflects the political 
dominance of neo-liberalism as an ethos of government operating within the social 
and cultural conditions of the risk society (Kelly 2000, 2001; Parton 1996, 1999; 
Warner 2006; Webb2006). Risk is regarded within this argument as a concept and set 
of practices that have been utilised to promote the conservative political and 
economic agenda of neo-liberal governments (Culpitt 1999; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 
2000). It will be demonstrated throughout the course of Chapters 2 and 3 that the 
politicisation of risk within the critical social work risk literature contrasts sharply 
with other social work literature that regards risk in less overtly political terms. Risk 
is conceptualised within these other literature sources as a more discrete material 
entity. It is considered to have ‘objective properties’ that can be ‘measured as the 
probability of well-defined adverse effects’ (Renn 1992, p. 54). Hence the social 
work risk literature comprises polarised theories of the nature and operations of risk 
in social work practice.  
 
I argue in this chapter that this division in the social work literature reflects the 
central preoccupation of a vast body of socio-cultural literature that similarly 
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philosophises the nature and operations of risk in oppositional terms within the 
contemporary era. While distinctive polarised viewpoints are evident within the 
socio-cultural literature (Adam & Van Loon 2000; Kemshall 2002; Lupton 2004; 
Shaw & Shaw 2001; Slovic 1999), subtleties of position are also evident between 
relatively commensurate theoretical positions. Cases in point are the comparable and 
yet divergent conceptualisations of risk contained within critical structuralist, 
postmodern/poststructural and functional structuralist theories of risk (Lupton 2004). 
The risk society thesis (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d), 
governmentality thesis (Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000) and 
Douglas’s (2003) cultural/symbolic analysis of risk respectively accord to each 
theoretical position. I claim that the polemics between, and distinctive arguments of, 
these literatures have become pivotal to the emergent critical social work risk 
literature that problematises the nature and operations of risk within the domains of 
social work knowledge, morals and ethics, and practices. The specifics of this critical 
analysis of how risk operates within these domains are the subject of the following 
chapter. This chapter then provides a theoretical background to the forthcoming 
review of the critical social work risk literature.  
 
The chapter begins with a basic overview of the paradigmatic controversy that 
underpins disputes about the nature of risk. The chapter progresses to a presentation 
of how the nature and operations of risk are generally theorised within functional 
structuralist, critical structuralist and postmodern/poststructuralist risk theories. The 
chapter then progresses to a discussion of the salient aspects of these risk theories as 
they are contained within the risk society and governmentality theses and Douglas’s 
cultural/symbolic analysis of risk. In this section I clarify that these risk theories 
reject a singularly realist ontology and objectivist epistemology of risk, foregrounding 
instead the social, political and cultural processes involved in the construction of 
ideas about risk. I conclude the chapter by affirming that these theories have been 
central to the development of the critical perspective of risk that has become a key 
feature of recently developed social work risk literature.  
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Theorising the nature and operations of risk within contemporary society has become 
an increasing preoccupation within academic literature. According to Garland (2003, 
p. 49) ‘The idea of risk has come to appear indispensable for understanding our 
times’. Lupton (2004, pp. 13 and 14) explains that the centrality of risk to our 
thinking can be understood in the following terms: 
To call something a ‘risk’ is to recognise its importance to our 
subjectivity and well being…Those phenomena that we single out and 
identify as ‘risks’, therefore, have an important ontological status in our 
understandings of selfhood and the social and material worlds. 
The importance of understanding what risk is and does has been embraced by a 
diverse range of disciplines. Garland (2003) notes that risk is represented in multiple 
ways within their literature. He states: 
Risk is a calculation. Risk is a commodity. Risk is a capital. Risk is a 
technique of government. Risk is objective and scientifically knowable. 
Risk is subjective and socially constructed. Risk is a problem, a threat, a 
source of insecurity. Risk is a pleasure, a thrill, a source of profit and 
freedom. Risk is the means whereby we colonize and control the future. 
‘Risk society’ is our late modern world spinning out of control (Garland 
2003, p. 49). 
The diversity of views regarding the nature and operations of risk contained within 
Garland’s (2003) summary intimate the deep divisions within and between discipline 
specific theories of risk. In the first section of the chapter I present an overview of the 
core debates that have been explored within socio-cultural literature. This is followed 
by a discussion of how these ideas have been integrated into functional structuralist, 
critical structuralist and postmodern/poststructural perspectives of the operations of 
risk.   
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Theorising risk incorporates at some point delineating what risk is. This definitional 
process centres upon questions regarding the ‘nature’, or in other words the ontology, 
of risk (Houston & Griffiths 2000). Discussions in the socio-cultural literature 
regarding the ontology of risk are often presented in polarised terms to reflect the 
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division between realist and idealist (also referred to as relativist) paradigmatic 
positions (Houston & Griffiths 2000; Shaw & Shaw 2001; Stalker 2003). Realist 
ontologies of risk accord to the view that risks are real – they exist independently of 
interpretative processes. On the basis of this viewpoint, various people, events and 
experiences can be regarded as independently comprising a risk in and of themselves. 
In contrast, idealist ontologies of risk assume that risks are a matter of ‘the mind’ 
(Crotty 1998); in other words, the recognition and naming of a risk as ‘a risk’ is a 
purely interpretive act. Hence, proponents of this alternative ontological paradigm 
argue that nothing is inherently a risk in itself. Instead, the naming and categorisation 
of risk is considered a subjective act.  
 
Considerations of the nature of risk invariably relate to discussions of how it is 
possible to determine knowledge about risk. That is, questions are asked about the 
epistemology of risk (Houston & Griffiths 2001). In tandem with the ontological 
schism pertaining to the nature of risk, discussions regarding the epistemology of risk 
are similarly divided. The first position holds that knowledge about risk can be 
accessed through objectivist and quantifiable methods of inquiry, such as risk 
assessment schedules. The second position argues that knowledge about risk is 
constructed through the attribution of meaning. It is thus claimed the content and 
processes of attributing the meaning of risk to people or things is best determined by 
interpretive methods of inquiry, such as through discourse analysis (Adams 2001; 
D’Cruz 2004a, 2004b; Parton 2000; Sarangi & Candlin 2003; Warner 2006; Zinn 
2006). While recent developments in the socio-cultural and social work literature 
suggest that attempts are being made to bridge these binarised conceptions of risk (for 
example, Houston 2001; Krimsky 1992; Renn 1992; Slovic 1992, 1999), it seems 
clear that the polarisation of the nature of risk is a key marker for orienting the 
differing perspectives of risk theories. 
 
Common to functional structuralist, critical structuralist and poststructuralist risk 
theories is the view that our understanding about ‘what risk is’ is constructed in a 
dialectical relationship between people and the social world (Lupton 2004, p. 29). 
Accordingly, Lupton (2004, p. 29) makes the point that these socio-cultural and 
political theories of risk: 
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tend to argue that a risk is never fully objective or knowable outside of 
belief systems and moral positions: what we measure, identify and 
manage as risks are always constituted via pre-existing knowledges and 
discourse. 
Thus whilst ontological and epistemological standpoints are on the one hand 
philosophical, they are also recognised in socio-cultural and political risk theories as 
reflecting the operations of power. As Adam and Van Loon (2000, p. 4) state, 
definitions of risk reflect the power and influence of those who come to participate in 
risk debates. Ewald (1991, p. 199) also makes this point, claiming: 
Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other 
hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the 
danger, considers the event. 
Consequently, functional structuralist, critical structuralist and 
postmodern/poststructuralist risk theories tend to share a profound scepticism of more 
empirical approaches to risk that speak of risk in ‘realist’ terms as an ‘objective fact’ 
(Lupton 2004, pp. 25-26 ). Objectivist approaches tend not to ask ‘what is risk’ or 
‘what makes a risk a risk?’. The reality of risk is assumed. Common to the arguments 
of those theorists that are canvassed in this chapter is that such an approach ignores 
the political contexts within which ideas about risk are created and managed. 
However, there are also differences between how these social, political and cultural 
theories of risk conceptualise the operations of risk, which I will now briefly discuss. 
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Broadly speaking, functional structuralist perspectives theorise risk in terms of how it 
operates within certain cultural contexts to structure social organisation and 
relationships and contributes to social order and social solidarity (Douglas 2003; 
Lupton 2004; Rayner 1992; Scott 2000; Tansey 2004; Wynne 1992). This theoretical 
perspective considers how cultural values are instrumental in defining who and what 
is perceived as a risk. Thus risk is understood as a culturally defined concept (Renn, 
1992, p. 72) that fulfils specific cultural purposes. 
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Commonly, functional structuralist accounts narrate risk as a particularly modern 
concept that has engendered a variety of social conditions or experiences. These 
include:  
• an increased risk consciousness (Beck 2003, 2004; Beck & Willms 2004; 
Giddens 2003b; Lupton 2004);  
• the undermining of trust in governments and officials (Beck 2003, 2004; Beck 
& Willms 2004; Giddens 2003c; Lupton 2004);  
• the creation of cultures of blame (Douglas 2003; Parton 1996, 2001; Rayner 
1992);  
• the shared experience of anxiety and fear by individuals and communities of 
latent risks (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a; Furedi 2003); and  
• the dominance of calculative and technical approaches towards the 
measurement and management of risk in personal and social contexts (Beck 
2004; Douglas 2003; Giddens 2003c; Lupton 2004).  
 
Mary Douglas’s (2003) cultural/symbolic analysis of risk is most commonly 
associated with this theoretical perspective. However, analyses from Beck (2003, 
2004) and Giddens (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) of the cultural significance of reflexive 
modernisation in their risk society thesis (discussed later in this chapter) also accord 
with functional structuralist theory. 
 
In contrast, critical structuralist and poststructuralist theories of risk emphasise the 
‘problematics’ (Castel 1994) of risk (Culpitt 1999; Kelly 2000, 2001; Kendall & 
Wickham 2000). This means that risk is theorised to varying extents as a social and 
political construct that bespeaks the operations of institutional and discursive power 
(Beck 2003, 2004; Dean 1999; Parton 1999; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000). Risk is 
revealed as an essentially conservative construct (Culpitt 1999) that is mobilised as a 
concept with currency in the context of the political spectre of neo-liberalism (Dean 
1999; Kelly 2000, 2001; O’Malley 1996; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000; Webb 2006). 
Hence, critical structuralist and poststructuralist theories of risk elucidate how risk 
operates as a rhetorical stratagem of advanced liberal democracies in the service of 
advancing certain interests and values over others, thus engendering a particular risk- 
based ‘politics of recognition’ (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006) in macro and micro 
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contexts. Where these two theoretical positions diverge is the extent to which they 
purport that risk is a socially constructed concept, which in turn impacts upon their 
specific analyses of the social, political and cultural operations of risk. Critical 
structuralist risk theorists (such as Beck and Giddens writing about the risk society) 
are said to be ‘weak constructionists’ given that they claim that risks are real, though 
their effects are ‘mediated, perceived and responded to via social, cultural and 
political processes’ (Lupton 2004, p. 28). Conversely, postmodern risk theorists such 
as Bauman (1995, 1997), and poststructuralist risk theorists such as Rose (1996a, 
1996b, 2000), Culpitt (1999), and Dean (1999) who champion the governmentality 
thesis, accord to a strong constructivist position.  
 
In spite of their differences, the academic social work risk literature indicates that 
attempts have been made to synthesise all three theoretical perspectives to explicate 
the social, political and cultural contexts within which risk is constructed and operates 
within our profession. In particular, this literature takes a critical stance in relation to 
the nature and operations of risk within the domains of social work knowledge, 
morals and ethics, and practice. In order to more fully understand these arguments, as 
presented in the following chapter, I will consider the central tenets of the risk society 
and governmentality theses, and Douglas’s cultural/symbolic analysis of risk. 
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Ulrich Beck is regarded as the author of the risk society thesis, although Anthony 
Giddens is also considered a pre-eminent theorist of this particular risk theory. Often 
the contributions of both theorists feature when the risk society is mentioned in the 
social work literature. The discussion that follows reflects this tradition, melding 
together that which is common to both theorists’ perspectives. In this overview I 
present several elements of their theory that have been integrated into the critical 
social work risk literature. They are presented here to signify the social context within 
which the nature and operations of risk can be understood. 
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As was mentioned in the preceding section, it has been suggested that Beck and 
Giddens share a weak constructionist view of the ontological nature and 
epistemological properties of risk (Lupton 1999, 2004). However, Mythen (2004) 
argues that Beck assumes an essentially realist stance. Beck (2003, p. 134) claims that 
he adopts both realist and constructivist positions to support his theory of risk. That 
is, he argues risk has real dimensions to it (for example, acts of terrorism exist) which 
are measurable (for example, by counting or estimating how many people are affected 
by an act of terrorism) as well as risk having constructed aspects to it (recognisable, 
for example, in the processes of identifying who a terrorist might be). Beck (2003, p. 
134) states that his adoption of the dual perspectives of realism and constructivism 
reflects his pragmatic approach to the epistemology of risk as it enables him to 
engage with concrete and abstract dimensions of risk. He states, ‘there is at the same 
time the immateriality of mediated and contested definitions of risk and [original 
italics] the materiality of risk as manufactured by experts and industries world-wide’ 
(Beck 2003, p. 4). Giddens (2003c) adopts a similar position to Beck, arguing that we 
are thoroughly bounded by the dynamics of the institutionalised forces of radical 
modernity (discussed in the following section) which influences the way we engage 
with risk.   
 
Risk is also generally spoken of as a negative construct within the risk society thesis. 
Beck (2004, p. 20) speaks of risk as the ‘hazardous side effects’ of modernity, where 
its ‘destructive [original italics] forces are…unleashed, forces before which the 
human imagination stands in awe’. Thus Beck’s sociological analysis portrays late 
modern society as being on the brink of catastrophic disaster as a result of 
environmental, financial and terrorist risks. Beck (2000, 2002b) also claims that these 
risks have the potential to be mobilised with positive effect as a result of the forging 
of transnational and deterritorialised alliances in a united response to global risks. 
However, overwhelmingly risk is constructed by Beck as a negative force. 
 
Whilst Giddens shares the view that late modern global risks are pervasive, latent and 
potentially catastrophic, he also promotes a more positive definition of risk as 
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opportunity, innovation, security and responsibility (Giddens 2003d, p. 63). In 
clarification, Giddens (2003d, pp. 63-64) states: 
Opportunity and innovation are the positive side of risk. No one can 
escape risk, of course, but there is a basic difference between the passive 
experience of risk and the active exploration of risk environments. A 
positive engagement with risk is a necessary component of social and 
economic mobilization…Risk isn’t exactly the same as danger. Risk 
refers to dangers we seek actively to confront and assess…We all need 
protection against risk, but also the capability to confront and take risks 
in a productive fashion.  
Thus in recognition of the failures of the modern welfare state, Giddens (2003d) 
suggests we need to reorient our conceptualisation of welfare as ‘positive welfare’ 
which allows for the ‘redistribution of possibilities’ that support active risk-taking on 
the part of people who have created a moral hazard as a result of their choice to rely 
upon welfare support. This point of view is expanded upon in Giddens’s (2003d) 
ideas of ‘Third Way’ social democracy, which was integral to New Labour’s welfare 
reforms (Jordan & Jordan 2000; Kemshall 2002).  
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The key argument of the risk society thesis is that modern societies are organised 
according to the concept of risk (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 1994, 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c). Beck (2003, 2004) notes that in contrast to class societies which focused 
upon the distribution of wealth and the elimination of scarcity, risk societies are 
structured according to the distribution of risks and the elimination of harm. This 
assertion is based upon the argument that all people are vulnerable to the global, high 
consequence risks of late modernity (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c), though it is acknowledged that control over risks can, to a certain extent, be 
mitigated by power and capital (Beck 2003, 2004). However, Beck (2003, p. 36) 
emphasises that while ‘poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic’. In turn, it is argued 
that risk has a democratising effect upon people, given our shared vulnerability to, 
and anxiety from, risk (Beck 2002a, 2003, 2004; Beck & Willms 2004; Giddens 
2003a, 2003c).  
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Beck (2003, 2004) and Giddens (1994, 2003a, 2003c) note that while danger has been 
prevalent in all societies, the concept of risk is a distinctly modern term, borne out of 
the desire of early modern society ‘to make the unforeseeable consequences of its 
own decisions foreseeable, and to subdue their unwanted side effects through 
conscious preventative actions and institutional arrangements (Beck & Willms 2004, 
p. 111). Thus risks are recognised as being ‘manufactured’ (Beck 2003, 2004; 
Giddens 1994, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c) in early modern and late modern societies as a 
direct consequence of the creation of modern systems of political, economic, 
technological and industrial organisation and their attendant technologies of 
sovereignty, military power, capitalism and industrialisation (Giddens 2003c). Thus 
late modern risks are systemic risks (Beck 2003, 2004). However, it is also argued 
that late modern risks are qualitatively different from early modern risks by virtue of 
their high levels of consequence (such as global warming, nuclear war, and financial 
market crashes) and their place, space and time independence (as can be noted in the 
ramifications of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster) so that risks have become globalised 
(Beck 2004; Beck, Bonss & Lau 2003; Beck & Willms 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003c). 
As a consequence Beck argues that the nature of late modern risks has engendered 
radicalised uncertainty. Accordingly, Beck (2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2004) claims that 
we are now living in a ‘world risk society’, which Giddens (2003b) refers to as our 
‘runaway world’.  
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According to Beck (Beck & Willms 2004), early modern risks supported probabilistic 
calculations, given the risks of the time could be perceived by the senses and could be 
identified within the ‘structural and systemic presuppositions’ (Beck, Bonss & Lau 
2002, p. 4) of modernity, which comprised:  
• the independent and territorial bounded nation state; 
• structured individualisation. This refers to individualisation (that is, the 
requirement of individuals to make decisions about their life chances for 
which they are held responsible) being supported by structural mechanisms 
such as class and gender; 
• the promise of a gainful employment society; 
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• the exploitation of nature; and 
• increased scientisation and the functional differentiation between experts and 
lay persons (Beck, Bonss & Lau 2002, pp. 4-5).  
 
Giddens (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) refers to the risks of this era as ‘external risks’. He 
notes that the concept of external risk was integrated into insurance models, including 
the social insurance model of the modern welfare state (Giddens 2003b, 2003c). 
However, as a consequence of radicalised modernisation (Giddens 2003c), risks 
within late modernity are said to have mutated into ‘systemic risks’ (Beck 2003, 
2004) that are temporally, spatially and socially unbounded (Beck 2002b, 2003, 2004; 
Giddens 2003c).  
 
The structural elements that characterised early modernity, as noted above, are said to 
have been radically undermined by the following social processes of late modernity: 
• globalisation, where territorial borders vanished thereby destabilising one of 
the core foundations of the concept of the nation state and, in turn, the 
economy; 
• the intensification of individualisation, where the need to create ‘reflexive 
biographies’ has amplified the responsibility of individuals to make good 
decisions about their employment, education, health and relationships as 
opposed to focusing upon these domains as the responsibilities of government 
and industry; 
• the transformation of gender roles, where there have been changes to how 
intimate relationships are experienced and how the labour market is 
constructed;  
• flexible employment practices, thus undermining the possibility of full and 
gainful employment; and 
• an acknowledgment of nature as a limited resource (Beck, Bonss & Lau 2002, 
pp. 6-7). 
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Consequently, when reckoning the possibility of these ‘manufactured’ risks, Giddens 
(2003c, p. 32) states we can only postulate ‘plausible risk scenarios’ as opposed to 
accurate predictions, as: 
In circumstances of late modernity, many forms of risk do not admit a 
clear assessment, because of the mutable knowledge environment which 
frames them, and even risk assessments within relatively closed settings 
are only valid ‘until further notice’.  
Hence the generation and use of knowledge about risk is a critical issue personally 
and institutionally in the risk societies of late modernity.  
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The politics surrounding knowledge about risks in risk societies is particularly 
evident in Beck’s and Giddens’s analysis of the cultural significance of reflexive 
modernisation. Beck (1994, 2003, 2004) and Giddens (1994, 2003a, 2003c) claim that 
late modern societies are reflexive societies, given they are subject to the processes of 
‘reflexive modernisation’. According to Beck, ‘simple modernisation becomes 
reflexive modernisation to the extent that it disenchants and then dissolves its own 
taken-for-granted premises’ (Beck, Bonss & Lau 2002, p. 3). That is, society looks to 
itself as its own problem, realising the rationalities, technologies and institutionalised 
practices of modernisation have engendered radical uncertainty and actually 
contributed to the existence of risk. Accordingly, reflexive modernisation: 
leads to the undermining of every aspect of the nation-state: the welfare 
state; the power of the legal system; the national economy; the corporatist 
systems that connected one with the other; and the parliamentary 
democracy that governed the whole. A parallel process undermines the 
social institutions that buttressed this state and were supported by it in 
turn. The normal family, the normal career and the normal life history are 
all suddenly called into question and have to be renegotiated’ (Beck, 
Bonss & Lau 2002, p. 4). 
Beck and Giddens argue that the intensification of reflexivity within modernity has 
engendered a constant questioning and critique of all aspects of life – the natural 
world, institutions, experts and officials, relationships and of our selves. Therefore, 
reflexivity has become embedded at an institutional and individual level (Beck 2003, 
2004; Bryant & Jary 2001; Giddens 2003a, 2003c; Giddens & Pierson 1998).  
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With respect to the reflexivity of modernity, Giddens (2003a, p. 20) states that 
reflexivity is institutionalised through ‘the regularised use of knowledge about 
circumstances of social life as a constitutive element in its organisation and 
transformation’. By way of explanation, Giddens (2003a, p. 20) states that knowledge 
about ‘most aspects of social activity, and material relations with nature’ are 
susceptible to ‘chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge’. In this 
respect reflexivity is constitutive of modern institutions whilst concomitantly 
undermining ‘the certainty of knowledge’ (Giddens 2003a, p. 21). With regard to 
individual reflexivity, Beck (2003, 2004) and Giddens (2003a, 2003c) argue that 
individuals are required to negotiate and construct their ‘reflexively mobilised’ 
identities (Giddens 2003a, p. 7) amidst the proliferation of knowledge about risks. 
Thus individuals are required to reflexively constitute and monitor their personal 
biographies (Lupton 2004) or ‘life plans’ (Giddens 2003a). Whereas institutional 
reflexivity calls the foundations of knowledge and progress into question, the 
reflexive self ‘calls itself into question. In the process of self confrontation 
individuals critically suspend their own certainty in questioning their identities and 
life-existence’ (Webb 2006, p. 35). Additionally, Beck (2003, 2004) claims individual 
reflexivity is institutionalised through the foundational elements of nation states in 
which systems of individual, as opposed to collective, rights and entitlements are 
embedded in the welfare state, legal system, economy and the ethos of democratic 
governments.  
 
Giddens and Beck disagree about the relationship between reflexivity and risk. 
Giddens argues that reflexivity within modernity has increased sensitivity to the 
existence of risks. However, Beck claims that the greater number of risks that are 
inherent in modernity has engendered risk reflexivity (Lupton 2004, p. 81). Whatever 
the case, both theorists agree that the inescapability of the reflexive engagement with 
risk personally and systemically has highlighted the contingent and fallible nature of 
knowledge generated about, and institutional responses to, risks. Furthermore, 
individuals have been implicated as the engineers of their own failings, be they at an 
individual or global level. Thus Beck (2003, 2004) and Giddens (2003a, 2003c) claim 
that the intensification and distribution of risks, coupled with a reflexive awareness of 
the existence of risk and the limits of knowledge and expertise, have culminated in 
ever increasing levels of interpersonal and communal fear and anxiety. As Mythen 
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(2004, p. 138) explains, ‘The cloak of anxiety which hangs over the risk society, 
leaves individuals in a state of permanent watchfulness. In short our minds become 
‘factories of fear’. Hence Furedi (2003) argues we are now living within a ‘culture of 
fear’. 
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Trust is an important concept within the risk society thesis. According to Giddens 
(2003a, 2003c) trust is a necessary precondition for existence under the reflexive 
conditions of risk societies. In support of this theory, Giddens (2003c) claims that 
modern societies are characterised by the dislocation of time and space (that is, the 
consequences of actions transcend spatial and temporal barriers, such as in the long 
term repercussions of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster), and the infiltration of 
disembedded, abstract systems into all aspects of daily life. Abstract systems remove 
us from the immediacy of events but are nonetheless essential to our participation in 
modern life. They require us to trust in their capacities to work and keep us safe. 
Money, as a ‘symbolic token’, is the first of these abstract systems discussed by 
Giddens (2003c). ‘Expert systems’ are the second (Giddens 2003c). Expert systems 
are ‘systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large 
areas of the material and social environments in which we live today’ (Giddens 
2003c, p. 27). What this means at an individual level is that knowledge and control 
over the most fundamental aspects of our day-to-day lives have been increasingly 
removed from us, which in turn has required us to place greater faith in the 
technologies and people who operate within these expert systems. Social work is a 
case in point, as are more basic areas of life, such as the production of food. Thus 
social relationships between people have been radically altered through the 
‘distanciation’ (Giddens 2003a, 2003c) of time and space and the ever increasing 
extension of human intervention into the natural and social worlds.  
 
Within this context, trust becomes necessary for engendering ‘ontological security’ 
(Giddens 2003a, 2003c) so that we can act on the basis of taken-for-granted notions 
of continuity in our self identities ‘and in the constancy of the surrounding social and 
material environments of action’ (Giddens 2003c, p. 92). Giddens (2003c, p. 97) 
claims that this form of trust is of a ‘persistent and recurrent kind’, thus he constructs 
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trust as a deeply psychological phenomenon that enables us to bracket out ‘potential 
occurrences which, were the individual seriously to contemplate them, would produce 
a paralysis of the will, or feelings of engulfment’ (Giddens 2003a, p. 3). That is, trust 
forms an essential ‘protective cocoon’ (Giddens 2003a, p. 3) around individuals from 
the risks that they face in their intimate and social worlds. 
 
However, whilst trust is fundamental to participation in even the most rudimentary 
aspects of individual and social life, Giddens (2003a, 2003c) cautions it cannot be 
taken for granted. Trust must be actively courted and negotiated given the contingent 
nature of knowledge engendered within reflexive modernity and our corresponding 
reflexive awareness of the existence of risk. Lay people’s scepticism in science and 
other expert systems (Beck 2004; Beck & Willms 2004) is a case in point of the 
‘bargaining’ practices undertaken to engender trust. As Giddens (2003c, p. 131) 
pointedly remarks: 
The baseline for analysis has to be the inevitability of living with dangers 
which are remote from the control not only of individuals, but also of 
large organisations, including states; and which are of high intensity and 
life threatening for millions of human beings and potentially for the 
whole of humanity (original emphasis). 
Thus, trust presupposes awareness of risk in our relations with nature, each other and 
in terms of our individual selves. We rely upon trust to reconcile our anxiety about 
the contingent nature of knowledge and the risks of our daily existence (Lupton 2004, 
p. 78). So whilst trust is at one level an ontological disposition, it is also a calculation: 
we question, ‘Who can I trust, to what extent and with what possible effect?’.  
 

The risk society thesis of Beck and Giddens is a dense sociological account of how 
risk operates as a dominant structuring force in modern society. Beck and Giddens 
impress upon us that risk is inescapable and unavoidable. They also present risk as a 
complex notion, littered with paradox, which in turn defies binarised 
conceptualisations of its nature (Lupton 2004). Risk is material and immaterial 
(Adam & Van Loon 2000; Beck 2004), antecedent and consequential (Culpitt 1999), 
personal and public (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003c), and real and 
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constructed (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens, 2003a, 2003c). Hence the politics of 
knowledge about risk is a pervasively constant feature of Beck’s and Giddens’s 
writing about the social and cultural significance of risk societies. These politics are 
also expressed in critical terms in the governmentality literature which is discussed in 
the following section. 
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The governmentality thesis of Foucault (as cited by Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996; 
Burchell 1996) features as a prominent theoretical perspective in critical accounts of 
knowledge and practices within many disciplines and domains, health and welfare 
(including criminal justice) being two of the most common of these. Increasingly the 
governmentality literature considers how risk operates as a particular strategy of rule 
of advanced liberal governments which regulates the relationship between the state 
and citizens and the conduct of individuals more generally in both public and private 
spheres (Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; Ewald 1991; Lupton 2004; O’Malley 1996; Rose 
1996a, 1996b, 2000). In many instances, the critical aspects of the risk society thesis 
are incorporated into the governmentality literature. In common with the risk society 
thesis, the literature pertaining to this theory of risk is immense. Accordingly, I 
present here the main tenets of the governmental perspective of risk that are reflected 
in the social work risk literature. These aspects of the governmentality thesis signify 
the political nature and operations of risk.  
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Discussing Foucault (1981), Rose (1996) argues that a particular government 
‘mentality’ – liberalism – became dominant in the 18th century. This ‘new’ form of 
governmentality was characterised by a distinctive approach to the regulation and 
control of populations and individuals (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996; Lupton 2004). 
This was achieved through ‘economic government’ that centralised and 
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operationalised the rationality of ‘the optimum performance of the economy at 
minimum economic and socio-political cost [original italic] (Burchell 1996, p. 26).  
According to Rose (1996a, p. 42), then: 
governmentality is to be analyzed in terms of the strategies, techniques 
and procedures through which different authorities seek to enact 
programmes of government in relation to the materials and forces to hand 
and the resistances and oppositions anticipated or encountered. Hence, 
this is not a matter of the implementation of idealized schema in the real 
by an act of will, but of the complex assemblage of diverse forces (legal, 
architectural, professional, administrative, financial, judgemental), 
techniques (notation, computation, calculation, examination, evaluation), 
devices (surveys and charts, systems of training, building forms) that 
promise to regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups, 
organizations in relation to authoritative criteria.  
 
These modern ‘technologies of governance’ (Rose 1996a, p. 42) have enabled liberal, 
and now advanced liberal governments, to ‘govern at a distance’ (Rose 1996a, p. 43) 
where the centre of rule is distanced from the means and effects of its rule. 
‘Governing at a distance’ has been made possible through the deployment of 
technologies that are administered by experts and professionals, such as social 
workers (Rose 1996a), and through ‘technologies of the self’ (Burchell 1996) where 
individuals are encouraged to self-actualise as ‘subjects of choices and aspirations’ 
(Rose 1996, p. 41). Hence liberal and advanced liberal forms of governance reflect a 
particular economy of power in which power is dispersed ‘beyond points of privilege’ 
(Moffat 1999, p. 221). As Moffat (1999, p. 221) explains: 
This new form of power was advantageous because it could be induced at 
the smallest element of the social body – at the point of 
microinterventions. For example, professionals could use it when 
intervening with their clients. Furthermore, economic and political costs 
were minimized, whereas the effectiveness of the exercise of power was 
enhanced; the exercise of power became more efficient and less wasteful. 
‘Discipline’, as a technique of power, exemplifies the economies of this strategy of 
rule (Foucault 1977). Disciplinary power enables individuals to be regarded as objects 
that can be sorted, categorised and acted upon. Its economic utility is evident, given it 
‘operates through minor procedures and modest methodologies’ (Moffat 1999, p. 
221) such as client interviews. Normalisation features as the technique par excellence 
in disciplining subjects (O’Malley 1996). Normalisation creates and specifies ‘a 
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general norm in terms of which individual uniqueness can be recognized, 
characterized and then standardized’ (O’Malley 1996, p. 189). However, 
governmental theorists emphasise that disciplinary power, though regulative, is not 
merely exercised against the populace. Disciplinary power also serves as a strategy of 
liberal government to recruit individuals as ‘necessary (voluntary) partner(s) [original 
italics] or accomplices(s) of government’ (Burchell 1996, p. 23). Accordingly, 
individuals act as regulators of their own behaviour in the pursuit of ‘their own 
civility, wellbeing and advancement’ (Rose 1996a, p. 40). As Hacking (1991, p. 2) 
laconically explains, ‘Few of us fancy being pathological, so “most of us” try to make 
ourselves normal...’. 
 
It is important to note that these practices are not indicative of modern government’s 
withdrawal from the practice of governance. Instead it reflects how modern liberal 
governments, including neo-liberal governments, have reflexively sought alternative 
methods of rule that do not encroach upon the freedom of the market (Burchell 1996; 
Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; Rose 1996a) whilst still attending to aspects of ‘social 
government’ (Rose 1996b). Under the conditions of neo-liberalism, the ‘retreat from 
the State’ (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996, p. 11) has provoked a particular form of 
‘governmental activism’ (Burchell 1996, p. 27) that has sought to ‘extend the field 
within which a certain kind of economic freedom might be practised in the form of 
personal autonomy, enterprise and choice’ (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996, p. 10). 
Rose (2000 p. 324) notes that a new range of ‘technologies of freedom’ have been 
employed in organisational and personal contexts to achieve this end. By means of 
explanation Rose (2000, p. 324) clarifies: 
as far as organizations are concerned, privatization, marketization, 
consumerization have been accompanied by the increased use of 
techniques of accountability such as centrally set but locally managed 
budgets, and the practices of evaluation and auditing. As far as 
individuals are concerned, one sees a revitalization of the demand that 
each person should be obliged to be prudent, responsible for their own 
destinies, actively calculating about their futures and providing for their 
own security and that of their families with the assistance of plurality of 
independent experts and profit-making businesses from private health 
insurance to private security firms. 
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The governmentality thesis argues that meanings of risk are constructed and practised 
as an ‘art’ of government (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996, p. 11) within neo-liberal 
discourse. Within the governmentality thesis risk is portrayed as a rhetorical 
instrument of neo-liberal governance which is discursively constructed to support its 
particular mentality of rule. Accordingly ‘risk’ is characterised as a political and 
social construct and product (Adams 2001; D’Cruz 2004a, 2004b; Green 1997; Kelly 
2000, 2001; Lupton 1999, 2004). Governmentality theorists dispute the realist 
paradigm that essentialises the ‘nature of risk’ (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996; Lupton 
1999, 2004) that is apparent in probabilistic risk discourses. Accordingly, the 
ontological and epistemological properties of risk are noted as being located within a 
constructivist/subjectivist paradigm in which the constitutive power of discourse in 
shaping social realities is foregrounded (Adams 2001; Chambon 1994, 1999a; Fook 
2002; Healy 2000, 2005).  
 
This perspective of ‘what risk is’ reflects Foucault’s analysis of the necessary 
relationship between power and knowledge. Foucault (1980, p. 27) notes that: 
Power and knowledge directly imply one another… there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor 
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations.  
Thus risk is regarded as having constitutive power to confer legitimacy to knowledge 
claims and identities (Culpitt 1999; Parton 1999). Consequently, Dean (1999, pp. 
131-132) notes, the significance of risk can be recognised through what it gets 
attached to. Thus: 
What is important about risk is not risk itself, but the forms of knowledge 
that make it thinkable from statistics, sociology and epidemiology to 
management and accounting, the techniques that discover it from the 
calculus of probabilities to the interview, the social technologies that 
govern it from risk screening, case management and social insurance to 
situational crime prevention and the political rationalities and 
programmes that deploy it from those that dreamt of a welfare state to 
those that imagine an advanced liberal society of prudential individuals 
and communities. 
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Therefore, an integral connection between epistemologies and practices of risk are 
elucidated within the governmentality thesis. Knowledge about the nature of risk 
must be understood within the context of the practices that are employed to give it 
meaning.  
 
Within this context risk is produced as a calculable object used to ‘create systems of 
governance’ (Culpitt 1999, p. 27). A number of authors note that this calculative 
attitude towards risk became prominent as science and mathematics gained 
momentum as the dominant disciplines for creating and organising knowledge about 
the natural and social worlds during the 18th and 19th centuries (Beck, 2003, 2004; 
Castel 1991; Douglas 2003; Ewald 1991; Giddens 2003a; Hacking 1991). Hacking 
(1991, p. 1) explains that: 
A new type of law came into being, analogous to the laws of nature, but 
pertaining to people. These new laws were expressed in terms of 
probability. They carried with them the connotations of normalacy and of 
deviations from the norm. The cardinal concept of the psychology of the 
Enlightenment had been, simply, human nature. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, it was being replaced by something different: normal 
people. 
Thus Hacking (1991, p. 4) notes that the calculus of probability became intrinsic to 
the ‘making up of people’, and stands as ‘the [original italics] philosophical success 
of the first half of the twentieth century’, evident in how ‘our public fears are 
endlessly debated in terms of probability’. Thus risk is a constituent of identity – 
people can be identified as high risk, low risk, at risk and a risk, which not only 
shapes the behaviours of people in relation to each other, but also in individuals’ 
personal management of themselves. Hence the construction of risk as a calculable 
object enables the identification of risk groups and populations, which in turn 
produces certain forms of knowledge and interventions (Lupton 2004, p. 87). 
Accordingly, Rose (1996a, p. 54) makes the point that calculative rationalities have 
become foundational to knowledge production, which has particular significance in 
the welfare arena. He observes that where once professions such as the ‘psy’ 
professions, which include social work, were once powerful in the production of 
knowledge, this power has been: 
transferred to the calculative regimes of accounting and financial 
management…These certainly rely upon a claim to truth, but it is one that 
has a different character from that of the social human science: these 
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‘grey sciences’, these know-hows of enumeration, calculation, 
monitoring, evaluation, manage to be simultaneously modest and 
omniscient, limited yet apparently limitless in their application to 
problems as diverse as the appropriateness of the medical procedure and 
the viability of a university department (Rose 1996a, p. 54). 
 
Dean (1999) develops this argument further, noting that it is important to 
acknowledge that diverse risk rationalities have been employed and deployed within 
the regime of neo-liberal governance. Dean (1999) makes the point that the 
heterogeneity of risk has been vital to the successes of these forms of governance to 
colonise disparate and distinct spaces and practices. Thus ‘the significance of risk 
does not lie with risk itself [original italics] but with what risk gets attached to’ (Dean 
1999, p. 131). Hence Dean (1999, p. 145) observes that:  
calculative rationalities such as those of risk have certain political 
polyvalence, that is, they can be invested with different sets of purposes 
depending on the political programmes and rationalities they come to be 
latched onto. 
Thus in the context of neo-liberal welfarism, risk rationalities and technologies have 
been utilised in the construction of an ethos of prudentialism in which citizens 
(individually and collectively) are ‘responsibilised’ (Kelly 2001) for the prevention 
of, and response to, risk.  
 
The calculative rationality of risk is in further evidence in the construction of the neo-
liberal citizen as a ‘rational choice actor who calculates the benefits and costs of risks 
of acting in a certain way and then acts’ (Dean 1999, p. 145). Objectifying risk as a 
calculable entity renders it governable and controllable. Accordingly, those who 
become associated with risk (such as welfare clients) are similarly rendered 
calculable, governable and controllable. Thus practices of assessment and various 
forms of regulation, through practices of inclusion and exclusion, operate as the 
primary disciplining technologies of the government of risk (Rose 2000). Therefore 
risk operates as a specific ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1980) that casts the assertions of 
its logics of calculation, security and regulation within a framework of ‘practicality, 
obviousness and common-sense’ [original italics] (Mouffe 1995, cited in Culpitt 1999, 
p. 4). As Foucault (1980 p. 133) notes: 
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‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of 
statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power 
which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces 
and which extend it. 
Risk then is positioned within the governmentality literature as inducing the effects of 
truth in which the ‘rhetoric of common-sense defies any opposition as ‘unreasonable’ 
(Culpitt 1999, p. 4). As an effect of ‘truth’ then: 
The dominant rhetoric about the perils of welfare dependency, arising out 
of the imperative of self-politicization, has exacerbated the ‘fear of the 
other’. The notion of risk has been used to support an anti-welfare 
rhetoric and to contextualise a form of neo-liberal individualism that is 
hostile to the legitimacy of the ‘other’. So much so that it could 
defensively frame any welfare dissensus as having the appearance of an 
anti-society (Culpitt 1999, p. 6). 
Thus the production and use of ‘knowledge about risk’ is presented within the 
governmentality thesis as an innately political and moral artifact of government that 
enables mastery over time as well as the capacity to ‘discipline the future’ (Ewald 
1991, p. 207). 
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Security, particularly economic security, has become a chief concern of liberal 
government. The emergence of both the welfare state following the Second World 
War, and the post-welfare/post-social state of the 1980s (Jamrozik 2005; Leonard 
1997; Rose 1996a), are generally accepted as reflections of government attempts to 
control for risks and respond to needs (Beck 2003, 2004; Beck & Willms 2004; 
Giddens 2003d; Jamrozik 2005; Jordan 1998; Kemshall 2004).  
 
Rose (1996a, p. 48) argues that liberal government became concerned with governing 
social welfare as a means of reformulating ‘the relations between the political field 
and the management of economic and social affairs’. Various political authorities 
were thus inveighed with the responsibility for guaranteeing ‘both the freedom of the 
individual and the freedom of the capitalist enterprise’. In other words:  
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The State was to take responsibility for generating an array of 
technologies of government that would ‘social-ize’ both individual 
citizenship and economic life in the name of collective security (Rose 
1996a, p. 48). 
‘Social security’ was attended to through the operations of the welfare state which 
sought to temper the ‘unwanted side effects’ of increased industrialisation and 
capitalism, or in other words as an institutional response to reflexive modernisation 
(Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 1994, 2003c). A social insurance model of welfare was 
implemented in which such risks were ‘pooled’ (Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; Kemshall 
2004; Jamrozik 2005; Jordan 1998). The pooling of risks within populations meant 
that experiences of individual hardship, such as ill health, unemployment and poverty, 
could be defined as social problems and hence the domain of the State. Welfare 
provision was thus universalised and for all intents and purposes operated as a 
strategy of nation-states to support economic growth whilst simultaneously promoting 
the collective needs and life chances of citizens (Kemshall 2004). Kelly (2001, p. 27) 
argues that this form of social insurance operated as an ‘inclusive’ technology of 
government ‘to socialise the regulation of the risks of a less reflexive modernity’.  
 
In contrast, social work was fashioned as a particular form of welfare governance that 
was individualising and ‘responsibilising’ in its practice. The focus of social work 
was ‘problematic cases…judged as pathological in relation to social norms’ (Rose 
1996a, p. 49). Here the operations of normalising judgements can be noted. However, 
Culpitt (1999, p. 65) argues that a focus on individuals alone would not have enabled 
risk to be discursively harnessed as an institutional stratagem of liberalism’s political 
will to ‘govern at a distance’. Thus Culpitt (1999) and Rose (1996a) note that families 
became specific targets of government. As Rose (199a, p. 49) explains: 
The family, then, was to be instrumentalized as a social machine – both 
made social and utilized to create sociality – implanting the techniques of 
responsible citizenship under the tutelage of experts and in relation to a 
variety of sanctions and rewards. Complex assemblages would constitute 
the possibility of State departments, government offices and so forth 
acting as centre, by enabling their deliberation to be relayed into a whole 
variety of micro-locales within which the conduct of the citizen could be 
problematised and acted upon in terms of norms that calibrated personal 
normality in a way that was inextricably linked to its social consequences 
[original italics].  
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The organisation and provision of welfare then was premised upon a contractual 
relationship between the State and its citizenry – protection by the State was offered 
to individuals to enable them to conduct their lives responsibly, autonomously and 
‘freely’ in the absence of overtly coercive and ‘present’ forms of government (Culpitt 
1999).  
 
In the wake of the ‘crisis’ of welfare in the 1970s and 1980s a marked transition 
occurred, from the socially focused welfare state of the post-war period to the 
commodified welfarism augmented by neo-liberalism (Kemshall, 2002; Leonard 
1997; Lymbery 2004). Aligned with the risk society analysis of Beck and Giddens, 
governmentality theorists argue that ‘The universality of risk, as both social and 
individual threat’ (Culpitt 1999, p. 12) was successfully employed by neo-liberal 
governments to politicise fear amongst the populace of the catastrophe of welfare. 
Culpitt (1999, p. 48) remarks that: 
notions of protection and care, which were allied with a general or social 
security against risk, have been destroyed. It is the shift in language that 
is significant: social security became welfare.  
Within this context risk has been cast almost exclusively in economic as opposed to 
social terms and need has been re-moralised as indicative of individual failure 
(Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; Fox 1999; Horlick-Jones 2003; Kemshall 2002; O’Malley 
1996; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000). Culpitt (1999) thus observes that ‘Marketplace 
liberalism is so dominant that clever articulations of need are forced to “stumble 
over” the more urgent logic of costs and the apportioning of limited economic 
resources’. Hence a ‘risk-led’ as opposed to ‘needs-led’ focus of social government is 
said to dominate the orientation of contemporary social policy (Kemshall 2002, p. 40) 
and with it the charge of individuals to assume responsibility for preventing and 
managing risk. Accordingly the organisation of welfare services has changed 
alongside of the changed relations between government and professions such as 
social work (Dean 1999; Rose 1996a). Furthermore the practices of welfare 
professions, such as social work, are also said to have dramatically changed so that 
assessment, control and regulation of risk objects (that is, clients) has become social 
work’s ‘core business’. The changed landscape of social work practices is discussed 
in further detail in the next chapter.  
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It has been suggested in this chapter that risk operates with disciplinary power within 
the context of neo-liberal government. It has also been noted how risk operates as a 
constituent of ‘good’ neo-liberal citizens who are constructed as individuals who 
actively ‘enterprise themselves’ (Rose 1996a, p. 57) by making rational choices to 
maximise their capacity to avoid or respond effectively to risks. Risk is privatised and 
citizens are held responsible for risk at a personal and community level. Prudential 
subjects are thus ‘rational subjects’ who are engaged in constant reflexive vigilance in 
the calculation and management of risk (Craddock 2004, p. 323). Hence Culpitt 
(1999, p. 13) notes that: 
A perverse cycle exists where the more risky life seems, the more 
individuals are expected to manage and insure against that risk. The 
emergence of the more brutal aspects of risk, when allied intrinsically to 
individualism and random fate, are used as generative reasons for the 
obvious imperative of that very individualism. 
Focussing on individual security has undermined collective responses to distress and 
need. Indeed, the obverse has become the case where the need of others has been 
redefined as dependency, and dependency has become scandalous (Culpitt, 1999, p. 
139). Those people who have not actualised or enacted a subjectivity of self-reliance 
are recognised as culpable, deemed to be moral failures and in need of various forms 
of re-education to correct personal deficits. There is a distinct insidiousness to the 
logic of this form of ‘responsibilisation’: no matter the level or nature of disadvantage 
which people experience they are regarded as active agents in the exercise of their 
‘re-moralisation’ and capacity for autonomy (Rose 2000).  
 
According to Rose (1996a, p. 60): 
this ethical a priori of active citizenship in an active society, this 
respecification of the ethics of personhood, is perhaps the most 
fundamental, and most generalizable, characteristic of these new 
rationalities of government… 
Thus the subjectivities of citizens within the context of the risk-soaked rhetoric of 
advanced liberal government are to be understood as moral subjectivities. That is, the 
moral identities of individuals and groups are constituted through normative 
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judgements regarding the extent to which people are deemed to have accepted their 
responsibility to be autonomous. In the case of people within the spectre of welfare 
and criminal surveillance mechanisms, these normative judgements are cast 
predominantly in the pejorative (Culpitt 1999). As Rose (2000, p. 334) notes: 
Within this new politics of conduct, the problems of problematic persons 
are reformulated as moral or ethical problems, that is to say, problems in 
the ways in which such persons understand and conduct themselves and 
their existence. 
Framed in these terms, then, ‘ethical reconstruction’ (Rose 2000, p. 335) becomes a 
major objective of the panoply of interventions that risky individuals are subjected to. 
Hence, ‘The logics of risk inescapably locate the careers and identities of such tainted 
citizens within a regime of surveillance which actually constitutes them all as actually 
or potentially “risky” individuals’ (Rose 2000, p. 333). Accordingly, risk discourses 
operate as powerful constitutive forces in the construction of identities. However, it is 
also the case that while risk has become privatised within a politicised culture of 
reflexive individualism, risk discourse also has the effect of disembodying ‘the 
subject’ through processes of enumeration and categorisation (Lupton 2004, p. 94). 
Thus risk-focused interventions are not ‘individualised’ in the sense that they herald a 
response to individual need. Instead the assessment and management of risk is girded 
within a system of rationalisation and standardisation according to broader knowledge 
regimes of population characteristics. Castel (1991, p. 288) claims ‘there is no longer 
a subject [original italics]…but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous 
elements’. Hence governmentality theorists and their supporters note the proliferation 
of ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ discourses that operate in the service of the control and 
regulation of various populations. 
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The governmentality thesis provides a critical perspective of how risk operates within 
the political context of neo-liberalism. Concerned with the ‘conduct of conduct’ 
(Burchell 1996; Dean 1999), this analysis claims that risk is a concept that operates 
with significant discursive power in the operations of social government. Within this 
analysis, the neutrality and objective rationality of risk is debunked. Risk is identified 
as acting as a strategic operant of neo-liberal governance for constituting liberal 
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subjectivities as risk identities that are formulated within a moral ethos of 
prudentialism and responsibilisation. The politics of the production of knowledge 
about risk is thus recognised as having profound ramifications for all aspects of social 
organisation, particularly in regard to the regulation of conduct and relationships. 
This exposition of the moral and political functions of risk within contemporary 
society is also considered by Douglas (2003) in her analysis of the cultural and 
symbolic functions of risk, which comprises the final theory section of this chapter. 
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Mary Douglas’s work on risk is recognised as having made an important contribution 
to understanding the normative function of risk in contemporary society. Douglas 
theorises risk as a cultural construct for responding to danger. She argues that risk 
operates to delineate boundaries between the self and ‘other’, as a way to structure 
social groups, and as a response to deviancy (Lupton 2004; Tansey 2004). The most 
prominent aspects of her work that have been incorporated into the social work risk 
literature are her analysis of the forensic capacity of risk to systematically allocate 
blame, and her critique of the production and utilisation of risk knowledge. 
Accordingly, these two aspects of her theory of risk are briefly presented here to 
signify the cultural context within which ideas about risk are generated and operate.  
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According to Douglas (2003), risk has been culturally defined to mean danger in 
modern society. She claims that risk is an overtly moral and politically imbued social 
construct that functions with distinct social purpose. Whilst maintaining that 
experiences of danger and hazards are only too real (Douglas 2003, p. 29), Douglas 
impresses that ‘ideas about risk’ operate with a civic instrumentality that bespeak 
deeply embedded cultural ideas about ‘pollution’, ‘danger’, ‘sin’ and ‘Otherness’ 
(Lupton 2004). Thus Douglas shares in those aspects of Beck’s and Giddens’s theory 
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that emphasise the synergistic, dynamic and constitutive dimensions of risk. 
However, there are some key points of difference between Beck’s and Giddens’s 
sociology of risk and the cultural anthropological study of risk conducted by Douglas, 
which I will briefly attend to. 
 
Whereas Beck and Giddens critically engage with modern notions of risk as events 
within individual and social contexts, Douglas emphasises the symbolic status of risk 
as a signal of danger within culturally institutionalised settings that defy historical 
categorisation (Lupton 2004). Furthermore, whereas Beck and Giddens, to varying 
degrees, highlight the disruptive nature and destructive potential of late modern risks, 
Douglas argues that the concept of risk operates with regulative power to establish 
and maintain social order (Douglas 2003). Douglas’s analysis of risk considers how 
certain acts, individuals and groups come to be defined in terms of risk whilst others 
are not. Thus, where Beck and Giddens engage with the concept of risk as a 
consequence and adjunct of increased scientific and technological intervention, 
Douglas construes environmental and other ‘risk oriented’ debates in different terms. 
She claims they reflect cultural orderings of moral discourses that in turn are 
politically appropriated to suit the interests of individuals and groups (Douglas 2003; 
Lupton 2004; Tansey 2004). Consequently, Douglas engages with the perception of 
risk, as opposed to its ‘social facts’ (Beck 2004; Culpitt, 1999, p. 93).  
 
In common with governmentality theorists, Douglas (2003) argues statements about 
risk are used to distribute modern notions of justice through the ascription of blame. 
Therefore, she claims, risk acts as a powerful forensic resource in modern societies. 
Within this context, Douglas (2003, p. 15-16) asserts that: 
The idea of risk could have been custom-made. Its universalizing 
terminology, its abstractness, its power of condensation, its scientificity, 
its connection with objective analysis, make it perfect. Above all, its 
forensic uses fit the tool to the task of building a culture that supports a 
modern industrial society. Of the different types of blaming system that 
we can find in tribal society, the one we are in now is almost ready to 
treat every death as chargeable to someone’s account, every accident as 
caused by someone’s criminal negligence, every sickness a threatened 
prosecution. Whose fault? is the first question. Then, what action? Which 
means, what damages? what compensation? what restitution? 
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Whilst Douglas doesn’t attribute risk as overtly acting in the service of a particular 
ideology, she emphatically maintains that:  
in all places at all times the universe is moralized and politicized. 
Disasters that befoul the air and soil and poison the water are generally 
tuned to political account: someone already unpopular is going to be 
blamed for it (Douglas 2003, p. 5).  
Furthermore, risk operates as a protective strategy. Douglas explains that in pre-
modern societies danger and taboo acted as mechanisms for establishing social 
cohesion and order by marginalising certain behaviours and the persons who 
committed them. Thus emphasis was placed on the protection of the community from 
‘dangerous’ individuals. However, in modern societies, Douglas argues, risk is used 
as a means of securing the protection of individuals who are vulnerable to others 
(Douglas 2003; Lupton 2004). She explains: 
The dialogue about risk plays the role equivalent to taboo or sin, but the 
slope is tilted in the reverse direction, away from protecting the 
community and in favour of protecting the individual (Douglas 2003, p. 
28). 
Thus to be ‘at risk’ is considered the equivalent of being sinned against, which in turn 
has ramifications for holding individuals to account.  
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In common with the risk society and governmentality theses, Douglas is critical of the 
politics that underpin the production of knowledge about risk, and in turn, how this 
knowledge is used within the scientific paradigm. Douglas is scathing in her critique 
of the cultural innocence that dominates technical scientific models of risk assessment 
and perception, particularly in the domains of economics and psychology. At issue 
here is the claim that these disciplines have relied on two false beliefs. First, that 
technology enables more accurate knowledge about danger, and, second, that the 
‘polluting’ hand of ‘interests and ideology’ (Douglas 2003, p. 11) can be excluded 
from the production of knowledge. Within the scientific paradigm, then, individual 
cognitive processes must be isolated from the subjective experiences of both the 
researcher and the researched to facilitate objective assessments and perceptions of 
risk (Douglas 2003).  
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Expanding on her anthropological theory of risk, Douglas (2003) states that there is 
an assumption that ‘moderns’ [sic] can know ‘real’ risks and ‘real’ dangers through 
the use of technologies that were unavailable to ‘primitives’ [sic]. Because of their 
reliance upon the inferior domains of superstition and folklore to establish causality, 
‘primitives’ are framed as cognitively under-developed in comparison to ‘moderns’. 
However, risk is ‘de-moralised’ by science and technology – morality is considered to 
‘contaminate’ and ‘pollute’ objectivity. Risk is thereby framed within this scientific 
argument as a calculative, as opposed to a moral or political, entity. Furthermore 
Douglas (2003, p. 24) notes that the objectivist scientific model defines risk as danger 
and thus associates it with only negative outcomes. In keeping with the scientific 
enterprise of risk, Douglas states that the ‘purity’ of this culturally innocent model 
demands that risk calculation be recognised as a specialist technology of experts. It is 
assumed lay people are not able to make the accurate, objective assessments of the 
‘scientist’. The argument here, then, is that technological knowledge of the ‘real 
causes’ of these ‘real risks’ enables blame to be legitimately ascribed by experts and 
lay people.   
 
Douglas stridently argues against the propositions of science. In a pointed refutation 
of the credibility of these arguments Douglas (2003, pp. 13-14) remarks: 
Warm-blooded, passionate, inherently social beings though we think we 
are, humans are presented in this context as hedonic calculators calmly 
seeking to pursue private interests. We are said to be risk aversive, but, 
alas, so ineffective in handling information that we are unintentional risk-
takers; basically we are fools…Personally I doubt that we need to be 
explained to ourselves by professional risk psychologists. I do not doubt 
that danger is with us, and very real, but for heaven’s sake, how could we 
have survived on this planet if our thinking is so inherently flawed? 
In defiance of the methodological individualism of this model, Douglas (2003) 
emphasises the emotive, aesthetic, moral, political and inter-subjective contexts that 
support definitions of risk. Without culture, she claims, there can be no understanding 
of the meaning of risk. And according to Douglas (2003), definitions of risk are 
intimately tied to their forensic functions within societies.  
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Whilst this presentation of Douglas’s contribution to understanding the cultural 
significance of risk has been brief it has illustrated the key aspects of her work that 
have been integrated into the social work risk literature. In common with the risk 
society and governmentality theses, Douglas’s work is a resounding critical analysis 
of the operations of risk in modern society. Her cultural theory of risk illustrates how 
fear is mobilised as a creative force in the construction of beliefs and systems of 
justice, in the reinforcement of power relations and in efforts to control social 
boundaries. Douglas’s theory clearly situates risk within a constructionist model as a 
moral and political construct mobilised for moral and political purposes.  
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The risk society and governmentality theses and Douglas cultural/symbolic analysis 
of risk have been influential in the development of theory in the expanding academic 
literature of risk in social work. Indeed, it is clear these theories sit at the heart of the 
vast literature of many disciplines that are concerned with the nature and operations 
of risk in contemporary society. Thus while it may be debated whether or not we are 
now living in Beck’s risk society (Scott 2000), there seems little dispute that risk has 
become central to the organisation of many aspects of life in both personal and public 
domains.  
 
Each of the theoretical perspectives presented argues against a totally realist 
conception of risk. However, the extent to which risk can be assumed to comprise 
realist elements is disputed between them. Nonetheless, what is not in dispute by risk 
society, governmentality and cultural risk theorists is that risk operates as a political 
construct that actively and materially constitutes the living conditions of people. 
These theoretical perspectives clarify that defining and recognising ‘what is a risk’ 
cannot be separated from the operations of power, in various social, political or 
cultural contexts. Their critical argument of the nature and operations of risk has been 
embraced within the rapidly developing critical social work risk literature, which is 
the subject of the following chapter.  
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‘Knowledge always lacks. Ambiguity always lurks’ (Douglas 2003, p. 9). 
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Recent attention given to risk as a product and practice of power (Culpitt 1999) 
within social work indicates that the risk society, governmentality and 
cultural/symbolic theories of risk have been integrated into the social work risk 
literature. This literature theorises risk by referencing the social conditions of the risk 
society, the political conditions of neo-liberalism and the cultural conditions of 
radical uncertainty that are engendered within the context of reflexive modernity 
(Green 2004; Kelly 2001; Webb 2006). The critical analysis of risk in social work 
positions it as a defining characteristic of contemporary social work practice (Green 
2004; Houston & Griffiths 2000; Kemshall 2000, 2002; McDonald 2006; Parton 
1996, 1999, 2000, 2001; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Webb 2003, 2006). Writers who 
adopt this critical theoretical stance tend to problematise the nature and operations of 
risk. They claim that social work has been subjected to the disciplining force of neo-
liberal rule with the effect that social work knowledge, morality and ethics, and 
practices have been redefined to reflect a modern day preoccupation with risk 
(Kemshall 2002; Parton 1999; Rose 1996a). Within this analysis, risk is said to have 
replaced need as the focus of social and economic policies and accordingly social 
control and regulation have overtaken former commitments to, and practices of, 
social care (Green 2004; Houston & Griffiths 2000; Kemshall 2002; Mullaly 2001; 
Parton 1999, 2001; Parton & O’Byrne 2000). Thus the emergent critical social work 
literature presents a pessimistic account of how risk operates to define the scope, aims 
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and foundations of contemporary social work knowledge, morals and ethics, and 
practices.  
 
This chapter considers the substance of these claims by grouping together writers in 
social work whose theoretical affiliations reflect the critical risk theories presented in 
the preceding chapter. The presentation of this literature is structured according to 
how risk is theorised and commented upon in the areas of social work knowledge, 
morals and ethics, and practice. Each dimension is considered in turn alongside a 
statement regarding the core, risk-based practice dilemmas this literature signals for 
social work. At the end of the chapter I reflect upon the need for a future research 
agenda in social work that is able to empirically address these dilemmas. I argue that 
the ‘catastrophe narrative’ embedded within the critical social work risk literature 
depicts social workers as unable to escape from the politically and morally 
conservative and repressive ethos of neo-liberal rule within their practice. Thus the 
chapter concludes with a statement of the aims and research question that have 
directed this study of the operations of risk. 
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In the preceding chapter, I discussed how theorising risk involves consideration of the 
content and ramifications of various paradigms that explicate the ‘nature’ of risk. 
Within this discussion I stated that the paradigmatic controversies that centre upon the 
disputed nature of risk are often presented in polarised terms within the socio-cultural 
risk literature. The same can be said of risk literature in social work. A realist 
paradigm is evident in social work literature that considers risk as a calculable 
concept that can be assessed and profiled according to quantifiable measures. An 
idealist paradigm underpins the critical social work risk literature that focuses upon 
the destabilised status of knowledge about risk, lack of trust in expert opinion and a 
growing awareness of the incalculability of late modern risks (Kemshall 2002, p. 14). 
This literature politicises the construct of risk and the ‘effects of truth’ (Culpitt 1999) 
engendered by realist conceptions of risk. In this section I consider the main points of 
contest between these risk paradigms as they are discussed in the social work risk 
  
60 
literature. This illustrates that the disputed nature and operations of risk presents 
practitioners with a dilemma about how to respond theoretically and practically to 
risk in their interventions. 
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It is generally agreed that the realist paradigm of risk is the dominant model that is 
operationalised to guide contemporary social work practice (Green 2004; Houston & 
Griffiths 2000; Kemshall 2000, 2002; Lester 2004; Webb 2006). The sheer volume of 
literature that addresses the ‘actuaries of risk’ (Castel 1991; Ewald 1991; Webb 2006) 
in social work is a testament to this claim. Kemshall (2002, p. 13) argues that this 
actuarial model of risk is given expression within the ‘risk as probability discourse’. 
This discourse presents risk as meaning danger and hazards (Fraser, Richman & 
Galinsky 1999; Lupton 2004). Thus it is spoken of exclusively in the pejorative. Risk 
is also deemed to be a calculable object within this discourse (Dean 1999; Ewald 
1991; Hacking 1991) and the ‘reality’ of risk is considered self-evident (Culpitt 1999; 
Kemshall 2002). Indeed, to argue against the reality and obviousness of risk is 
presented as a naïve and reckless endeavour that compromises the safety of others 
(Culpitt 1999; Houston 2001; Kemshall 2002). Such claims are evident in the social 
work literature, for example, within debates concerning the real or constructed 
‘nature’ of child abuse (D’Cruz 2004a, 2004b; Houston 2001; Houston & Griffiths 
2000; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997). The logic of the argument is that certain 
activities are inherently risky, requiring a measured response on the part of policy 
makers and practitioners (Renn 1992). The same is also said of certain individuals 
(Dean 1999; Fox 1999; Kemshall 2002). That is, the probabilistic discourse of risk 
supports the view that certain people are more likely to experience risks or be a risk to 
others. For example, children and young people are often seen to be at risk by virtue 
of their age (Green 1997; Kelly 2001; Sharland 2006) and people with a mental 
illness are deemed to be either at risk or a risk by virtue of their symptomatology 
(Warner 2006).  
 
  
61 
Evidence of the sphere of influence of probabilistic thinking about risk in social work 
is apparent in the development of social work knowledge and practice. It sits at the 
heart of debates regarding the foundational sources of knowledge that are considered 
appropriate for guiding the development of social work theory and practice models 
(Parton 2001; Sheldon 2001; Webb 2001, 2006). According to Webb (2006, p. 126), 
the contemporary insurgence of an empirical focus upon the development of practice 
knowledge can be understood as ‘a response to growing fears of risk’, given that 
‘empirical realism…reassuringly purports to offer certainty, facticity, predictability 
and stability’. He notes the rise of ‘empirical realism’ in social work as signifying: 
the individualisation of practice interventions based on scientific criteria, 
with common sense precepts replacing depth interpretation and a 
preoccupation with unresolved desires…This shift also represents a 
closer link between applied and basic research and front-line practice… 
(Webb 2006, p. 121).  
The rise of ‘acutarialism’ (Horlick-Jones 2003; Lymbery & Butler 2004; McDonald 
2006; Webb 2006), short-term work (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006), increased favour 
with ‘research based’ practice models such as Evidence Based Practice (McDonald 
2006; Parton 2000; Webb 2001), as well as the ‘audit culture’ of human service 
organisations (Lymbery 2004; McDonald 2006; Webb 2006) can all be understood as 
reflecting realist conceptualisations of the ontological and epistemological properties 
of risk.  
 
These developments in thinking about risk in social work have had a corresponding 
impact upon the technologies used within social work practice, particularly in the 
areas of case or care management, risk assessment and in the increased use of 
information and communication technologies (Culpitt 1999; Garland 2003; Rose 
1996a; Webb 2006). It is argued that the probabilistic model of risk has the greatest 
likelihood of achieving accuracy in risk assessments, thus reducing the likelihood of 
social workers making mistakes in their practice (Green 2004; Lennings 2005; Munro 
1999; Parton 2001; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Tomison 2002; Warner 2003). 
Formal risk assessment measures are spoken of as increasing consistency and 
accountability in decision making (Goddard et al. 1999; Green 2004; Leschied et al. 
2003; Lester 2004; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997), and off-setting errors in human 
reasoning (Lennings 2005; Munro 1999). Nonetheless, it is recognised within this 
literature that solely relying upon technico-scientific practices is problematic in social 
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work (Firkins & Candlin 2006; Humphries 2003; Lennings 2005; Munro 1999; Shaw 
& Shaw 2001), though the resolution of how to achieve a balance between the two 
sources of practice knowledge appears unresolved. Thus reduction of the likelihood 
of harm occurring is stated as the goal of probabilistic assessments of risk (Houston 
2001; Lennings 2005; Munro 1999), although efficient use of services is also cited 
(Kemshall 2000, 2002; Munro 1999). Controlling error to foster correct identification 
of risk is therefore a primary epistemological concern of the probabilistic model of 
risk in social work. 
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The realist risk paradigm has been critiqued in the social work literature on the basis 
that it empties risk of its political and moral significance and functions (Craddock 
2004; Culpitt 1999; D’Cruz 2004a; 2004b; Dean 1999; Green 2004; Houston & 
Griffiths 2000; Kelly 2000; Parton 1996; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997) (discussed 
later in this chapter). Writers comprising this critical perspective also assert that the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the probabilistic model of risk are 
invalid (Culpitt 1999; Gillingham 2006; Houston & Griffiths 2000; Kemshall 2000; 
Parton 2001). The claims made against the validity of the probabilistic model reflect 
the essence of the postmodern critique that meta-narratives of scientific rationality 
and economics have failed to progress social development (Bauman 1995, 1997), and 
Beck’s (2003, 2004) and Giddens’s (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) recognition of the 
incalculability of late modern risks.  
 
Thus the quantification of risk is treated with immense scepticism within the 
burgeoning critical social work literature. This literature questions the validity of 
actuarial practices of risk assessment and management in social work in terms of:  
• the temporal distortion of risk as a future-oriented as opposed to retrospective 
activity (Goddard et al. 1999; Green 2004; Kemshall 2000);  
• the over-simplification of complex issues when attempting to establish causal 
explanations (Croft 2001; Goddard et al. 1999); and  
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• the disqualification of alternate sources of expertise, such as professional 
judgement and practice wisdom (Craddock 2004; Goddard et al. 1999; Green 
2004; Kemshall 2000; Parton 2000, 2001; Webb 2001).  
Drawing largely upon the critical perspective expressed within the risk society and 
governmentality theses, and Douglas’s cultural/symbolic analysis of risk, these 
challenges to the realist paradigm of risk amount to a comprehensive critique and 
foundation for alternative conceptualisations of risk in social work that foreground 
the uncertainty of knowledge about risk. Accordingly, for those who have embraced 
alternative ontological and epistemological paradigms of risk, the probabilistic 
discourse of risk is itself considered to be a risk to people (Gillingham 2006; Goddard 
et al. 1999; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Silver & Miller 2002). Its 
epistemological and value standpoints are considered by many to be inappropriate 
and undesirable as the sole basis for developing social work knowledge and welfare 
practices (Humphries 2003; Kemshall 2000; McDonald 2003; Parton 2000). 
 
Croft (2001) contends that if the meaning of ‘risk as uncertainty’ was more fully 
embraced within the welfare sector, practitioners would be able to realise a greater 
range of future possibilities for welfare clients. She distinguishes contingent risk (that 
which is a future possibility) from actual risk (‘that which has crystallised into 
something tangible’) (Croft 2001, p. 743). Thus Croft (2001, p. 745) suggests that risk 
could be reconceptualised as ‘a diachronic process during which the uncertainties of 
contingency may crystallise into consequences which may or may not give rise to 
further contingent conditions [original italics]’. Thus she argues that a more 
contingent understanding of risk would enable practitioners to be more flexible and 
responsive to risk ‘events’ and ‘consequences’ as they emerge, effectively bypassing 
the necessity to pre-empt and control for ‘risk’ and hence control clients.  
 
Parton (2001) offers a different perspective. He suggests that risk and uncertainty 
need to be held as two distinctly different entities and concepts within social work. 
Parton (2000, 2001) claims that much of the confusion that reigns in our profession in 
regard to risk is the result of the conflation of uncertainty with risk. His view is that if 
it could be accepted that social work knowledge is itself characteristically uncertain 
then the importance and value of professional judgement in decision making can be 
  
64 
recognised and supported (Parton 2001, p. 69). Parton believes this would avert the 
tendency to blame practitioners when things do not go as planned. Green (2004) 
makes a similar point. He states that ‘irreducible uncertainty’ prevails within the 
community services sector which in turn invokes the inevitability of error and the 
need for sound judgement. He claims that it is important to accept rather than deny 
that uncertainty characterises practice so that realistic outcomes and flexible, creative 
and professional responses to the risk-saturated environments of community care can 
be supported.  
 
Despite such attempts to reconfigure an alternate epistemology and practice of risk, 
there have been few successes at ‘speaking back’ to the dominance of probabilistic 
models of risk. A notable exception is Turnell and Edwards’s (1999) ‘Signs of Safety’ 
approach that has evolved from ‘Solutions-focused’ perspectives (DeJong & Berg 
2002; Milner & O’Byrne 2002; O’Connell & Palmer 2004). Nonetheless those who 
problematise the probabilistic model of risk claim that its practices are currently 
afforded greater legitimacy within the human services sector. It is argued that in 
combination the increased scrutiny by the public and managers of social workers’ 
decisions and an increasingly litigious mentality (Reamer 2000; Regehr et al. 2002) 
support the actuarial mindset that privileges a calculative attitude towards risk 
(McDonald 2006; Webb 2006). Within this context social workers are faced with the 
dilemma of how to comprehend the divide in knowledge about the nature of risk and 
how this knowledge operates within, and impacts upon, their practice. The 
politicisation of knowledge about risk within the critical social work risk literature 
may well have revealed how power operates in the construction and utilisation of 
such knowledge. However, it is also noted that presently there are few legitimate 
alternatives for taking this understanding into direct social work practice (Croft 2001; 
Shaw & Shaw 2001; Webb 2006).  
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In contrast to realist and objectivist paradigms of risk, morals and ethics are 
considered central, rather than peripheral or methodologically problematic, to how the 
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operations of risk are theorised and commented upon within the critical social work 
risk literature. Morality and ethics are a chief, though still relatively recent, concern 
of these writers. According to Ericson and Doyle (2003, p. 4), ‘the rise of risk entails 
an attendant rise in the new moralities of responsibility and accountability at multiple 
levels of society: institutions, organisations, communities and individuals’. In the 
following section of the chapter I review how the political implications of the moral 
and ethical nature and operations of risk have been theorised within the defining 
context of neo-liberal risk society in the critical social work risk literature. This 
illustrates the moral dilemma which social workers are confronted with, given their 
role in creating and sustaining risk-based client subjectivities in risk assessment and 
other interventions. I then present some recent suggestions from within the critical 
social work risk literature of how social workers might ‘speak back’ to the 
conservative and repressive morality of neo-liberalism.   
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As was noted in the presentation of the governmentality thesis in the preceding 
chapter, risk has been theorised as being employed as a key conceptual and rhetorical 
tool to displace government commitment to welfare provision (Culpitt 1999; 
Kemshall 2002; Parton & O’Byrne 2000). Recapping this argument, risk is 
discursively positioned within neo-liberal rhetoric as meaning actual (Castel 1991; 
Ewald 1991) or potential (Culpitt 1999; Kemshall 2000; O’Malley 1996) threat, harm 
and danger. As Douglas (2003, p. 24) remarks, ‘the word risk now means danger; 
high risk means a lot of danger’. Thus in relation to welfare debates, risk is employed 
as a ‘semiology of catastrophe’ (Culpitt 1999, p. 37; cf. Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996) 
to impress the seriousness and severity of the existing and looming financial crises of 
welfare (such as the ageing of populations and corresponding decline in birth rates in 
western countries). Fear is politicised within this rhetoric (Culpitt 1999; Furedi 2003) 
and harnessed to justify and promote the values of protectionism and prudentialism 
(Barry, Osborne & Rose 1996; Culpitt 1999; Green 2004; O’Malley 1996; Parton 
1999; Rose 1996a, 1996b).  
 
Within this context, risk becomes pivotal in the alignment between political and 
personal goals within an ethos of ‘private enterprise, wealth and self-reliance’ (Hewitt 
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1992, cited in Culpitt 1999, p. 15). The argument here is that the values of freedom, 
security and independence have been distorted within the political and economic 
rhetoric of neo-liberalism so that the ‘suffering of Others’ (Bauman 1995, 1997; 
Parton & O’Byrne 2000) no longer acts as a motivator of government response. 
Consequently a ‘new morality’ is fashioned, within which need is presented in 
pejorative terms as dependency (Culpitt 1999; Kemshall 2002). Welfare provision is 
rendered problematic at an individual and social level and is commodified in 
accordance with the imperatives of market sustainability and opportunity (Barry, 
Osborne & Rose 1996; Culpitt 1999; Kemshall 2002; Leonard 1997; Rose 1996a). 
Culpitt (1999, p. 147) pointedly remarks that: 
The language of risk and its various epistemologies reflects defence 
against risk, not satisfaction of needs. The effect of this in terms of the 
discourses about welfare dependency is a grand ‘emptying out’ of the 
validity of social rights… Previously, the legitimisation of rights 
presupposed the welfare state. The nature of welfare discourse has totally 
changed. Now the perspectives on governance, in an age of risk, imply 
that the proper role of the state is not the meeting of needs, and the 
satisfaction of rights, but protection against risk.  
 
This reconfiguration of welfare provision and social work practice through market- 
based interpretations of risk has had a profound impact upon how social work clients 
are discursively positioned within neo-liberal risk society. As Davies (1994, cited in 
Healy 2000, p. 46) states, ‘We can only ever speak ourselves or be spoken into 
existence within the terms of available discourses…’, thus welfare client 
subjectivities (identities) come to be constituted through references to neo-liberal 
discourses of risk that render need as a problem and hence those in need as similarly 
problematic. Reflecting an increasing interest in the construction of clienthood (Juhlia 
et. al. 2003; Taylor & White 2000; Warner 2006), consideration has recently been 
given to how client identities are constructed as risk-based identities. Clients are 
spoken of as ‘at risk’ of harm by others, or ‘a risk’ of harming others (for example, 
see Croft 2001; Fox 1999; Furedi 2003; Kelly 2000, 2001; Kemshall 2002; Krane & 
Davies 2000; Lupton 2004; McDonald 2006; Warner 2006). As Furedi (2003, p. 19) 
comments: 
The emergence of the ‘at risk’ concept ruptures the traditional 
relationship between individual action and the probability of some 
hazard. To be at risk is no longer only about what you do – it is also 
about who you are. It becomes a fixed attribute of the individual…  
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Similarly to be ‘a risk’ can mean being cast as ‘intractably risky’ (Rose 2000, p. 333). 
In this instance individuals are seen as ‘somehow faulty or incomplete, and [their] 
very nature thus seems to place them permanently beyond the limits of civility and its 
demands on subjectivity’ (Rose 2000, p. 334). Thus risk identities are flawed 
identities, or to borrow White’s (1995, p. 43) phrase, they are ‘spoiled identities’ and 
on this basis they are created as ‘Others’ (Bauman 1995, 1997, 2000; Culpitt 1999). 
To be ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’ is indicative of a moral lapse or failure to operate as a 
responsible, knowledgeable and rational individual (Burchell 1996; Culpitt 1999; 
Hannah-Moffat 1999). This construct of acceptable personhood is presented as 
necessary within neo-liberal welfare discourses to secure against risk at an individual 
and social level. Thus individuals and communities are ‘responsibilised’ for risk, 
whether they are the protagonist or ‘victim’ of actual or future harm (Hannah-Moffat 
1999; Kelly 2000, 2001; O’Malley 1996; Rose 1996b, 2000). 
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Social work is directly implicated in the construction of these risk identities. Our 
assessments and interventions actively construct clients as objects of risk (Fox 1999; 
Green 1997; Krane & Davies 2000; Parton 1999) and the ‘locus of risk’ (Warner 
2006). The task of social workers is to ‘remoralise’ clients so that they accept 
responsibility for themselves so that they can actualise as independent, productive 
citizens (Culpitt 1999; Kemshall 2004; Rose 1996a, 2000). As an object of risk, they 
are not recognised according to their humanity but as a constellation of risk factors to 
be studied, measured and corrected (Dean 1999; Green 1997; Houston & Griffiths 
2000; Kelly 2001; Moffat 1999; Parton 1999; Rose 2000). Service provision then is 
dependent upon the enumeration of risk factors (Kemshall 2002). As an object of high 
risk, clients are subject to a range of disciplining practices that act to reform, control 
and contain the potentiality of harm to or by them (Dean 1999; Lupton 2004; Moffat 
1999; Parton 1999; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000; Warner 2006). As an object of low 
risk, services can be denied (Green 2004; Kemshall 2002) in spite of apparent need. 
In either case, the consequence for clients is that they are invited to see themselves 
and recognised by others in terms of a deficit model of self for which they are 
charged with the responsibility for resolving.  
  
68 
Craft and Willis (2005) pointedly demonstrate in their study of the trajectory between 
child protection and the juvenile justice system for children in care that the creation 
and reinforcement of negative identities of clients by social workers has devastating 
immediate and long-term consequences. Warner’s (2006) study of the location and 
governance of risk in mental health yielded a similar result. Warner (2006, para. 29) 
warns that: 
The implications of locating risk in ‘dangerous individuals’ compared 
with locating it in specific symptoms of mental illness or in the wider 
social context in which individuals may find themselves are major. In 
simple terms, the ‘dangerous individual’ will be subject to quite different 
forms of constraint and surveillance – such as via the criminal justice 
system – compared with the one who is identified as ‘safe’ but for the 
risks located in their active psychotic symptoms when unwell. 
Thus the emergent critical narrative of the operations of risk in social work indicates 
the connection between client identities and the interventions that are implemented by 
social workers. These connections bespeak the morally conservative and repressive 
ethos of neo-liberal risk society. The dilemma which social workers face in this 
context is that the ‘new moralities’ of neo-liberal risk society are regarded as 
inescapable features of social work practice (Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Parton, Thorpe 
& Wattam 1997; Webb 2006). The challenge for us as social workers, then, is how 
we can act with moral and ethical integrity in our interventions within this context.  
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The pervasiveness of the conservative political and moral philosophy and practices of 
neo-liberalism that have come to shape contemporary social work in the risk society 
might easily be seen to have engendered a ‘politics of despair’ (Mullaly 2001) within 
our profession. As Lymbery and Butler (2004, p. 1) remark: 
many social work practitioners and students…experience a gap between 
the ideals that informed their entry into the profession – for example, a 
commitment to social justice and to making a difference in people’s lives 
– and the realities of practice with which they are confronted. 
Practitioners are struggling to survive (let alone thrive) as they 
experience externally imposed changes to their work that move them 
away from their personal and professional values.  
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It has been argued that the intellectual critique of ‘post’ theories of the emancipatory 
ideals and values of social work has further served to undermine the profession’s 
confidence to confront and appropriately respond to the grim realities of neo-
conservative, ‘post-welfarist’ rule (Hugman 2001; Mullaly 2001). Undoubtedly, the 
profession and the organisations social workers work in face significant challenges in 
this context, as Green (2004, p. 4) explains:   
How the ethical agency and its workers balance these competing 
demands and how they define the relative significance of the client’s 
present against the future are critical choices which will have a 
significant impact on the way a service defines what it considers to be the 
priorities for intervention. This process presents complex political and 
ethical dilemmas for agencies with respect to client rights to services 
which are risk taking, responsive and committed to their duty of care, 
while at the same time being protective of workers and the community. 
These are policy and practice issues of considerable complexity. 
Unfortunately most risk frameworks provide little assistance in their 
resolution, or do not even recognise their existence. 
However, Parton and O’Byrne (2000), McBeath and Webb (2002) and Webb (2006) 
suggest that the uncertainty that prevails within the conditions of late modernity can 
be utilised by social workers as a valuable form of response to the political and moral 
conservatism that is endemic to neo-liberal risk society. 
  
Parton and O’Byrne (2000) claim that social work is primarily a moral activity. 
However, they note that their notion of morality within constructivist social work is a 
very particular one that is ‘relevant to the uncertain times in which we live and the 
inherent ambiguity which we see as lying at the core of social work’ (Parton & 
O’Byrne 2000, p. 178). Drawing upon the work of Bauman (1995, 1997, 2000), 
Parton and Byrne (2000) discuss the importance of reconceptualising morality as 
moral responsibility. According to Bauman (1997, p. 3), ‘Moral life is a life of 
continuous uncertainty’. In this life we are constantly faced with the responsibility 
and burden of choice of how to act in regard to ‘Others’. This is particularly the case 
within the conditions of the risk society where the distance between deeds and their 
outcomes is immense, defying rational calculation. He claims that modernist ethical 
laws, based upon the principles of universalisation and reason, have resoundingly 
failed in their attempt to eliminate uncertainty, ensure ‘right’ decisions are made and 
progress the social good. However, rather than view this failure pessimistically, 
Bauman (1995, 1997) suggests the contingency and indeterminacy of our choices 
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provides us with an opportunity to be more conscious in our considerations of how 
our actions might impact on ‘Others’. He claims that: 
it is precisely because of the demise of the allegedly unified and 
ostensibly unique ethical code, that the ‘regulative ideal’ of moral 
responsibility may rise into full flight (Bauman 1997, p. 7).  
Therefore Bauman (1995, 1997) suggests that ambivalence and the burden of choice 
are simply inescapable within postmodern society. Essentially, he argues, we need to 
accept this and ‘deal with it’. What this also means is that we need to ‘re-personalise’ 
and re-engage with the ‘emotion of morality’ that is akin to compassion (Fox 2006; 
von Dietze & Orb 2000). Thus the primary question for us becomes ‘How can I act in 
response to the suffering and “unspoken demands” of the “Other” and thus act with 
the intent of being-for the “Other”?’ (Bauman 1997, 2000). 
 
Parton and O’Byrne (2000, p. 44) similarly claim that notions of ambiguity, 
indeterminacy and uncertainty are at the core of social work and should be built upon 
to open up the potential for creative and novel ways of thinking and responding to 
risk. Rather than viewing the uncertainty generated within the cultural context of 
reflexive modernisation as problematic, Parton and O’Byrne suggest it provides an 
opportunity for more considered, reflective and moral practice. However, they 
caution that in refusing to ‘hide behind the rules we are fully exposed to the anguish 
of responsibility and the consequences of our choices’ (Parton & O’Byrne 2000, p. 
180). Consequently: 
Logic, reason and ethics are brought down from their absolute, pre-
existent heights into the creative, contextual web of day-to-day action and 
decision making. It suggests that we shift from a conception of truth as 
discovery to a conception of truth as process, or put another way, we 
should focus on the how rather than the what of truth or virtue (Parton & 
O’Byrne 2000, p. 182). 
Thus Parton and O’Byrne (2000, p. 182) claim that: 
morality and responsibility are implied on each and every occasion we 
think and act. It is a concern with the question of the moral responsibility 
for the Other…which…has from the beginning been at the heart of social 
work.  
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In a similar argument, McBeath and Webb (2002, p. 1024) state that there is a need to 
‘develop an ethics of social work that is compatible with the facts of complexity and 
risk’. They note that reliance upon utilitarian and Kantian ethics, in combination with 
the defensive attitude toward decision making in social services, has diminished the 
possibility for moral agency within social work. Thus in common with Bauman 
(1995, 1997) and Parton and O’Byrne (2000), McBeath and Webb (2002, p. 1020) 
suggest it is important to reinstate the view of ‘persons-as-subjective-agents’ so that a 
situated and contextualised morality can be instilled in an effort to do ‘good’ social 
work. However, in a point of departure from Parton and O’Byrne (2000), Webb 
(2006, p. 201) argues ‘it is time for social work to embrace a core ethical framework’ 
in the service of defining ‘the ethical good of social work’. He optimistically proposes 
that ‘In some very important respects social work can turn the neo-liberal economic 
doctrine on its head by emphasising care, compassion, solidarity and shared values’ 
(Webb 2006, p. 11).  
 
More recently, Webb (2006) has argued that the moral identity of social workers is 
‘constituted in and through the taking of moral stances’. Following C. Taylor’s (1989, 
cited in Webb 2006) lead, Webb (2006, p. 204) states that what is important in this 
endeavour ‘is how we orient ourselves in relation to the good, and the way in which 
we negotiate and move in the ethical space we inevitably find ourselves in as human 
agents’. Webb (2006) claims that for social workers to become ethically ‘strong 
evaluators’ in the face of the self-interested ethics of neo-liberal risk society, we need 
to aspire to being a particular kind of moral person. In this endeavour, Webb (2006) 
claims five ethical perspectives are central to a ‘practice of value’. These are 
presented briefly below. 
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Webb (2006, p. 210) notes that ‘the value of the care relationship lies in its potential 
for compassionate ethical reciprocity’. An ethics of care is mostly associated with 
feminist ethics (Banks 2006; Hugman 2003; Meagher & Parton 2004), in which care 
is conceived as an ‘attribute of relation’ based upon connection as opposed to care 
being cast as an inherent virtue (Banks 2006, p. 59). Webb (2006, p. 216) argues that 
an ethic of care has great significance in the context of front-line practice. 
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The ethics of recognition emphasises human interconnectedness (Webb 2006) and 
inter-subjectivity (Culpitt 1999). The argument of this ethical perspective is that our 
sense of self, and experiences of ourselves in society, are founded upon how we are 
‘recognised’ by others. Lack of respect for persons fosters ‘damaged recognition’ 
which in turn, it is argued, legitimises and perpetuates social inequality (Culpitt 1999; 
Webb 2006). As Honneth (1995, cited in Culpitt 1999, p. 126) explains, the struggles 
of history have not been struggles of preservation, but a ‘struggle for the 
establishment of relations of mutual recognition’. Culpitt (1999, p. 126) notes that 
neo-liberalism ‘is preoccupied with the preservation of personal autonomy, not 
recognition of legitimate difference’, and in this regard neo-liberalism perpetuates 
self-interest over respect for others. Much of social work addresses the pain of 
misrecognition and the social inequalities and ills that emanate from it. Webb (2006, 
p. 218) claims that the relational nature of social work means that we are able to 
directly facilitate acceptance, support and encouragement in acts of ‘solidaristic 
acceptance and ethical concern’. 
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A number of authors suggest that Aristotelian virtue ethics, which include the virtues 
of justice, reflection, perception, judgement, bravery, prudence, liberality and 
temperance, support the construction of moral identities that enable social workers to 
act with greater moral purpose and effect (Clark 2006; McBeath & Webb 2002; 
Mangini 2000). The focus here is upon producing ‘good’ social workers who will 
make ‘good’ decisions because they are ‘good’ people. Thus, ‘The individual’s 
character and judgement are the stable reference point’ (Webb 2006, p. 220), which is 
considered important given that neo-liberal risk society is plagued with uncertainty 
and is oriented towards self-interest.  
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Social capital refers to the ‘norms and networks that enable people to work 
collectively to resolve problems and achieve common goals’ (Stone 2000, cited in 
Healy & Hampshire 2002, p. 227). It enables the creation of social cohesion. Webb’s 
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(2006, p. 222) argument is that social capital ‘depends on bonds of trust, reciprocity 
and obligation’ which generate a sense of solidarity. Thus, social capital ‘helps 
ameliorate the effects of the privatisation of risk and the morality of low expectation’ 
(Webb 2006, p. 222) by transforming the self-interested and privatised agendas 
endemic to late modern living into communal living. 
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Webb (2006) reaffirms in this final dimension of his ‘practice of value’, that ‘face-
work’ or direct service delivery by front-line staff is an important medium for helping 
people plan for and face the ‘fateful moments’ (Giddens 2000a) of their lives. The 
emphasis here is once again upon the value of creating relationships of trust and 
cooperation that ‘bind human beings together and furnish people with a sustainable 
self in the face of neo-liberal risk society’ (Webb 2006, p. 232). 
 
According to Webb, then, ethics is an important area of strength in social work; 
cultivated towards a practice of developing relationships based upon care, recognition 
and values, our profession could stand in strong opposition to the erosive power of 
the new moralities of neo-liberal risk society.  
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As has been discussed, the critical risk literature in social work argues that the social, 
political and cultural climate of neo-liberal risk society is heralded by the ‘risk 
orthodoxies’ (Kemshall 2004) of constraint, repression and control. Within this 
context clients and practitioners are conjointly ‘disciplined’ towards an awareness of 
and concern for risk and away from dependency (Culpitt 1999, p. 39). Subsequently, 
it is argued, the current mandate of social work is to assess, manage and control risk, 
as opposed to addressing issues of need (Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Waterson 1999). 
This redirection of focus sits at the heart of the critical perspective of how risk 
operates as a politically and morally constitutive force in social work. In this section 
of the chapter I canvas the critical analysis of the operations of neo-liberal risk 
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mentalities upon the practice environments and interventions of social workers. This 
review intimates a key practice dilemma for social workers, that being how to 
transcend the imperative of control within their interventions that is engendered by 
the conservative ideology of neo-liberal risk society. 
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The essence of the narrative of the critical social work risk literature is that social 
work has become subject to the constraining and ‘disciplining’ influence of 
managerial principles and practices whilst simultaneously acting as a key source of 
‘governance at a distance’ (Kemshall 2002; Parton 1999; Rose 1996a). It is argued 
that the mentality of neo-liberalism in combination with the malleability of the 
socially constructed nature of risk have infiltrated the ethos of welfare services with 
the policies and practices of ‘corporate managerialism’ and ‘economic rationalism’ 
(Barnes & Hugman 2002; Horlick-Jones 2003; Hugman 2001; Jamrozik 2005; 
Kemshall 2002; Leonard 1997; Morley 2004). In this context risk can be seen as 
having been strategically defined and rhetorically deployed as a key concept to 
facilitate the market-oriented goals of neo-liberalism within social work.   
 
The central concern of writers who argue a critical perspective regarding the politics 
of neo-liberal risk society is that risk has overtaken need as the primary focus of 
social work (Green 2004; Houston & Griffiths 2000; Kemshall 2000, 2002; Leonard 
1997; Moffat 1999; Mullaly 2001; Parton 1999, 2001; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; 
Waterson 1999). Without exception, this literature claims that a neo-conservative 
ethos now pervades the rationality and organisation of ‘social care’ and that this has 
become a defining context for: 
• managing social work as a profession (Hugman 2001; Kemshall 2002; 
Lymbery 2004; Mullaly 2001; Parton 1999, 2000, 2001);  
• practicing in terms of direct interventions (Dean 1999; Kemshall 2000, 2002; 
Parton 1999; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Rose 1996a);  
  
75 
• implementing professional ethics and values (Charles & Butler 2004; Green 
2004; McBeath & Webb 2002; Mullaly 2001; Rossiter, Prilleltensky & 
Walsh-Bowers 2000); and  
• developing relationships between social workers and clients (Charles & 
Butler 2004; Culpitt 1999; Green 2004; Lymbery 2004; Mullaly 2001; Parton 
1999; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Rose 1996a, 1996b).   
 
Within this literature, risk is spoken of as having profoundly disrupted the 
‘progressive politics’ of social work (Mullaly 2001), to the extent that the nature and 
goals of our profession have been radically displaced (Hugman 2001; Leonard 1997; 
Lymbery & Butler 2004). As Mullaly (2001, p. 306) observes: 
Caught in a social service system that is under-funded, understaffed, 
overloaded with demand and operated along industrial production lines, 
many social workers find themselves trapped between the economic-
rationalist efficiency goals of their agencies and the well-being of service 
users.  
Thus the radicalised nature of modernisation, increased individualisation, heightened 
reflexivity and the systemic nature of late modern risks (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 
2003a, 2003c) are recognised by writers of this narrative as having had a negative 
impact upon social work and those we work with. As Parton, Thorpe and Wattam 
(1997, p. 233) comment:  
Not only can changes in social work be seen to reflect these wider and 
rapid social and economic transformations, but the nature of social work 
is such that it is intimately implicated and involved.  
 
It is also argued in this literature that the conservative influence of risk as an 
instrument of neo-liberal rule in risk societies has far-reaching effects upon the lives 
of individuals, communities and practitioners and upon the domain of social policy. 
This is in evidence in all aspects of the welfare system, including: 
• the reduced provision of, and accessibility to, universal social and health care 
services (Culpitt 1999; Davis & Garrett 2004; Green 2004; Green & 
McClelland 2003; Kemshall 2002; Lupton 2004; Lymbery 2004);  
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• increasingly devolved responsibility to communities and individuals for social 
care and order (Green 2004; Kelly 2001; O’Malley 1996; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 
2000); 
• restricted entitlements to income support (Culpitt 1999; Jamrozik 2005);  
• an increased emphasis upon efficiency and effectiveness targets in the 
coordination and delivery of human services (Charles & Butler 2004; Green 
2004; Hugman 2001; Kemshall 2000; Mullaly 2001; Parton 1999; Parton & 
O’Byrne 2000; Waterson 1999);  
• greater demands for professional accountability (Green 2004; Parton 2001; 
Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Rose 1996a); and  
• attempts to standardise practice interventions (Dean 1999; Green 2004; 
Houston & Griffiths 2000; McBeath & Webb 2002; Mullaly 2001; Parton 
2001; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997).  
 
Hence risk is constructed within the critical social work literature as a repressive 
social, political and cultural ‘problematic’ (Parton 1999). 
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It is suggested the mentality of neo-liberal risk society has been instrumental in the 
trend toward ‘short termism’ in social work interventions (Green 2004; Webb 2006) 
and the increased use of case management in the place of case work (Culpitt 1999; 
Dean 1999; Webb 2006). As a consequence, opportunities for developing positive 
relationships based upon trust between social workers and clients, and between 
practitioners, are undermined. It is argued that this distancing in relationships is 
further exacerbated by the increased use of formalised and routinised assessments – 
the focus of which, it is claimed, is the ‘appropriate’ targeting of services as opposed 
to genuine efforts to alleviate suffering (Charles & Butler 2004; Kemshall 2004). 
According to Kemshall (2004, p. 128), risk assessment acts as a form of gatekeeping 
and diverts practitioners’ skills and time away from meaningful long term work with 
individuals, families and communities. Instead, practitioners are charged with the 
primary responsibility of controlling risk and in doing so, it is argued, they control 
their clients (Green 2004). Therefore through the personalisation of risk, individual’s 
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problems, as opposed to systemic and structural issues, become the targets of 
interventions. Adding to this grim narrative, Kemshall (2004, p. 129) states: 
Interventions tend towards the didactic, premised on appropriate 
information giving, instruction, sanctions, enforcement and inducement 
to make the ‘correct choice’. Those who fail to do so run the risk of 
having their eligibility reassessed or are confronted with compulsory 
correction or exclusion (for example, prison or mental health detention).  
Hence, Kemshall notes that technique wins out over clinical judgement in ‘what 
counts’ as good practice. 
 
As a defining context, then, it is argued that neo-liberal risk society positions 
practitioners in the unenviable position of experiencing both the regulative effects of 
being governed ‘at a distance’ whilst at the same time acting as agents of governance 
‘at a distance’ in the regulation of welfare clients (Craddock 2004; Kelly 2000, 2001; 
Rose 1996a, 2000; Webb 2006). Writers within the critical social work risk literature 
claim that social work practice has been reconstructed as a set of administrative tasks 
within which social workers are required to account for their actions according to the 
‘logic of risk minimisation’ (Rose 1996b, p. 349). Therefore, according to Parton and 
O’Byrne (2000, p. 1) social work has become ‘very defensive, overly proceduralised 
and narrowly concerned with assessing, managing and insuring against risk’. Parton 
and O’Byrne (2000, p. 8) continue: 
It is as if social workers are deployed to process needs in an essentially 
bureaucratic way and slot human misery into categories of risk and 
vulnerability…social work has become legalised and proceduralised 
where manuals, guidelines and lines of accountability are carried out in a 
functional way almost to the exclusion of any creativity or skill in dealing 
with human relationships. 
Hence Rose (1996a, p. 349) states that the role of practitioners is to:  
calculate and reduce the risk of their professional conduct, instruct the 
subjects of their authority in the riskiness of the practices and procedures 
in which they are engaged and manage their clients in the light of the 
imperative to reduce the risk they may pose to others… 
Thus various authors note that: 
• increased use of formalised and standardised risk assessment instruments 
(Craddock 2004; Parton 1996; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Webb 2006);  
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• the establishment of risk systems within departments and organisations 
(McDonald 2006; Webb 2006);  
• increased auditing of decision making (Charles & Butler 2004; Lymbery 
2004; McDonald 2006; Mullaly 2001; Parton 1996, 2001); and  
• greater reliance upon information technology and communication systems 
(Garland 2003; Webb 2006);  
 
have had the effect of exacerbating a focus upon risk, as opposed to need, in practice 
as well as exerting control over practitioners and clients. 
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Calculative regimes of audit and risk assessment are central to the rationality of 
regulation and security (Culpitt 1999; Ewald 1991; O’Malley 1996; Rose 1996a, 
2000), and in combination with a growing trend toward case management (Culpitt 
1999; Webb 2006), they form a triangulated methodology that vitalises the legitimacy 
of holding clients and social workers responsible when things go wrong. Thus 
Craddock (2004, p. 325), speaking of risk assessment in child protection, states: 
Risk assessments do not simply assess their object; they render users 
visible to audit. Ideally, what child protection workers assess are not 
social work values of relationship but audit values of numeration and 
completeness, complete in the sense of fidelity to those techniques that 
auditors deem important – and measurable. It is not simply parents and 
children who are being governed from a distance but child protection 
workers too. 
Therefore not only are assessments used to identify which clients might be ‘at risk’ 
and hence eligible or ineligible for services, social workers themselves feel at risk of 
being blamed for making poor decisions (Craddock 2004; Gillingham 2006; Goddard 
et al. 1999; Parton 1996, 2001; Regehr et al. 2002). Accordingly, Taylor (2005) notes 
in his study of risk concepts used by staff providing long-term care for older people 
that they felt fearful and vulnerable. They spoke of themselves as feeling ‘at risk’ of 
being blamed in their work place. In a related sense, Smith, McMahon and Nursten 
(2003) report that fear of disapproval and rejection by seniors and managers was one 
of five reported fears of employees in social service departments (see also Smith, 
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Nursten & McMahon 2004). This form of fear was strongly related to workers being 
concerned that they would be blamed or held to account for their own or others’ 
actions. Hence the critical social work literature claims social workers have become 
more defensive as practitioners adopt a ‘safety first’ stance in their approach to 
practice. 
 
According to Green (2004) and Titterton (2006), social work has failed to embrace a 
more positive meaning of risk as generative of change and opportunities through 
purposeful risk taking. Titterton (2006) states that risk has been central to ‘welfare 
dilemmas’, given practitioners are often faced with making difficult decisions in 
climates of uncertainty in which rights and responsibilities appear to conflict. Banks 
and Williams (2005) seem to make a similar point in their presentation of findings 
from their study of how social workers construct ethical issues, dilemmas and 
problems. Interestingly, two of the three examples presented in their paper revolve 
around the ethical difficulties practitioners encountered when they felt their practice 
was constrained by risk assessing instruments and schedules used in their 
organisations. Parton (1999) notes that taking risks in social care can widen and 
increase opportunities for empowerment, inclusion and diversity. Alaszewski and 
Alaszewski (2002) make a similar point. Adding his voice to this argument Green 
(2004) states that risk taking is important when working in complex situations. 
Furthermore he claims:  
An ethical service is a risk taking service in which its workers are 
supported to take risks…Risk minimisation and risk taking must be seen 
as equally legitimate…Therefore policies on risk taking are just as 
significant as those on risk minimisation (Green 2004, p. 11).  
However, given that the welfare sector is dominated by a ‘culture of blame’ (Parton 
1996), it is argued that fear, the undermining of trust and the need to control have 
overtaken and undermined the creative impetus and courage required to take risks in 
practice.  
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The critical risk literature in social work highlights that risk operates within the 
context of neo-liberal risk society to:  
• reinforce realist assumptions about the nature of risk and actuarial responses 
to risk (Parton 2000; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Webb 2006); 
• configure need as dependency (Culpitt 1999; Kemshall 2002; Leonard 1997); 
• establish ethical and moral imperatives for supporting readings of risk in 
terms of individual agency and responsibility (Culpitt 1999; O’Malley 1996; 
White 2003); 
• ascribe and reinforce ‘risk-based’ subjectivities (Parton 1999; Lupton 2004; 
Moffat 1999; Rose 2000); and  
• necessitate practices of surveillance, regulation and control of clients and 
social workers (Dean 1999; Moffat 1999; Parton 1999, 2001; Rose 1996a, 
1996b, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, risk is presented as operating with discursive power in the construction 
of professional identities and practices. In turn the nature of social work is directed 
away from a politics of action, and an ethic of care (Banks 2006; Hugman 2003) and 
recognition (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006), and towards a politics of economic security 
and an ethic of prudentialism (Culpitt 1999; Jamrozik 2005; Kemshall 2000, 2002; 
O’Malley 1996; Parton 1999; Parton & O’Byrne 2000). It is argued that the emphasis 
on risk calculations, increased surveillance of workers’ decisions and outcomes, and 
increased demands for efficient service delivery models indicate that it will be 
sometime yet before more reflexive, contingent and heuristic models of social work 
will be embraced in the risk-saturated environment of practitioners (Webb 2006).  
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The value of the critical narrative of the nature and operations of risk in social work is 
that it ‘troubles’ (Søndergaard 2002) the presumption that risk is socially, politically 
and culturally ‘innocent’ within our discipline. This alternate narration of risk 
clarifies that it operates as a powerful discursive construct in the production of client 
and practitioner identities and in the ‘production’ of social work more generally. The 
ubiquity of the constitutive force of risk as a rhetorical instrument of neo-liberalism 
clarifies the extent to which social work knowledge, morals and ethics, and practices 
have been colonised by its discursive power. However, several gaps exist within this 
literature. These are a lack of empirical research into the discursive nature and 
operations of risk, a lack of understanding of how social workers enact their moral 
agency when attending to matters related to risk in their interventions, and few 
suggestions for how social workers can ‘speak back’ to the moral conservatism 
engendered by the rhetoric of risk within neo-liberal risk society. 
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With few exceptions (D’Cruz 2004a, 2004b; Sharland 2006; Taylor 2005; Warner 
2006) the significance of the discursive attributes of risk to embodied aspects of 
social work practice has yet to become a focus of empirical study. Reflections by 
practitioners of how concepts of risk shape their practices at the local site of their 
interventions are generally missing from the social work risk literature. While social 
work’s theoretical understanding of risk has been developed in the critical social work 
risk literature, there are few studies based upon concrete data that consider how ideas 
about risk are experienced in the micro aspects of social work practice.  
 
Perhaps the im/material nature of risk (Adam & Van Loon 2000) has been an obstacle 
to making the concept of risk an object of study in social work within an alternative 
epistemological paradigm to objectivism. Locating oneself in a constructivist 
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framework to research risk would seem a fairly ‘radical’ act in view of the dominance 
of the realist/objectivist paradigm in risk research. Notable recent contributions to this 
‘brave’ endeavour is research by D’Cruz (2004a, 2004b) who explores the social 
construction of child abuse, Taylor (2005), who has recently studied the risk 
paradigms employees use in their work with older people in long-term care and 
Warner’s (2006) study of the ‘locus of risk’ in mental health social work. Another 
explanation for the lack of research into the constructed dimensions of ideas about 
risk may be that it is a ‘new’ topic in the social work literature. In either case, I 
suggest there is a need for social work research that links the theoretical analyses of 
the problematics of risk contained within the critical social work risk literature with 
direct social work interventions.  
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Review of the literature suggests that social workers are presented as primarily 
disenfranchised, passive and/or victimised within the majority of the critical social 
work risk literature. This viewpoint has five ramifications. First, the ethical agency of 
social workers in the construction of meanings of risk is negated. While the critical 
social work literature has begun to consider how risk impacts discursively in the 
construction of client identities, Juhlia et al. (2003) note that this area of research is 
only in its infancy and the link between research and practitioners’ ethical identities is 
even less apparent. A second related consequence is that risk is positioned within the 
literature as a form of power and an object that exists outside of social work and over 
which social workers have little control. Third, the localised meanings of risk 
generated by practitioners are unaccounted for. Fourth, the moral implications of how 
concepts of risk are utilised by social workers in their interventions, such as their 
consequences for clients, are de-emphasised. And fifth, how social workers actively 
resist the social, political and cultural conservatism of risk is disregarded. 
Appropriating Sharland’s (2006, para 36) comment, then, ‘Neither the life politics of 
reflexive individualisation, nor the determinism of social structuralism, nor the 
regulatory thrust of governmentality, is sufficient to explain the complex interplay of 
agency, structure and power involved’ in social work. Therefore, a research agenda 
wishing to disrupt this totalising viewpoint would question:   
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• By what means, at the site of social work interventions, does risk come to 
assume certain meanings and in turn act as a form of risk knowledge?  
• By what means, at the site of social work interventions, does risk act as a 
source of discursive influence in the construction of social work morals and 
ethics?  
• By what means, at the site of social work interventions, does risk act as a 
source of discursive influence in the construction of social work practices? 
 
These questions thus suggest the need for research that considers, first, how risk is 
constituted as a concept in social workers’ interventions and, second, how these 
conceptualisations of risk become integrated into social workers’ interventions. 
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Review of the critical social work risk literature would suggest that its narrative of the 
operations of risk in social work is a ‘catastrophe narrative’. The inescapability of the 
political and moral conservatism of the operations of risk is a dominant storyline 
within this literature. Risk is presented as a negative, as opposed to positive, construct 
which is endemic, as opposed to situational, to the practice of social work. 
Furthermore risk and need are theorised as being in opposition to each other within 
the context of the politics of neo-liberal risk society. As a consequence, little attention 
is given to how social workers might attend to both need and risk in practical terms in 
their day-to-day interventions. Speaking of risk in such totalising ways results in 
‘what risk gets attached to’ (Dean 1999) similarly being spoken of in totalising ways, 
most significantly in terms of social work practices and client identities and futures. 
Thus Green (2004, p. 9) notes that few practical options are presented in the literature 
for social workers to respond to the problematic dimensions of risk.  
 
This suggests a need for research that investigates how social workers are active 
agents, as opposed to passive subjects, in negotiating or resisting the conservative 
morality of ‘risk orthodoxies’. The work of Parton and O’Byrne (2000), McBeath and 
Webb (2002) and Webb (2006) gives support to the viability of such a research 
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agenda. Accordingly, two questions can be raised that attempt to disrupt fixed ideas 
about the inevitable problematic of risk in social work practice:  
• How do social workers, at the site of their interventions, engage with and 
respond to the social, political and cultural contexts that feature within their 
practice environments? and 
• How do social workers, at the site of their interventions, enact their ethical 
agency in their negotiation of the constitutive power of risk upon their 
practice?  
These questions add another dimension to a future research agenda in social work 
which considers examples of practice that tell an alternative story about the 
operations of risk in social work.   
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This chapter has considered how the politics of risk are narrated within the emergent 
critical social work risk literature. It has been noted that the concept of risk has only 
recently become a topic of analytic interest in social work. While risk may always 
have been a part of our profession, it has only recently attracted critical attention 
within social work (Green 2004; Parton 1996; Stalker 2003; Webb 2006). It would 
seem that neo-liberal risk society has come to define our practice context to the extent 
that our discipline has finally been forced to ‘take notice’ of risk. Consequently, in 
this chapter I have integrated and synthesised a diverse range of writings to produce a 
coherent critical narrative of the main concerns expressed in the welfare literature of 
the nature and operations of risk in social work.  
 
The final section of this chapter has considered the limitations of the critical narrative 
of risk in social work. In this section I have argued that as a ‘catastrophe narrative’, 
this literature limits a conception of an alternative story of the operations of risk in 
social work or of the possibility of social workers ‘speaking back’ to the repressive 
and conservative ethos of neo-liberal welfare discourses. Indeed, I have claimed that 
such a view fails to account for a more positive reading of the constitutive effect of 
risk within social work where practitioners actively engage in risk taking and sharing 
to facilitate positive outcomes for clients. Several writers have noted that a more 
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positive view of risk is required to invigorate the ethical impetus of social work 
(Alaszewski & Alaszewski 2002; Green 2004; Parton 1999; Titterton 2006). My 
research has therefore sought to establish whether the influence of risk is necessarily 
as totalising of our professional identities, and in turn our practices, as has been 
suggested by the ‘catastrophe story’ of risk encapsulated within the critical social 
work risk literature.  
 
I have suggested there are five research questions that emerge from these points of 
focus for social work research:  
• By what means, at the site of social work interventions, does risk come to 
assume certain meanings and in turn act as a form of risk knowledge?  
• By what means, at the site of social work interventions, does risk act as a 
source of discursive influence in the construction of social work morals and 
ethics?  
• By what means, at the site of social work interventions, does risk act as a 
source of discursive influence in the construction of social work practices? 
• How do social workers, at the site of their interventions, engage with and 
respond to the social, political and cultural contexts that feature within their 
practice environments? and 
• How do social workers, at the site of their interventions, enact their agency 
in their negotiation of the constitutive power of risk upon their practice?  
 
Drawing the themes of the literature together alongside the directions for research set 
by these questions, this chapter supports the conceptual and methodological focus of 
this research upon the operations of risk in social work practice. The aim of this 
research – to identify the spaces that exist within our practice contexts that enable 
practitioners to resist invitations into the moral conservatism of negative constructs of 
risk – is similarly supported. Accordingly, this research has questioned how ideas 
about risk are constituted and integrated into social workers’ interventions. The 
following chapter presents the theoretical framework that was used for developing the 
methodological focus of the study and the methods that were used for data collection 
and analysis. 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
[We must] appreciate the power of redescribing, the power of language to 
make new and different things possible and important – an appreciation 
which becomes possible only when one’s aim becomes an expanding 
repertoire of alternative descriptions rather than The One Right 
Description (Richard Rorty n.d., cited in Gergen 2002, p. 62). 
Shattered beings are best presented by bits and pieces (Rainer Maria 
Rilke n.d., cited in Bauman 1993, p. 1). 
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As noted from the preceding chapter, there are few examples of empirical research 
that have investigated how the macro theories of risk outlined in Chapter 2, and the 
problematics of risk raised in the critical social work risk literature discussed in 
Chapter 3, have relevance for the micro aspects of social work practice. My research 
has sought to address this oversight by investigating how ideas about risk are 
constituted and integrated into social workers’ interventions. In keeping with the 
emphasis of this literature upon the social, political and cultural dimensions of risk, a 
theoretical methodology congruent with constructivist and subjectivist epistemologies 
was necessary. Thus I argue in this chapter for a poststructuralist theoretical 
methodology to study the operations of risk in social work. Within this theoretical 
context the discursive attributes of risk became the focus for conceptualising the 
concept of risk in the study (as discussed in Chapter 1) and informed the 
methodological approach taken to engage with its embodied dimensions in social 
workers’ interventions.  
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The chapter begins with a brief overview of the main principles of poststructural 
theory. This discussion includes a review of the key debates that poststructuralism has 
sparked within social work and social research. After reviewing these controversies I 
reflect upon recent attempts to apply poststructural methodologies to the study of risk. 
This provides a platform from which I am able to discuss how poststructural theory 
has been incorporated into this study. In particular I note that the analytic medium for 
determining the methodological focus of the study has been a concern for how risk is 
‘spoken into existence’ (Søndergaard 2002) in social work practice. I argue for 
adopting a reflexive, iterative, qualitative research design and then present detailed 
information on how data was collected and analysed. 
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A key concern expressed within the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 is that the 
ontological and epistemological conceptualisation of risk within realist paradigms is 
problematic for social work knowledge, morals and ethics, and practice. The 
argument of this literature is that realist interpretations of the nature of risk ignore its 
social, political and cultural dimensions and ramifications. What emerges from the 
analysis of this literature is the need for a methodological approach of inquiry that is 
able to engage with the socially constituted ‘nature’ of risk. My argument in this first 
section of the chapter is that poststructural theory supports such an approach.  
 
,		
A diverse literature addresses the theoretical foundations of poststructuralism. It is 
well noted that writers who comprise this ‘movement’ attempt to elude categorisation 
of their theoretical perspectives and any one writer may be referred to as both a 
postmodernist and poststructuralist (Agger 1991; Alvesson 2002; Crotty 1998). 
Unsurprisingly, distinctions between ‘what is postmodernism?’ and ‘what is 
poststructuralism?’ are not always clear, as many writers within each perspective 
share similar theoretical concerns about knowledge and power (Agger 1991; 
Alvesson 2002; Crotty 1998; Healy 2000, 2005). Consequently the terms are often 
used interchangeably or subsumed under the broad and inclusive heading of ‘post’ 
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theory (Healy 2005). Agger (1991) attempts a distinction between postmodernism 
and poststructuralism in the following terms: 
poststructuralism…is a theory of knowledge and language, whereas 
postmodernism…is a theory of society, culture, and history.  
Healy (2005, p. 197) also states that postmodernists recognise that ‘the truths of 
modernity once made sense, but no longer do so’. In addition, she claims 
poststructuralists are interested in the politics of language and identity. In view of 
these somewhat tentative though workable distinctions between the two theories, I 
will refer specifically to poststructural theory as the orienting theoretical framework 
of this study.  
 
Poststructuralism brings together the ideas of a number of theorists whose shared 
concern, though expressed and investigated variously, is the instability of meanings 
which are constructed in discourses (Healy 2000). Originating in the structural 
linguistics of de Saussare (Ashenden 2005; Healy 2000) this perspective departs 
‘from notions of “essential” meanings or beliefs in a fixed, singular, logical order’ 
(Featherstone & Fawcett 1995, cited in Healy 2000, p. 39) with the consequence that 
positivism is ‘abandoned’ (Crotty 1998). Instead it is asserted that language creates 
understanding about the world. Language is organised into discourses which render 
our experience of the world and our sense of being in the world intelligible to 
ourselves and to others. As Parton (1999, p. 106) explains, a focus on discourse: 
gives weight to the linguistically constituted character of reality. This 
does not mean that discourses are ‘mere words’. Discourses are structures 
of knowledge, claims, and practices through which we understand, 
explain, and decide things. In constituting agents, they also define 
obligations and determine the distribution of responsibilities and 
authorities for different categories of people…They are frameworks or 
grids of social organization that make some social actions possible while 
precluding others.  
 
This has several ontological and epistemological implications. First and foremost it 
disrupts any essentialist notions of qualities being fixed to an entity, idea or 
experience (Crotty 1998; Fook 2002; Lather 1991; Wearing 1996; Weedon 1997). 
Instead, our understandings of the world, and our sense of self in the world, are 
  
89 
understood as historically and contextually situated circular interpretive exercises 
where we attempt to establish relationships between qualities and ‘things’. Derrida 
describes this process as ‘an infinite regress of signification’ (Crotty 1998, p. 205). As 
Healy (2000, p. 39) explains: 
meaning is constructed through discourses, which are always historically 
and contextually situated, and in any one context a number of discourses 
operate thus making possible competing interpretations of entities. 
Thus claims to truth can only be understood as partial representations (Haraway 1991; 
Mauthner & Doucet 2003; Weedon 1997).  
 
This being the case, the inscription of some meanings or discourses over others as 
‘truth’ reflects the operations of power (Alvesson 2002; Healy 2000). Foucault (1980) 
regards power and knowledge as inseparable, as he considers each implies the other. 
As Foucault (1980, p. 93) notes:  
There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of 
discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this 
association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power 
and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. 
By way of further explanation, Kress (1985, p. 52) notes, ‘language is entwined in 
social power in a number of ways: it indexes power, expresses power, and language is 
involved wherever there is contention over and challenge to power’. Hence language 
can be understood as a site of political struggle where competing ‘voices’ vie for the 
legitimacy of their truth claims, authority and status (Weedon 1997, p. 24).  
 
In this struggle for ascendancy of knowledge claims, various exclusions take place in 
relation to the social organisation of ideas, resources and people (Culpitt 1999). 
Hence discourse is constitutive of the material conditions of lived experience (Agger 
1991; Gergen 2002; Healy 2000; Kendall & Wickham 2000; Parton 1999; 
Søndergaard 2002). Discourses inscribe systems of differentiation, often through 
polarised categorisations of all aspects of life, be they systems of thought, a form of 
action, a type of emotion or an identity (Fook 2002; Gergen 2002; Scott 1988). These 
categorisations are cast in opposition to each other (Scott 1988) and are used to 
support practices of ‘ordering’ the natural and social world (Crook 1999). 
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Simultaneously and perhaps paradoxically ‘the coherence of discourse depends on the 
suppression of differences…thus neglecting the differences within each category and 
the commonalities across them’ (Healy 2000, p. 40). Thus discourses can operate 
with ‘totalising’ effects (White 1995).  
 
This understanding of discourse as socially, culturally and historically contingent has 
important ramifications for an understanding of identity. Subjectivity is also cast as 
contingent, meaning there is no ‘pre-social identity or essence’ (Healy 2000, p. 45). 
The way someone understands themself and is understood by others is said to be 
constituted through discourse and context (Davies 1997; Fook 2002; Moffat 1999; 
Søndergaard 2002; Wearing 1996; Weedon 1997). As Davies (1991, cited in Healy 
2000, p. 45) states: 
our patterns of desire that we took to be fundamental indicators of our 
essential selves (such as the desire for freedom or autonomy or moral 
rightness) signify little more than the discourses, and the subject 
positions made available within them, to which we may have access. 
Thus discourse and the subject positions within them are understood as ‘precarious, 
contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we 
think and speak’ (Weedon 1997, p. 33). Subjectivity can therefore be understood as a 
form of embodied discourse where it is possible to identify ‘the multiple imprints that 
institutions make on our bodies’ (Chambon 1999a, p. 59). Accordingly, how 
‘subjects’ are formed is of particular interest to Foucaultian theorists. As Foucault 
(1980, p. 97) argues: 
we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, 
progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of 
organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should 
try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of 
subjects.  
What is important from a Foucaultian perspective is that an examination of the 
constitution of subjects through discourse should rely upon the concrete operations of 
discourses. That is, discourses should be investigated for their effects – what they 
produce – as opposed to trying to discover their hidden meaning or ‘truth’ (Healy 
2000; Irving 1999; Kendall & Wickham 2000). Healy (2000, p. 41) notes that ‘it is in 
these operations, in the practical effects of discourse, that the form and limits of 
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discourse are exposed’. Thus how knowledge comes to assume the status of truth and 
acts with discursive power in matters of ‘subjection’ (Søndergaard 2002) becomes a 
focus for empirical poststructural research (Fine et al. 2000; Kendall & Wickham 
2000; Soobrayan 2003). 
 
,	.		
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Poststructuralism has become increasingly influential paradigmatically, theoretically 
and in terms of practice in social work and social research. Perhaps recognition by 
poststructural scholars and practitioners alike of the potential for researching and 
producing ‘transgressive counter discourses’ (Irving 1999) has supported its growing 
influence in these domains. Irving (1999, p. 43) says an agenda for transgressive 
counter discourses involves:  
an endless questioning of the systems of thought in which we are located 
and hence an opening up of realms of freedom accomplished through 
speaking the truths of the multiplicities that traverse the self.  
According to Healy (2000, p. 6) this can occur in social work through: 
interrogating and diversifying approaches to progressive change rather 
than abandoning these ideals altogether…poststructuralism denotes 
approaches to social change that are anti-dogmatic, pragmatic, flexible 
and contextually sensitive and that require activists to adopt a critically 
self-reflexive attitude towards the effects of their emancipatory ideals. If 
there can be said to be an aim of poststructural emancipatory politics it is 
towards the creation of conditions for ongoing dialogue and contestation. 
 
However, significant controversy surrounds the appropriateness of adopting 
poststructuralism as a theoretical framework in social work practice. In spite of 
Healy’s and other writers’ high recommendation of its analytic value and 
transformative potential for our discipline (Chambon 1999a; Irving 1994, 1999; John 
1994; Milner & O’Byrne 2002; Moffat 1999; Pease 2002; Pease & Fook 1999; 
Rossiter, Prilleltensky & Walsh-Bowers 2000; Saleeby 2006a, 2006b), a number of 
authors have made contrary claims (for example, Ife 1997, 1999; Piele & McCouat 
1997; Solas 2002; Trainor 2002). For these authors the ontological, epistemological, 
political and moral relativism of poststructuralism is considered problematic for 
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social work as it undermines the profession’s progressive ideological politics and 
weakens moral justifications for action. By way of explanation, McDonald (2006, p. 
79) states that ‘post’ theory: 
constitutes an epistemological challenge, in that it calls into question the 
profession’s knowledge base. It is also an ontological challenge if such a 
thing can be said to exist in relation to a profession. By this I mean that 
the notions that social workers might have about themselves as, for 
example, advocates and change agents are destabilized.  
 
Debates regarding the legitimacy and value of poststructuralism for social research 
also rage. There are clear synergies between the politics of poststructural theory and 
social research, particularly (though not exclusively) in qualitative, interpretivist 
research paradigms (Lincoln & Guba 2000; Schwandt 2000). The main focus of these 
paradigms is how matters of truth, ethics and politics converge in the construction of 
meaning (Soobrayan 2003). As Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005, p. 2) state:  
Qualitative research aims to elicit the contextualised nature of experience 
and action, and attempts to generate analyses that are detailed, ‘thick’, 
and integrative (in the sense of relating individual events and 
interpretations to larger meaning systems and patterns). 
Theoretical research paradigms, particularly standpoint perspectives such as 
feminism, ethnic and queer theories (Denzin & Lincoln 2000) have to varying 
degrees been influenced by poststructuralism and postmodernism. More broadly, 
poststructuralism has been integrated into social constructionist and subjectivist 
epistemological paradigms (Crotty 1998; Schwandt 2000).   
 
The extent of the influence of ‘post theory’ thinking in qualitative research is 
reflected in Denzin and Lincoln’s (2000) summary of the historical context of 
contemporary research. They state that at present: 
We occupy a historical moment marked by multivocality, contested 
meanings, paradigmatic controversies, and new textual forms. This is an 
age of emancipation, freedom from the confines of a single regime of 
truth, emancipation from seeing the world in one colour (Denzin & 
Lincoln 2000, p. 189).  
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However, Schwandt (2000) makes the point that the ‘interpretive turn’ engendered by 
‘post’ theories sets particular challenges for qualitative researchers with regard to 
their being able to speak about the plausibility of their interpretations, the goals of 
their research and, in related terms, the ethical and moral relations between researcher 
and the objects and subjects of their research. In addition, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) 
note that there are clear tensions between positivist, post-positivist, standpoint, 
constructivist and participatory paradigms. These contestations extend to debates 
regarding the foundational or anti-foundational nature of knowledge, the extent to 
which paradigms should be seen as discrete or fluid and how issues of representation 
can be addressed in research. Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005, p. 24) state that criticism 
has also been levelled at postmodern and poststructural research on the basis that its 
usefulness for knowledge building has not been proven, its methods of inquiry are 
suspect, and its theory and language are impenetrable.  
 
Social work research is increasingly engaging with interpretivist paradigms that have 
been influenced by post theory (Alston & Bowles 2003; Shaw & Gould 2001). Hence 
a concern for what counts as truth, and how such truths operate with discursive effect 
with regard to their ethical and political consequences for clients and practitioners, 
has become a recent and important research agenda in social work (Fook 1999, 2001, 
2002; Fook & Napier 2000; Juhila et al. 2003; Rossiter, Prilleltensky & Walsh-
Bowers 2000; Taylor & White 2000). Although it remains a contentious field of 
research, an already substantial literature continues to grow as researchers and 
practitioners engage with the complexities, opportunities and challenges posed by 
poststructuralism for studying and understanding the ‘social reality’ of clients and 
practitioners. 
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The applicability of poststructuralism as a theoretical orientation in social work risk 
research has been recognised by researchers who empirically study the problematics 
of risk. This has particularly been the case for researchers interested in the 
governmentality of risk in social work. These researchers typically focus upon how 
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the discursive attributes of risk are constitutive of policy (for example, Corby 2003), 
practices (for example, Holland 1999; Lester 2004; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997) 
and identities (for example, Sharland 2006; Warner 2006). More broadly, a 
constructivist approach is increasingly evident as social work researchers engage in 
empirical studies that consider the meaning of risk within various contexts (for 
example, Taylor 2005), how such meanings are created (for example, D’Cruz 2004a, 
2004b) and how they are used in the generation of professional knowledge and 
practice (for example, Kemshall 2000; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997). There are 
also a number of links between this kind of research and research that more broadly 
considers the ‘subjectification’ of groups of people such as social workers and/or their 
clients (for example, Craft & Willis 2005; Juhlia 2003; Juhlia et al. 2003; Moffat 
1999; Taylor & White 2000; Watkins 2006; White 2003). Taylor and White’s (2000) 
work is particularly instructive on this matter. They consider how performances of 
various conversational and textual strategies, alongside invocations of dominant 
discourses, are used in health and welfare settings to create and sustain professional 
and client identities. Their analysis indicates that ‘words and language have powerful 
consequences’ (Taylor & White 2000, p. vii) and reflect how knowledge is both 
created and used in practice settings.  
 
My research builds upon this emergent field of poststructural and constructivist 
inquiries into the study of risk in social work. The nexus of social work knowledge, 
morals and ethics, practice and risk were the original concerns of the study and 
poststructuralism provided a coherent theoretical framework for conceiving of them 
in research terms. Adopting a poststructural approach thus had important implications 
for how the study was conceived and implemented. Although some argue a pragmatic 
approach is more appropriate to inquiries into the multi-layered and multiple 
dimensioned realms of human understanding (Patton 2002; Shaw & Gould 2001), I 
believed a theoretical approach was appropriate for this study. As I discuss in Chapter 
1, having regard for the depth and breadth of the ontological and epistemological 
disputes that dominate discussions of risk in the social work literature meant that I 
had recognised the importance of being clear and consistent in my overarching 
theoretical framework. The methodological implications of having adopted a 
poststructuralist paradigmatic approach for the study will now be discussed. 
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Consistent with poststructural theory, I adopted Parton’s (1996, p. 98) view that the 
construct of risk can be understood as a way of thinking about the world. Thus I 
assume in this research that risk acts as an idea that influences how the things that 
come to be associated with it (such as events and people) are recognised (Dean 1999). 
I conceived of risk as a discursive construct for the purposes of this study. Given the 
basic premise of poststructuralism that ‘All forms of poststructuralism assume that 
meaning is constituted within language…’ (Weedon 1997, p. 22), I thus understood 
risk to be something that is ‘spoken into existence’ (Søndergaard 2002, p. 189).  
 
	
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This way of thinking about risk was inspired by Søndergaard’s (2002) suggestions for 
focusing poststructural empirical inquiries. Søndergaard (2002, p. 196) argues that the 
concept of ‘alienation’ as a deconstructive technique enables ‘the researcher to 
transgress the cultures she/he studies and so come to know them against the grain of 
their own discursive constitution’. Alienation in this sense corresponds with the 
concept of ‘Verfremdung’ involving ‘troubling’ ‘taken-for-granted discursive 
practices and categories' (Søndergaard 2002, p. 196). Identifying risk as a discursive 
practice and category in social work rendered it available to practices of alienation 
throughout the study. 
  
The epistemological interest of positioning risk in these terms is that how risk is 
spoken into existence becomes a viable and valuable focus for research. The 
emphasis on ‘how’ is important and deliberate. It situates risk as operating within an 
ongoing cycle of signification (Crotty 1998; Healy 2000) in which it acts with 
constitutive power to shape phenomena whilst simultaneously being subject to the 
processes that constitute it. Thus ‘how utterances work’ (Potter 1996, cited in 
Schwandt 2000, p. 197) becomes a focus for empirical analysis. Hence the 
contingent, dynamic, and embodied dimensions of risk in social workers’ practice 
became my interest. Accordingly I explored how the ‘idea of risk’ as a way of 
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thinking and as a discursive construct operated in social workers’ practice. 
Specifically, my research questions how ideas about risk are constituted and 
integrated in social workers’ interventions.  
 

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Naturalised meanings of risk were destabilised in this study of the operations of risk 
in social workers’ practice by asking ‘How is risk spoken into existence?’. Thus 
focusing on ‘risk talk’ was necessary to conduct the research. As can be ascertained 
from the discussion of poststructural theory in the preceding section of this chapter, 
positioning risk as a form of talk was not undertaken as a flippant, semantic whimsy. 
As noted by Weedon (1997, p. 24), language is intensely political. With particular 
reference to welfare work, Taylor and White (2000, p. 93) impress the point that: 
talk is not simply a resource (a neutral medium for supplying 
information) but a topic worthy of study in its own right. By 
problematizing talk we also problematize the client/professional 
relationship more effectively. We bring into focus the issue of ‘moral 
adequacy’, in particular the ways in which agencies expect clients to 
behave, and the ways in which clients ‘do’ (and resist doing, or failed to 
do) ‘moral adequacy’. By analysing talk we can make better sense of 
welfare work.  
Within this context a site in which risk talk was in operation needed to be identified 
for the study. Reflective accounts by social workers of their interventions were 
considered to be such a site. The credibility of this site for the research was that 
reflective accounts are indicative of practitioners’ ‘active processes of meaning 
making’ (Taylor & White 2000, p. vi; cf. Fook 1996; Fook & Napier 2000). 
Furthermore, using these accounts as data presences the voice of practitioners in 
theory generated about their practices. In order for practitioners’ voices to be heard in 
research plentiful direct quotes need to be incorporated into any writing of their 
accounts (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005). Having thus determined the site of the 
research, a methodological approach to the investigation needed to be determined.  
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A qualitative methodological approach was considered appropriate for this study. At a 
conceptual level, qualitative research is ‘concerned with understanding human 
behaviour from the informant’s perspective’ and ‘assumes [a] dynamic and negotiated 
reality’ (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 10). As ‘a set of interpretive practices’ (Denzin & 
Lincoln 2000, p. 6), qualitative analysis thus provides ‘insight into how people make 
sense of their experience’ (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005, p. 5). Qualitative research is 
inductive, ‘moving from specific observations or interactions to general ideas and 
theories’ (Alston & Bowles 2003, pp. 9-10) and is often used in exploratory research 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005, p. 5). Cresswell (1998, pp. 17-18) argues that qualitative 
methods should be used when: 
• the research question is concerned with the ‘how’ or ‘what’ of a phenomenon; 
• the study is exploratory and theories need to be developed; 
• a detailed view of the topic is required; 
• an understanding of individuals or phenomena need to be understood within 
specific contexts;  
• the researcher is interested in writing in the literary style where they use the 
pronoun ‘I’, perhaps to engage in a storytelling form of narration; 
• there is sufficient time and resources available to commit to extensive data 
collection and analysis; 
• ‘audiences are receptive to qualitative research’; and 
• the researcher’s role is that of ‘an active learner [original italics] who can tell 
the story from the participants’ view rather than as an “expert” who passes 
judgement on participants’. 
 
Each of these conditions was met within the context of this study. A qualitative 
approach thus reflects the ontological, epistemological and theoretical concerns of my 
research alongside its exploratory nature. 
 
Several qualitative methodologies were considered in the design of my research. 
First, narrative analysis was considered. According to Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005, 
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p. 125) narrative analysis ‘emphasises the narrative, or story-based, nature of human 
understanding’. Narratives have a: 
configuring plot, an overall structure within which the constituent parts 
make sense…the plot is constructed out of these parts, out of a succession 
of events, and the power of the story derives from understanding this 
sequence of events (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005, p. 129).  
This form of analysis considers how narrative plots or storylines and the 
characterisations of the subject positions made possible within them ‘are saturated 
with cultural meaning’ (Søndergaard 2002, p. 191). This understanding of storylines 
and characterisations assisted me in data analysis and informed my consideration of 
the implications of the results of my study. However, I did not conduct a narrative 
analysis of the operations of risk in social workers’ practice. My interpretive focus 
was more tentative than I thought narrative analysis would allow. I was concerned 
that narrative analysis would be too prescriptive a methodology for my purposes. It 
would impose its own structure and interpretive focus onto the data. I was also unsure 
if risk was going to be spoken of at all in social workers’ reflective accounts of their 
interventions. As discussed earlier, empirical research into the problematics of risk in 
social work has to date been specific to fields of practice, such as child protection and 
mental health. My research takes a broader focus, questioning whether social 
workers’ practice is being shaped in a more general sense by the ubiquitous influence 
of risk (Parton 1996).  
 
The second methodological approach considered for my study was discourse analysis. 
Quoting Marvasti (2004), Liamputtong and Ezzy ( 2005, p. 261) state that discourse 
analysis ‘can be defined as “a way of writing or speaking that constructs a particular 
type of knowledge with practical and rhetorical implications” ’. The discursive focus 
of my study has clear synergies with this methodological approach. However, this 
study of the operations of risk was not strictly a discourse analysis. My study did not 
consider the operations of a specific risk discourse in social work. I was concerned 
that a discourse analysis might result in an overly-interpretive and deterministic 
reading of the operations of risk in social workers’ practice. Zinn (2006, p. 13) notes 
that discourse analyses of risk have been critiqued on the basis of their inability to 
explain ‘differences in individual responses’. Zinn (2006, p. 13) states that ‘While the 
approach focuses on the institutional constitution of the subject, individual responses 
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to institutional ascriptions are regularly underexposed’. I identified this as a concern 
in my review of the critical social work risk literature in Chapter 3. I argued in this 
chapter (pp. 81 - 83) that there is a need for research that considers how social 
workers, at the site of their interventions, are able to negotiate the constitutive power 
of risk in their practice. I was not convinced that a discourse analysis approach would 
have enabled this focus. Thus I was concerned that this methodology might overtake 
the data (though I accept it could conversely have given it form).  
 
Given my more tentative approach to the exploration of the operations of risk in 
social work I favoured a more open-ended and general methodological approach. An 
iterative-generative research design (Bishop et al. 2002), which utilised the inductive 
process of constructivist grounded theory methodology as described by Charmaz 
(2000), was therefore adopted for the study. The attraction of this approach was that it 
‘fosters the researcher’s viewing the data afresh, again and again, as he or she 
develops new ideas’ (Charmaz 2000, p. 526). The process is iterative and generative 
on the basis that fieldwork and analysis occur simultaneously, sparking new ideas that 
lead to further fieldwork and analysis. This requires considerable flexibility on the 
part of the researcher as well as the capacity to ‘trust the process’. The spirit of this 
form of inquiry was well matched to the manner in which I had approached my 
research. Accordingly the design of my study evolved into a symbiotic process of 
fieldwork and analysis over an extended period of time, as I explored if and how risk 
was spoken of in social workers’ reflections on their interventions.  
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Within the context of this methodological approach a method of data collection 
needed to be chosen which could facilitate an in-depth understanding of the meanings 
attached to the ideas being researched as they progressively emerged. Two options 
were considered for achieving this: a text analysis of written reflections of 
practitioners’ interventions, and/or face-to-face interviews with practitioners where 
they spoke directly to an interviewer about their interventions. The second option was 
favoured over the first primarily because of the time and effort that would be required 
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by practitioners to complete the writing exercise. I thought this would be a 
disincentive to participation.  
 
Interviewing is a common data collection method in qualitative research generally 
(Minichiello et al. 1995), and alongside textual analysis in its various forms is 
favoured by poststructural and postmodern researchers (Fontana & Fey 2000). In 
interviewing, the ‘text of talk’ (Gubrium & Holstein 2003) becomes the focus for 
analysing the constitutive elements of discourse upon knowledge and identity. Thus it 
was decided to conduct a series of in-depth interviews (Minichiello et al. 1995) with 
practitioners where I incrementally examined the presence, substance and processes 
that constituted risk in social workers’ articulations of their interventions. Fook’s 
(1996, 2002) critical reflective approach to practice-based research was used to guide 
how the interviews were conducted. This approach can also be understood as an 
iterative-generative methodology (Moffat et al. 2005) relying upon processes of 
reflectivity and reflexivity (Fook 1999, 2002). Accordingly this approach to 
interviewing was congruent with the poststructural paradigm of the study.  
 

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Minichiello et al. (1995, p. 247) state that the ‘aim of data analysis is to find meaning 
in the information collected. Data analysis is the process of systemically arranging 
and presenting information in order to search for ideas’. However, data analysis 
appears to also be one of the most contentious stages in the interpretive process in 
poststructural research. Perhaps one reason is that as researchers it is the moment that 
we are unambiguously involved in solid practices of constructing the ‘truth’ or 
knowledge about a phenomenon. Of course the whole research process involves us in 
the production of truth (Mauthner & Doucet 2003; Soobrayan 2003). Since the 
‘discovery’ of reflexivity during the ‘postmodern turn’ (Alvesson 2002; Lincoln & 
Guba 2000) we have been invited to acknowledge and reflexively monitor how our 
positionality interplays with the generation of research questions, methods and data 
(Charmaz 2000; Fook 1999; Lincoln & Guba 2000; Mauthner & Doucet 2003; 
Soobrayan 2003). However, in making sense of data, attending to the postmodern and 
poststructural critiques of the production of knowledge has become a significant 
challenge for researchers. As Alvesson (2002, p. 1) quoting Rosenau (1992) states, 
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‘The challenges post-modernism poses seem endless. It rejects knowledge claims, 
obscures all versions of truths, and dismisses policy recommendations’. Commenting 
specifically upon data analysis, Alvesson (2002, pp. 2-3) argues:  
In many forms of qualitative study…the assumption is that data, carefully 
processed, can guide the researcher to understand specific phenomena 
and develop theory…This great faith in data and empirical inquiry as a 
cornerstone in knowledge development has been challenged by a 
multitude of intellectual streams during recent years. 
There is a sense then that data analysis in the postmodern age presents a no win 
situation for social researchers – we are in the double bind of being dammed if we do 
and dammed if we don’t address methodological rigour in analysis.  
 
This dilemma troubled me as I considered how I would analyse my data. I was one of 
those researchers who were caught in this double bind. To disregard methodological 
processes of rigour in analysis in favour of the ‘hypersceptical understandings’ 
(Alvesson 2002, p. 15) of postmodernism and poststructuralism would leave my 
research open to questions over its credibility and relevance. To follow a 
methodological process of discovery, in which the data was able to ‘speak for itself’ 
made me vulnerable to regressing to essentialised notions of social reality and single 
versions of truth (Angen 2000; Charmaz 2000). My sense of dilemma was 
exacerbated by the lack of direction available in research texts on how to resolve 
these matters in practice. While I had taken to heart Patton’s (2002, p. 432-433) 
observation that ‘No abstract processes of analysis, no matter how eloquently named 
and finely described, can substitute for the skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, 
diligence, and work of the qualitative analyst’, I was still uncertain how to progress in 
real terms. Discourse analysis and narrative analysis provide instruction about how to 
conduct these forms of research. However, poststructural research in a more general 
sense is yet to see the translation of its philosophical critique into ‘the action-related 
principles and ideas on how to produce and make sense of empirical material’ 
(Alvesson 2002, p. 4).  
 
To resolve this impasse I began to envisage the two stages of data analysis that would 
comprise my study from a ‘reflexively pragmatic’ (Alvesson 2002) view. By means 
of clarification of the term, Alvesson (2002, p. 15) notes that: 
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Reflexivity means a bridging of the gap between epistemological 
concerns and method, trying to combine more philosophically informed 
aspects with what one is doing on the field. Pragmatism means a 
balancing of endless reflexivity and radical scepticism with a sense of 
direction and accomplishment of results. Pragmatism here means that one 
is not too concerned about the philosophical and methodological 
imperfections of doing social inquiry. All truth claims are problematic, 
yes. It is still worth trying to give our best shots on how to understand 
social issues, and empirical work can be valuable here, at least if one can 
avoid all the problems involved. 
Being reflexively pragmatic in this research meant that I decided upon an analytical 
medium for ‘entering’ the data that was consistent with my concern for risk as a 
discursive construct. This medium was to ask the general question of my data, ‘How 
is risk being spoken of in social workers’ reflective accounts of their interventions?’. 
My reflexive engagement with the question centred upon my continuously asking 
myself, and encouraging my research supervisors to ask, the following: 
• Can I hear the voices of the participants or is it my theorising that is 
dominant?  
• How do I respond to hearing risk spoken in these ways? What insights does 
my response yield about the data?  
• What ethical issues arise for participants and me from my understanding risk 
in these ways? How can I address these? 
• Am I enforcing a pattern upon how risk is being spoken of, or are patterns 
present? 
• What am I not hearing? What does not seem obvious to me?  
• What doesn’t ‘fit’ with my ideas and what does this suggest? 
 
These questions guided the practice of my analysis. However, they also guided me 
towards achieving an ethical stance in relation to the management, analysis and 
reporting of the data (Angen 2000; Lincoln & Guba 2000; Soobrayan 2003).  
 
Having adopted this focus, a reflexive process of coding could begin, as described by 
Charmaz (2000) in her account of constructivist grounded theory. While grounded 
theory has been criticised for being overly positivistic and reliant upon objectivist 
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methods, Charmaz (2000, p. 510) argues that ‘we can adopt grounded theory 
strategies without embracing the positivist leanings of earlier proponents of grounded 
theory’. Charmaz (2000, p. 510) continues: 
The power of grounded theory lies in its tools for understanding 
empirical worlds. We can reclaim these tools from their positivist 
underpinnings to form a revised, more open-ended practice of grounded 
theory that stresses its emergent, constructivist elements. We can use 
grounded theory methods as flexible, heuristic strategies rather than as 
formulaic procedures. 
Accordingly, constructivist grounded theory techniques were utilised in data analysis.  
 

A poststructural theoretical framework offered me a valid conceptual structure for the 
study. It supported the conceptualisation of risk as a discursive construct within the 
research and the focus upon the operations of risk in social work practice. 
Accordingly the research question of ‘how are ideas about risk constituted and 
integrated into social workers’ interventions?’ brought together the ‘what’ and ‘how’ 
of risk. These two aspects of ‘social reality’ are increasingly the focus of qualitative 
research (Gubrium & Holstein 2003, p. 215). Considering how risk was spoken of 
within social workers’ reflections on their interventions provided a concrete link 
between the idea and practices of risk. Having a regard for the ‘partial, provisional 
and perspectival nature of knowledge’ (Mauthner & Doucet 2003, p. 416) suggested 
the need for a methodological approach that would be sensitive to the emergence of 
new ideas from fieldwork and analysis and allow for an in-depth understanding of 
meanings. This iterative methodological process was mirrored in the reflective and 
reflexive methods adopted to guide the conduct and analysis of interviews. A 
poststructuralist paradigm (Cresswell 1998; Lincoln & Guba 2000) provided a 
coherent framework for operationalising the theory and processes of this research. It 
was considered the most appropriate means of achieving the study’s aim, that being to 
identify the spaces that exist within social workers’ practice contexts which enable 
practitioners to resist invitations into the moral conservatism of negative constructs of 
risk.   
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This section of the chapter presents details about the methods that were used to 
generate data for the research. The section begins with an overview of the contexts in 
which the research took place and a presentation of the research design. This is 
followed by a discussion of the sampling method, the ethical issues that needed to be 
addressed in the design of the research, and the processes used to conduct and analyse 
interviews.  
 
	
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This research was conducted in Tasmania, Australia. The geography and demography 
of the state, alongside my professional history, were key contexts for shaping this 
research. Practitioners from around Tasmania were invited to participate in the study 
and the sample was derived from each of the four major population centres. This 
required a considerable amount of travel on my part. Approximately 3750 kilometres 
were travelled over the duration of the study. The distances involved in accessing 
participants had practical consequences for the study’s design. It contributed to 
determining the small sample size, given the time and economic resources that were 
required for travelling. It also meant that fieldwork tended to be conducted in ‘blocks’ 
so that practitioners living in a defined geographical area could be seen over one or 
two days thus limiting the amount of repeated travel I did to the same area. 
Nonetheless, as the kilometres travelled indicate, few ‘short cuts’ were taken in the 
process of accessing the study’s sample. My willingness to travel beyond the bounds 
of where I live in the northern region of the state to speak directly to participants 
engendered a great deal of goodwill amongst potential and actual participants. People 
appreciated that they could participate in the study without having to travel and that 
they were not excluded from participation on the basis of where they were 
geographically based. These issues of access and participation have significance for 
those of us living in Tasmania. 
 
Being a small community of practitioners, challenges were faced in guaranteeing 
anonymity to research participants. Social workers are generally well known to each 
other in Tasmania and few clues are required to identify people. Naming a geographic 
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area, the type of work done or even indicating speech patterns could have been 
identifying in the research. However, my being known to others was useful in 
recruiting people to participate in the study. As a member of the Tasmanian social 
work community and as a social work academic, practitioners directly knew me or 
knew of me by word of mouth. Established relationships and associations with people 
undoubtedly impacted upon the willingness of people to participate in the study and 
the quality of the research data. Hence while each context posed pragmatic 
constraints upon the design of the research with regard to limiting the sample size, it 
also afforded valuable opportunities, particularly with regard to the willingness of 
people to speak in detail with me about their experiences. 
 
$

Reflecting the methodological issues discussed in the preceding section, the research 
was designed according to a two-staged approach to data collection and analysis. 
Adapting Fook’s (1996, 2002) critical reflective approach, I asked practitioners to 
discuss with me an intervention they had implemented that was significant to them. 
For the purpose of this research an intervention was a deliberate act taken by a 
practitioner in response to their judgement that the action was necessary or justified. 
The breadth given to what counted as an intervention in this research was deliberate. 
The aim was to cast the field of social work practice as widely as possible to 
determine if ideas about risk were present in generic social work practice. It didn’t 
have to be a critical incident; it just needed to be something that was meaningful to 
them. For all but one practitioner (who described an intervention with colleagues) this 
involved their work with a client.  
 
In asking practitioners to talk with me about their intervention a retrospective account 
of practice was produced. Banks and Williams (2005, p. 1007) note that ‘These 
situated accounts necessarily are versions constructed for a specific occasion and 
recipient’ – that is, the interviewer. Accordingly they should not be ‘presented or 
analysed…as unproblematic reflections of “what really happened”. Like all such 
retrospections, their formulation is at least partly determined by the situation of their 
production…’. Thus the focus of my questioning and analysis was on reflective 
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accounts of practice as opposed to establishing the ‘truth’ of what actually happened 
in practice. 
 
As a means of generating deeper understandings of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of risk, 
practitioners were interviewed twice about a single intervention they had conducted. 
In the first stage of data collection the goal was to establish if risk was being spoken 
of as present in social workers’ reflections of their interventions. If this was the case 
then the goal of data analysis was to produce tentative understandings of general 
ways in which it was being spoken of by practitioners. The goal of the second stage 
of data collection was to contradict and/or confirm and/or develop my understanding 
about practitioners’ ideas about risk in their interventions. The goal of the second 
stage of data analysis was to produce a detailed understanding of how risk was 
spoken of by practitioners in their reflections, combining their comments from both 
interviews.   
 

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The sample comprised 18 social workers from across Tasmania. As noted above, 
geography was a consideration in determining the sample size. However, the primary 
consideration was the need to have a core group of practitioners who could spend 
considerable time with me to explore their understandings about risk in their practice. 
In keeping with the iterative design of the research, I planned to meet with each 
practitioner at least twice to discuss their interventions. This amounted to a total of 36 
long, in-depth interviews being completed. Each interview took between two and four 
hours, so each practitioner participated in four to eight hours of interviewing. This 
was a considerable investment of their time and energy, and many participants had to 
see me outside of their work hours. In total 88 hours of interviewing was recorded. 
Within the context of in-depth and repeated interviews, the sample size was adequate 
to ‘support the desired analyses’ (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005, p. 49). Utilising a 
smaller sample enabled me to obtain a large amount of extremely detailed and 
personal data about what social workers were thinking about, feeling and responding 
to in their interventions.  
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Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005, p. 44) state that: 
The objective of sampling in qualitative research is fundamentally 
different from that in quantitative research…Sampling in qualitative 
research is not concerned with ensuring that the findings can be 
statistically generalised to the whole population. Rather, sampling in 
qualitative research is purposive. The aim is to describe the processes 
involved in a phenomenon, rather than its distribution.   
As mentioned above, the sampling frame (Babbie 2002; Grinnell 1999; Liamputtong 
& Ezzy 2005) of the study was broad. To be a participant in the study, practitioners 
needed to be eligible for membership with the AASW and to be currently residing in 
Tasmania. Participants also needed to have worked in the welfare industry. They 
could have been employed on a permanent or casual basis, full-time or part-time in 
social work or other roles. However, a stratified purposive sampling method 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005, p. 47) or quota sampling method (Alston & Bowles 
2003, p. 89) was also used. The sample was stratified according to years of practice 
experience. Before proceeding with the research I had wondered if risk might mean 
different things and be experienced differently by practitioners depending on their 
years of experience in the field. Furthermore, I wanted to pay heed to the importance 
of context in supporting how meanings of risk are generated. 
 
The sample was stratified according to the following criteria: 
• less than two years’ practice experience working in the welfare industry since 
obtaining a social work qualification; 
• between two and four years’ practice experience working in the welfare 
industry since obtaining a social work qualification; and 
• greater than five years’ practice experience working in the welfare industry 
since obtaining a social work qualification. 
 
Six participants were sought for each group, comprising at least two men in each 
group. 
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To begin the recruitment phase of the study, 150 Letters of Invitation (see Appendix 
1) and an Information Sheet (see Appendix 2) were sent to social workers around the 
state. This figure was chosen on the basis that it could yield a 10 – 15% response rate 
that would enable me to obtain the required sample size. The names of potential 
participants were taken from a database of practitioners used by the School of 
Sociology and Social Work. The database was greater than 150. Reducing it to this 
figure was achieved by using every second name on the database until 150 names had 
been collated. Potential participants were asked to telephone or email if they wished 
to express their interest in participating. 
 
The response was overwhelming. Fifty-two practitioners contacted me by telephone 
or email during the recruitment phase. Of these, 13 decided that they would not be 
able to participate due to time constraints. Several practitioners also contacted me 
after the deadline for expressing an interest had passed. Most respondents were from 
the north and north western regions of the state, possibly because I know more 
practitioners in these regions than in the south. The names and contact details of 
potential participants were compiled into a data base.  
 
Given that I had a greater number of participants than I required by the end of the 
recruitment phase I needed to select participants. To do this I divided the sample pool 
into the three stratified sub-groups according to years of practice experience. I 
identified the male social workers in each group and randomly selected two names 
per group. This ensured the quota of males for the sample was obtained. The 
remaining female social workers in each group were then randomly selected. Having 
identified the sample, I contacted people who had been selected by telephone and 
email and organised a time for their first interviews. I also contacted practitioners 
who had not been selected by telephone and email, many of whom expressed a desire 
to participate in later stages of the research if it was required.   
 
4
Alston and Bowles (2002, p. 21) note that ‘ethics is a vital part of every research 
project’. Alongside standpoint theories, a key contribution of postmodern and 
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poststructural theory in social research has been its systematic dismantling of the 
view that research is and should be an ethically and politically neutral exercise 
(D’Cruz & Jones 2004; Fine et al. 2000; Lincoln & Guba 2000; Schwandt 2000; 
Soobrayan 2003). Positionality, emotion, morality and politics are regarded as vital 
components of the research context that must be considered to establish ‘ethical 
validation’ (Angen 2000). Within this context, Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005) argue 
that ethics need to be addressed in two ways. First, research ethics must be attended 
to in procedural terms by obtaining ethics approval from relevant authorities. Second, 
the researcher must engage in reflective and reflexive practices about their 
positionality and politics throughout the duration of the research. Both of these 
stratums of research ethics were incorporated into this study.  
 
Before implementing the study, I was required to gain ethics approval from the 
University of Tasmania’s Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. In the 
process I had to identify the potential for harm to occur to participants. As the study 
unfolded other nuanced understandings of the ethical ramifications of the research 
became apparent. Most of these understandings came to light through reflecting upon 
my research practices. They are discussed here alongside of the steps taken to address 
them. 
 

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Participants were at risk of being identified in the reporting of the study. As 
mentioned above, Tasmania is a small state and practitioners are well known to each 
other. Complete anonymity was not possible for participants as I would know each 
participant by sight given I would be doing in-depth face-to-face interviews. In 
addition, although I would transcribe the majority of interviews, I had funding to help 
me to complete this task due to illness. Furthermore, when practitioners spoke with 
me about their interventions they referred to other people. Care needed to be taken to 
ensure their anonymity as well. To address these concerns I took the following 
measures: 
1. Identifiable information such as names, ages, position titles, work places and 
location were omitted from transcribed material and the reported results. The 
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only identifiable information retained has been social workers’ comments 
about their experiences as new graduates in their workplaces.  
2. Pseudonyms were given to all people who featured in practitioners’ stories. 
They have been used in the recording and reporting of findings.  
3. Data was collapsed into themes, highly unusual information was not reported 
and complete stories have not been included. 
4. All research data have been kept in secure locations. 
5. My commitment to confidentiality and the anonymity of participants was 
outlined in the Information Sheet given to participants.  
6. Participants were asked to make a commitment to maintain the anonymity of 
people they spoke about in their interventions. This undertaking formed 
Clause 9 of the Consent Form (Appendix 3). 
7. Professional transcribers were asked to make a commitment to not discuss the 
details of the transcripts with anyone other than the researcher. They were 
also asked to take measures to ensure the information was secure while it was 
in their possession. 
8. I regularly attended supervision sessions with my research supervisors and 
submitted written work to them. The potential for participants to be identified 
in my work were discussed and addressed. 
9. Participants were also told of the limits of confidentiality in the research 
process. If I had cause to believe that there was a risk of their intending to 
harm, or that they had already harmed, someone I would need to report this. 
Accordingly, I asked that participants kept this in mind as they decided what 
they would tell me in the research interviews. 
 
4		
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Participants could have become upset while talking about their interventions. 
Participants were asked to speak about an intervention they had implemented that was 
significant to them. For many participants these interventions were significant to them 
because of the feelings they stirred. I was also concerned participants might feel 
embarrassed or uncomfortable if they became upset. Furthermore I thought there was 
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the potential for practitioners to feel as though I was judging or evaluating their 
practice. Fook (2001) expressed a similar concern in her study, conducted with 
Napier and Ryan (2000), which investigated the development of professional 
expertise. Given discussion in the social work risk literature of the predominance of 
the ‘culture of blame’ (Parton 1996, 2001; Green 2004) within social work services, I 
was keen to avoid this potential. A related issue was that I did not want to trivialise 
the materiality that practitioners accorded to their ideas about risk. While I had 
adopted a constructivist and subjectivist understanding of risk, I did not want 
practitioners to sense that I had minimised the ‘reality’ of their understandings and 
experiences. Finally, I was concerned practitioners could feel fatigued, given the long 
interview process.  
 
To address these concerns I took the following measures: 
1. I conducted each of the interviews. I thought I was an appropriate interviewer 
because of my training and experience.  
2. I was committed to acting with integrity as an empathetic interviewer 
(Fontana & Fey 2000). I was clear that the aim of my research was to identify 
the spaces in practice situations where social workers can resist the 
conservative potential of negative constructs of risk. However, while I am 
somewhat embarrassed to confess this, I had anticipated that practitioners 
would more often than not speak about their reluctance to confront the 
conservative influence of risk. I had expected a ‘catastrophe narrative’. To 
assist me to achieve my aim of being an empathetic interviewer I spoke 
openly about my thoughts and assumptions in supervision sessions and 
postgraduate meetings. I maintained a journal over the duration of the study. I 
challenged myself to remain open to the surprises of the data. Asking how 
risk was being spoken of during data analysis assisted me in this endeavour. 
3. I took great pains to clarify to practitioners that I was not evaluating their 
practice. I spoke with each participant about this at the beginning of each 
interview and it was also stated in the Information Sheet. While my 
commitment to this was constant, it was a more difficult goal to achieve than I 
had anticipated. While I was able to conduct myself in a non-judgemental 
way during the interviews, I later found myself wanting to applaud the actions 
of some whilst questioning the actions of others. To interrupt this, I journalled 
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my thoughts after each interview. I looked through these reflections to 
determine where I was making judgemental statements and then planned to 
act differently. I also took advice from my research supervisors when they 
thought I had begun to make judgements, particularly in data analysis and the 
writing up of results.  
4. In a related sense, I did not directly question the efficacy of practitioners’ 
work or thinking in the interviews. Instead I asked practitioners how they 
arrived at their understandings about their situations, or what enabled them to 
act in the ways that they did. Thus I tracked the processes of meaning-making 
and action rather than questioning why they thought their actions were 
correct. This avoided an intimating judgement and validated the ‘reality’ of 
their perceptions. 
5. Participants were reassured that they would not incur any penalty or 
disadvantage if they decided not to take part in the research, or withdrew from 
the research at any point.  
6. Participants were told explicitly that the research would be used to produce a 
thesis, journal publications and conference presentations. 
7. If participants had any concerns about my conduct they were invited to 
contact my supervisors or other university staff. 
8. Participants were asked to name the time of day that would suit them to be 
interviewed. 
9. Participants were told that they could interrupt the interview at any stage and 
have a break. They could also stop their interviews if they felt tired. 
10. The space between the first and second interviews was negotiated to suit the 
needs of participants.  
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In-depth interviews were the data source for this study. Minichiello et al. (1995, p. 
68), quoting Taylor and Bogdan (1984), state that in-depth interviews are:  
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repeated face-to-face encounters between the researcher and informants 
directed toward understanding informants’ perspectives on their lives, 
experiences or situations as expressed in their own words. 
The repeated nature of in-depth interviewing was important in this study. It enabled 
me to establish rapport and trust with participants which facilitated their being able to 
talk in an open manner about the significant intervention they had implemented. 
However, aside from supporting the collection of quality data, the repeated nature of 
the interviews generated an empathetic relationship between me and the practitioners. 
This was an important ethical goal to achieve in its own right. It limited the potential 
for negative judgements on my part, created an intimate environment to share strong 
emotions and allowed things to be spoken of that had not previously been spoken. 
This enabled the interviews to have a transformative effect upon the practitioners. 
Many participants said that their participation had left them with new insights about 
their work, they felt ‘unburdened’, they had been able to resolve matters for 
themselves and they had gained new ideas about how they could reflect upon their 
practices in the future. In addition the repeated nature of the interviews ensured my 
familiarity with practitioners’ stories which enhanced the depth of understanding 
about the operations of risk that emerged during data analysis. 
 

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Two interview schedules were used throughout the course of data collection. The goal 
of the first interview was to establish whether risk was present in social workers’ 
reflective accounts of their interventions. I deliberately omitted asking questions 
about risk. I wanted this data (if it was there) to emerge from the participants, as 
opposed to it being imposed by me as a meaning of their practice. Banks and 
Williams (2005) used a similar process in their study of social welfare practitioners’ 
constructions of ethical issues, problems and dilemmas. Thus my aim in the interview 
was to elicit a detailed description of an intervention and to track the key decision-
making moments that occurred throughout the history of the intervention. 
 
The first stage of data collection relied upon the use of an open-ended, semi-
structured interview schedule (Minichiello et al. 1995) that was comprised of three 
core questions. These were: 
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• What is the significant intervention you would like to discuss?  
• How did you come to an understanding about what you would do?  
• What is important that I understand about the meaning of this story for you?  
 
The remainder of the interview relied upon the use of recursive questions 
(Minichiello et al. 1995). Prompts were noted on the interview schedule and used if 
necessary (see Appendix 4). Basic reflective listening skills were employed, such as 
use of empathy, paraphrasing, summary statements, and reflections of meaning and 
feeling (Bolton 1987). I asked practitioners what they were thinking, feeling and 
responding to during each decision-making moment. Thus the process of constructing 
the retrospective account of the intervention was the primary focus of this first stage 
of data collection.  
 
In many respects this first interview reflected Fook’s (1996, 2002) model of critical 
reflection involving critical deconstruction. Integrating these ideas into the recursive 
nature of the interview meant that I listened for: 
• the main themes or patterns that emerged in the descriptions that practitioners 
gave about their interventions;  
• terms, phrases and patterns of communication that were frequently repeated;  
• labels and categorisations and evidence of binarised opposites; 
• who the players in the story were; 
• perspectives that were represented and those that were missing; 
• interpretations and explanations that practitioners gave;  
• how explanations were represented; 
• the influence of personal and external contextual factors such as gender, 
political affiliations, social group affiliations, cultural considerations, type of 
work being done, years of practice experience and place of work; 
• the knowledge and assumptions that were used, such as practice theory, value 
and belief systems, paradigms, formal theory, moral and ethical codes, policy 
and legislation; 
  
115 
• roles or positions that this knowledge and these assumptions supported;  
• who stood to gain or lose from holding these ideas; and 
• the practices, systems or structures that were upheld by these assumptions. 
 
I was not asking participants to critically deconstruct their practice with a view to 
reconstruction (Fook 2002). It was more a case of my gathering this information to 
reinscribe a deconstructive focus of risk in my analysis of the interview material. That 
is, I was going to ask how is risk being spoken of in each of these layers of critical 
reflection. This meant that I asked questions in the interviews such as, ‘How is it that 
you came to care so much about your client?’; ‘What seemed important to you at the 
time? How come?’; ‘What was it like being faced with this?’; ‘How were you able to 
do that when you were so fearful?’; and ‘Did you consider other ways of dealing with 
this?’. 
 
The second stage of data collection relied upon a more structured in-depth interview 
process (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 63) similar to Shaw and Gould’s (2001, p. 144) 
description of a ‘problem-centred interview’. Following analysis of the data obtained 
from the first interviews, I determined that risk was being spoken of in social 
workers’ reflective accounts of their interventions. I also thought that ideas about risk 
were being spoken of in particular ways. To check whether my analysis was correct 
and to elicit further information I constructed a second interview schedule (see 
Appendix 5). This comprised of several key areas of questioning: 
• the meaning of risk; 
• how ideas about risk impacted upon practitioners’ thoughts about clients; 
• how ideas about risk impacted upon practitioners’ thoughts about themselves; 
• how these ideas impacted upon the decisions that were made; 
• how ideas about risk related to practitioners’ moral judgements about what 
they should do; 
• how ideas about risk impacted upon practitioners’ ideas about change; and 
• how practitioners were able to make sense of the place of risk in their 
interventions. 
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While I saw myself as guiding the construction of a story in the first interview, my 
role and presence in the second interview was more deliberate. I established the 
parameters for the discussion by creating the interview schedule which I sent to 
participants before we met for the second interview. I believed this interview would 
involve practitioners in a deeper level of analysis than their first interviews and I 
wanted them to feel prepared rather than overwhelmed. In anticipation of our meeting 
practitioners spent considerable time preparing for the interview, writing copious 
notes about how they had ‘reflected upon their reflections’ in light of the questions on 
the second interview schedule. Our discussions in this second interview then were 
extremely focused as I drew out the refined understandings practitioners had about 
the presence and operations of risk in their interventions. 
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Two pilot interviews were conducted before formally commencing data collection. 
These interviews were conducted with experienced social workers that I knew and 
who met the basic criteria for participation. The process of interviewing was the same 
as that planned for initial data collection and analysis. Both interviews were 
invaluable as a form of training for the data collection period as well as serving to 
highlight procedural matters. These interviews clarified: 
• the emotional content of the interview for practitioners and myself; 
• the need for me to be gentle in the way I asked questions; 
• that I needed to situate recursive questioning in the contexts of reflections 
upon meaning, content and feeling; 
• the importance of remaining focused upon practitioners’ decision-making 
pathways in terms of the decisions that were made, what influenced their 
decisions and the consequences of decisions for practitioners; 
• the importance of attending to the language used by practitioners; 
• the value of taking notes throughout the interview; 
• the importance of a staged approach to data collection and analysis; 
• that I was using clear and straightforward language; and 
• that the process was a valuable exercise for practitioners. 
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After completing the interviews I discussed the experience with my research 
supervisors and made the necessary adjustments and inclusions to the first interview 
schedule and plan. 
 
Interviews were conducted between March and November 2004. After selecting 
participants, I contacted them by email and telephone to verify that they were still 
willing to participate in the research. This being the case, a date, time and location for 
the first interview was decided. While a small number of practitioners were able to 
meet during work hours in their work places, the majority of practitioners preferred to 
meet in their homes or if in Launceston, at the University of Tasmania. Meeting away 
from work premises promoted the anonymity of research participants. No matter the 
location or time of day, I met people with my interview schedules, tape recorder to 
record the interviews, note book and pen, a box of tissues and a box of chocolates. 
Usually practitioners offered me hot drinks and providing the chocolates was 
something I could offer in return. If we met at the University I would take flowers 
into the room that I was using to make the environment more comfortable. I would 
also offer various refreshments. On one occasion I was invited to meet with a 
practitioner over dinner in her home. Time was taken before the interviews proceeded 
for me and participants to become reacquainted if we already knew each other or to 
become acquainted if we were meeting for the first time. 
 
At the first interview I checked that people had read the Information Sheet and asked 
if they had any questions, which I answered. I reiterated the care I would take with 
them, particularly with regard to their anonymity and the confidentiality of their 
information, that I would be sensitive to any distress they might experience and that I 
would not be judging their interventions. I then asked participants what they would 
need from me to feel comfortable while talking to me about their interventions. This 
amounted to establishing a form of ‘contract’ between us, common to that used in 
interpersonal interviewing (DeJong & Berg 2002; Milner & O’Byrne 2002).  
 
During this preamble to the interview, participants often expressed doubts that their 
stories would be good enough or that they would not have enough to say about their 
work. Recognising this as an opportunity to clarify that I would not be judging 
  
118 
participants’ actions, I responded by saying that any information they were willing to 
share would be appreciated and valuable. I re-stated that their practice was not being 
evaluated and that I recognised that practitioners work in difficult and ambiguous 
situations. Perhaps my years of practice experience added to the genuineness of this 
statement being recognised by participants, as invariably the interview progressed. An 
Informed Consent form was then distributed. On this form, participants were asked if 
they were aware of the conditions of their participation in the research. They were 
asked to tick the appropriate box on the form if they gave permission for their 
interviews to be transcribed by somebody other than myself. They were also asked to 
indicate if they would like a copy of the final results chapters. With this formality 
completed, the interview began by me asking the first question from the interview 
schedule.  
 
Some practitioners came to this first interview having already thought about the 
intervention they would speak about. For others it was not as clear, so time was given 
to support people in their choice of intervention to discuss. It was thus important not 
to be too concerned about the time the interview took, other than in terms of the limits 
imposed by practitioners. Having a second interview planned meant that if we did run 
out of time and something wasn’t spoken it could be addressed in the follow-up 
interview. Each interview lasted on average two hours, with some lasting as long as 
four. Given the length of these interviews regular breaks were taken which provided 
an opportunity to gather our thoughts and to continue the process of relationship 
building. However, such breaks also helped provide space from the intense emotion 
that often accompanied the telling of practitioners’ stories. Practitioners expressed 
their fears, doubts, anger and intense sorrow about the circumstances surrounding 
their clients, colleagues and own lives. These emotions also had their effect upon me 
and it was not uncommon, both for me and participants to draw a tissue from the box 
I carried with me.   
 
The second interview followed a similar process to the first. The difference was that 
the interview was more structured, though there was considerable room for 
practitioners to discuss topics and issues that were relevant to them. After re-
contacting participants and making a date and time to meet as well as establishing the 
location of the interview, the second interview schedule was sent by post to them. The 
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second interviews were generally no more than two hours in duration. 
Overwhelmingly the responses of participants in these interviews confirmed my 
initial theorising of the data generated from the first interviews. My understandings 
were extended as practitioners offered more focused insights about the meaning and 
operations of risk in their interventions. At the completion of the interview I thanked 
participants for their generosity of time, insight and candour. I re-contacted 
participants on occasion during the remainder of the research process, first to invite 
them to choose a pseudonym and then on several other occasions to inform them how 
the research had progressed. 
 

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There were two primary phases of data analysis, each corresponding to the staged 
approach taken to interviewing. However, to speak of it in these terms belies the 
recursive process that characterised how the data was transformed to more abstract 
concepts and theories consistent with a constructivist grounded methodology 
approach (Charmaz 2000). While there were two historical moments that defined the 
implementation of two different methods of data analysis for the interviews, the 
process of analysis itself was gradual, reflective, incremental and conceptually 
complex. It was also time intensive. In this section of the chapter I present an ordered 
account of this process that ‘troubled’ (Søndergaard 2002) how risk was spoken of in 
social workers’ reflective accounts of their interventions.  
 
0
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The audiotapes of all the first interviews were transcribed verbatim into Word 
documents. This amounted to 712 pages of data. Identifying information was deleted 
and pseudonyms were given to participants. Throughout the interviews I had taken 
detailed notes about what was being spoken about in the interview. This served three 
purposes:  
• it provided a backup in the event that the tape recorder failed;  
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• it produced something concrete during the interview that participants and I 
could look at as we attempted to make sense of various aspects of their 
stories; and  
• it provided an immediate data source that could be used in the generation of 
ideas to progress the research that was not reliant upon the completion of a 
transcript. 
 
Transcription was a slow and difficult process during this stage of the study. Illness 
impeded completion of transcribing in a timely manner. Eventually I was able to 
enlist some help in completing the task. However, having the notes from the 
interviews alongside the tapes and the gradual compilation of completed transcripts 
meant that I could progress the first stage of data analysis. 
 
This first stage of analysis was essentially a thematic analysis (Liamputtong & Ezzy 
2005). In this process I ‘listened to the data’ (Rubin & Rubin 1995) to determine 
whether risk was being spoken of in the interviews. My initial impressions during the 
interviews and reading my notes afterwards had suggested to me that it was. 
However, I thought it was important to listen more attentively and systematically for 
indicators of its presence. This occurred by my developing an open coding system for 
the multiple ways I heard risk being spoken of. These codes were kept within a 
handwritten coding book (due to problems with being able to type), and recorded as 
general themes and concepts (Minichiello et al. 1995). This process involved listening 
for: 
• repeated words, phrases and concepts; 
• use of the word ‘risk’ or similar words and phrases such as ‘danger’, ‘harm’ 
and ‘out there’; 
• events or occasions that stirred strong emotions of all kinds in the participants 
and/or myself; 
• particularly descriptive, elegiac and eloquent passages of speech; 
• contexts which were spoken of as being important to practitioners; 
• times when practitioners spoke of feeling uncertain or troubled by a situation; 
and 
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• the interplay of what was being spoken with how it was being spoken. 
Having completed this analysis within each interview, open codes were collated and 
compared between interviews during the process of axial coding. Similarities and 
differences between codes ascribed to each interview were noted. In this review core 
categories began to be established according to meanings, events and processes that 
appeared to be associated with risk. Tapes and notes were listened to and read once 
again to check that these categories could be heard in the data. At this point data 
analysis stopped.  
 
It was clear that risk was being spoken of and in very particular ways in the 
interviews, particularly with regard to how clients and practitioners were identified as 
being ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’. Nonetheless I was still not certain about the intricate detail 
of how ideas of risk came together in social workers’ interventions. I had some initial 
thoughts which I wrote in my journal, but in the spirit of reflexive pragmatism 
(Alvesson 2002) and constructivist grounded methodology (Charmaz 2000) I did not 
want to impose these thoughts upon the data without checking their relevance with 
practitioners. Therefore I used the core categories that had been identified in the first 
stage of data analysis to construct the second interview schedule.  
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After completing the second interviews with practitioners the second stage of data 
analysis commenced. This analysis was comprehensive. The second phase 
incorporated the data generated from both interviews, comprising 1213 pages of 
completed verbatim transcripts taken from audio tapes that had been entered into 
separate Word documents. I went into this second phase of data analysis with a clear 
analytic focus. Whilst I still asked how risk was being spoken of within the 
transcripts, the data was further ‘troubled’ (Søndergaard 2002) by asking:  
• How is the materiality of risk spoken into existence by social workers? and 
• How do social workers take up the discursive practices of risk as their own 
and how do they negotiate them? 
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At this point I decided to use NVIVO, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
program, as a means of managing the large amount of data that had been generated 
from the interviews. I created 18 ‘cases’ in NVIVO, one for each practitioner. I then 
transported their two interviews into their ‘case’. Coding then began by coding line 
by line according to a combination of the headings used from the second interview 
schedule, the guidelines used for coding in the first stage of analysis outlined above 
and spontaneous thoughts. These codes were of two types: descriptive (what the 
narrative was about) and interpretive (what the narrative suggested). This generated 
multiple ‘free nodes’ or open coding categories. At the completion of this process 
relationships between ‘free nodes’ were identified and the coding system was refined. 
Descriptive coding tended to be replaced by interpretive codes at this stage as 
relationships and patterns in the data began to be identified. The move to selective 
coding took place by considering the applicability and lack of applicability of codes 
across all cases. Once this task was complete documents were printed of the data 
entered against each of 12 core categories and their subsidiary themes. Throughout 
the process I completed a coding journal where I hand-wrote ideas that occurred to 
me as I coded. I also used the journal to record my reflections about the coding 
process. 
 
At this point in analysis I began to feel a loss of connection with the stories as a 
whole. Practitioners’ reflective accounts seemed too fragmented in these excerpts for 
me to have a sense of the complete versions of their stories and a sense of the 
embodied people behind them. During the interviews I had thought that I had 
developed an empathetic understanding with people about the circumstances of their 
interventions and I began to feel the loss of a similar empathetic connection in data 
analysis. To rectify this situation I decided to work with both the computer generated 
analyses as well as hard copies of complete transcripts. This enabled data analysis to 
progress to a deeper level of understanding about the operations of risk and this is 
when the move to more abstract conceptualisations of the data took place.  
 
Using the analysis that had been generated with NVIVO, complete transcripts were 
read again to delineate the moments in which practitioners: 
• spoke about risk in particular ways; 
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• referred to risk; 
• spoke about risk in association with an event or circumstance;  
• spoke about risk in association with people, including themselves; and 
• drew conclusions about their interventions. 
 
Notes and final codes (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005, p. 271) were recorded in the 
margins of the hard copies of transcripts. Having completed the task, three conceptual 
matrices were developed for exploring the relationships between meanings of risk, 
client and practitioner identities and practice dilemmas. Considerable time was spent 
refining the concepts attendant to these matrices so that patterns in the data, as well as 
variations, could be accounted for. The data belonging to each matrix that had been 
divided into sections were compiled into three bound books. Wide margins in the 
‘final’ product of the analysed data allowed further refinement of each category to 
occur as the writing up of results progressed. These three matrices comprised the 
theoretical framework for presenting the results of the study in the three data chapters 
of this thesis and they have been incorporated in tables in each of these chapters. 
 
Finally, the writing process was also important to the achievement of an end result in 
the analysis. This process allowed for detailed feedback from, and discussion with, 
my research supervisors. I presented my findings at local and international 
conferences which generated considerable interest and ideas about the research. Two 
articles (Stanford 2007a, 2007b) were also submitted, serving to sharpen the focus of 
the arguments of the research.  
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This chapter has discussed the theoretical paradigmatic framework that was used to 
support my position as the researcher in the study and the study’s design. Within this 
context the research focus of the operations of the risk in social work has been 
supported as a legitimate research topic. In addition the research question ‘How are 
ideas about risk constituted and integrated into social workers’ interventions?’ has 
also been demonstrated to be theoretically relevant. Its value in supporting social 
  
124 
work knowledge about risk had previously been established in Chapter 3. However 
the theoretical rigour of the question gains further credibility in view of the arguments 
developed in this chapter. Furthermore, the aim of the research to identify how 
practitioners are able to resist invitations into the moral conservatism of negative 
constructs of risk can be understood as having practical and theoretical relevance. It 
positions this research in opposition to the totalising assumption that social work is 
necessarily subject to the moral and political conservatism of risk embedded in 
contemporary risk discourses. It also clarifies my moral and political commitment as 
a researcher to the generation of a ‘practical philosophy’ (Lincoln & Guba 2000, p. 
179) that is potentially transgressive in social work (Irving 1999). 
 
The methodological and method implications of the theoretical paradigm of the 
research have also been clearly delineated. The chapter demonstrates the synergy 
between the philosophical and practical aspects of the study, suggesting the 
congruence of the study’s theory and practice. Within this context the research design 
and the methods used for data collection and analysis can be understood as being 
predicated upon a desire to achieve theoretical, methodological, interpretative, 
evaluative and reflexive rigour (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005, pp. 38 – 44). Conducting 
repeated interviews with a small number of participants has allowed depth in 
understanding the operations of risk in social work practice. The following chapter 
presents the first of three findings chapters that have resulted from the methods used 
in data collection and analysis. 
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The question which this research has asked is ‘How are ideas about risk constituted 
and integrated into social workers’ interventions?’. This is the first of three results 
chapters that presents data in answer to this question. In this first chapter I present one 
of the pivotal findings of this research, being that ideas about risk were closely 
intertwined with how social workers spoke about their clients, colleagues and 
themselves. For the majority of the practitioners who participated in this study, risk 
operated as an embodied concept. Clients and colleagues were recognised as being ‘at 
risk’ and/or ‘a risk’ and practitioners similarly spoke of themselves as ‘at risk’ and/or 
‘a risk’.  
 
To begin the chapter, I provide a brief overview of the meaning and qualities that 
social workers attributed to risk as they recounted their interventions. In this section 
risk is presented as having been constructed by practitioners as a wholly negative 
concept that was ‘real’ and inescapable. These conceptualisations of risk provide a 
defining conceptual context for locating how ideas about risk became embodied in the 
ascription of client, colleague and practitioner risk identities.  
 
The chapter then progresses to an outline of the typology of risk identities that were 
present within social workers’ reflective accounts of their interventions. I present a 
detailed description of each of these identities, relying heavily upon quotes from 
practitioners’ narratives. This serves to illustrate how risk identities operated as a very 
powerful source of recognition in social workers’ interventions. Following this 
presentation, I sort the data in order to demonstrate that multiple risk identities were 
spoken of by practitioners within a single reflective account of their interventions. 
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Within this context, the meanings of risk as seeming everywhere and being a negative 
concept clearly resonate as a defining context for how social workers storied their 
interventions.  
 
The final section of the chapter presents alternative conceptualisations of risk than 
those presented elsewhere in the chapter. Søndergaard (2002, p. 198) suggests that 
depth in analysis is supported by ‘troubling’ data to identify ‘ruptures in discourses’. 
With this in mind I have identified a ‘maverick’ storyline from one practitioner who 
spoke against the presence of risk in his intervention, as well as two other 
practitioners who had alternative ideas about the meaning and influence of risk in 
their practice. The chapter concludes with an integration of the meanings and 
operations of risk spoken by practitioners, as a synthesis of how ideas about risk were 
constituted and integrated into social workers’ interventions.  
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As will become evident in the course of this chapter, all but one social worker (Craig) 
recognised risk as a definitive factor in operation within the context of their practice 
situations. For these practitioners risk was unquestioningly present. It was spoken of 
as an intrinsic and inescapable feature of the situations that social workers were 
involved in. Thus risk was ascribed the interdependent qualities of being ‘real’, 
‘everywhere’ and ‘negative’.  
 
The reality of risk was evident in both what was said and how it was said by 
practitioners. For example, explicit statements of the reality of risk were contained in 
responses such as: 
it was a real life death and risk. That was, to me, that was enormous from 
the word go my understanding of that risk to the mum and therefore to 
the child’s life (Frances). 
risk walks by that child every day (Josephine). 
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the risk to him was extreme and encapsulating (Kaitlin). 
I guess one of the ways you could think of him was as evil personified 
(Moira).  
The reality of risk then was reinforced by how practitioners spoke of it as being 
intrinsic to people and to events. In this sense risk was spoken of as being ubiquitous, 
or to use Narelle’s phrase, ‘risk was everywhere’. Narelle clarified this expression, 
saying:  
a lot of the time I don’t think you are even aware – you are not sort of 
consciously thinking about risk but it…is always there. It is just a matter 
of scraping the surface…it is obviously there. It is complex. 
Frances provided similar insight into how risk was an integral feature of her work 
with Julianna, who was considered to be ‘a risk’ to her baby daughter. However, 
Frances was also acutely aware and sensitive to how Julianna was ‘at risk’ both in 
terms of the effects of having been severely abused throughout her own life, and as a 
result of her ‘wilting under the Departmental gaze’. Frances had been struck by the 
symbolism of a broken TV screen and a ‘bashed in’ washing machine that were 
situated outside Julianna’s home. Frances recalled: 
I was very aware of the risk. I think the image of the broken, shattered TV 
with a great big glass that was an inch thick was with me and it 
symbolised, I think the risk…that image was really powerful in the work 
and it reminded me and it spoke to me about risk to the child, that is what 
the child protection whole system…is centred around theoretically and in 
all sorts of ways really... 
Thus risk was recognised by the social workers in this study as a pervasive force that 
was unquestioningly present in their interventions.  
 
For Moira, risk existed as an all-encompassing entity that had infiltrated all spaces. 
Consequently Moira saw herself and others as being constantly ‘at risk’. Risk had 
come to colour her worldview. Moira remarked that:  
There are no designated areas in this world where people can be safe 
and it’s almost as if you have to be on the lookout and be wary of people 
all the time and I thought that’s a sad way to have to be and was a sad 
way for me to have to think about it. 
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 Overwhelmingly, then, risk was spoken of by social workers in this study in 
primarily negative terms. This was evident in the terminology that was used to 
reference the meaning of risk within each account. Risk was commonly spoken of as 
meaning: 
• a threat (Joseph, Mark, Sebastian, Zoe); 
• physical, sexual, and emotional harm, abuse or violence towards self or others 
(Frances, Geraldine, Graham, Jenny, Josephine, Kaitlin, Linda, Maggie, 
Mark, Moira, Narelle, Peter, Petra, Sebastian, Zoe); 
•  danger (Geraldine, Graham, Maggie); and 
• a negative consequence (Elaine, Joseph, Mark, Petra).   
 
Zoe spoke of risk as meaning threat in very clear terms: 
It came to me that the feeling of being at risk…is really similar to feeling 
under threat or being threatened and I thought, well what is that about? 
To be threatened by consequence…it is a feeling that I am being watched, 
I am under threat. Something is going to happen...  
Equating risk with harm or violence was common to many of the stories that 
practitioners told. Jenny’s account of her work with a young woman she was working 
with is typical of how the relationship between risk and harm were spoken of by 
social workers. Jenny reflected that: 
The biggest risk at the time was maybe the child harming themselves 
because they were presenting self-harming behaviours plus also the 
child…harming the family members because when she used to get really 
angry she would lash out at them and be fairly physically aggressive. 
Similarly, Josephine spoke of the young boy she was working with in the following 
terms: 
there was always a risk to the actual child’s wellbeing and safety and 
that was always going to be a risk because it was a case where there was 
a lot of violence inside the home then it was always his actual wellbeing 
was always at risk… 
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The specific meaning of risk as danger is evident in Geraldine’s accounts of how she 
was regarded by her organisation. According to Geraldine: 
Their comments that clients would be frightened suggested they thought 
they might be in danger. That the clients would think they were in 
danger. I was the risk to clients. 
Finally, risk was spoken more generally as the possibility of negative consequences 
eventuating for clients, practitioners or others. Elaine’s story indicated that she 
believed that recurring notifications and investigations of child neglect within a 
family were placing the parents and the family in general ‘at risk’. In this example the 
negative consequences that were envisaged by Elaine were a result of her 
organisation’s interventions. As Elaine explained: 
The biggest risk was definitely this family having this whole thing blow 
up on them and having their children removed and getting kicked out of 
their house and all that kind of stuff…I thought the more times they were 
investigated the more disempowered they became which I don’t think is a 
good way to be. It would leave them not able to protect themselves from 
other…agencies. 
 
Ascriptions of negative characteristics to risk were also thoroughly embedded within 
the milieu of social workers’ practice contexts. This was most evident in how the 
social workers within this study spoke of their mandatory obligation to report child 
abuse and neglect. This was the case for social workers working within statutory and 
non-statutory agencies. As Petra explained:  
we are mandatory reporters as well by law to refer that young person or 
at least make a report that they are at risk of abuse. Or danger in some 
way. So if a young person’s story includes some element where it feels to 
us that that young person may be at risk in a physical sense or, you know, 
quite emotionally traumatised or whatever, by a parent or other, then we 
are obliged to notify as a mandatory reporter.  
Meanings of risk as a negative concept were thus supported at a systemic level, which 
served to reinforce practitioners’ negative conceptualisations about risk. 
  
The reality of the ubiquitous existence of risk and it being seen as a negative concept 
were undisputed in these practitioners’ reflective accounts. The discursive power of 
these qualities of risk was fully recognised in how they were linked to the identities of 
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people. That is, these meanings and qualities of risk became definitive of how 
practitioners recognised their clients, colleagues and themselves. This is the focus of 
the next section of this chapter. 
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Risk was spoken of as an embodied concept within practitioners’ reflections of their 
interventions. Clients, colleagues and practitioners were spoken of as embodiments of 
risk. This was evident in how practitioners spoke of their clients, colleagues and 
themselves according to various risk-based identities. Risk operated as a tangible 
concept in social workers’ interventions on the basis of the ascription of these risk 
identities. 
 
The dominant identities that emerged within this study were of two main types: 
‘Client Risk Identities’ and ‘Practitioner Risk Identities’. Within each of these broad 
category types two further categories were identified, being ‘Client at Risk’ and 
‘Client a Risk’ and ‘Practitioner at Risk’ and ‘Practitioner a Risk’ identities. While 
colleagues and family members were all referred to in social workers’ stories, their 
presence was not central to their narratives. Practitioners’ relationships with clients 
were the pivotal issues. The exception to this was Joseph. Joseph spoke of an 
intervention he had implemented in response to a situation that happened with some 
colleagues. However, the process of ascribing risk identities to himself and colleagues 
was the same as for other practitioners. Rather than establish a separate category 
scheme for Joseph, I have included his data about his colleagues within the heading 
of client ‘a risk’ identity and his own as practitioner ‘at risk’.  
 
Each of these identities comprised of a number of sub-identities. These are 
summarised in Table 1 with the names of practitioners who ascribed these identities 
to their clients, colleagues and themselves. A discussion of each identity type follows 
this table. 
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Client Risk Identities Practitioner Risk Identities 
Client at Risk Client a Risk Practitioner at Risk Practitioner a Risk 
1. Vulnerable Client 
Elaine, Frances, 
Josephine, Kaitlin, Linda, 
Mark, Narelle, Petra, 
Sebastian, Zoe 
 
2. Abused Client 
Frances, Josephine, 
Kaitlin, Linda, Maggie, 
Mark, Narelle, Peter, 
Petra, Sebastian 
 
3. Unsafe Client 
Frances, Graham, Jenny 
Josephine, Kaitlin, 
Narelle, Peter 
 
4. Discriminated Client 
Geraldine, Moira, 
Narelle, Sebastian  
1. Violent/Neglectful 
Client 
Elaine, Frances, 
Graham, Jenny, Joseph 
(colleagues), Josephine, 
Maggie, Moira, Narelle, 
Peter, Zoe 
 
2. Problem Client 
Graham, Jenny, Mark 
1. Vulnerable 
Practitioner 
Frances, Geraldine, 
Graham, Joseph, Kaitlin, 
Mark, Moira, Narelle, 
Petra, Sebastian, Zoe 
 
2. Compromised 
Practitioner 
Elaine, Geraldine, 
Joseph, Maggie, Moira, 
Narelle, Peter, Petra 
 
3. Judged Practitioner 
Elaine, Geraldine, 
Josephine, Mark, 
Sebastian, Zoe  
 
4. Vexed Practitioner 
Graham, Jenny 
  
1. Ineffective 
Practitioner 
Elaine, Linda, Maggie 
 
2. Persecutory 
Practitioner 
Kaitlin 
 
3. Overzealous  
Practitioner 
Josephine, Kaitlin 
 
4. Discriminatory 
Practitioner 
Moira  
 
5. Dangerous 
Practitioner 
Geraldine  
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The reflective accounts of social workers of their interventions demonstrate they 
genuinely felt concern, empathy and compassion for their clients. While the specific 
stories of clients are not discussed in this thesis, it is still possible to surmise from the 
extracts that are presented that the circumstances of clients’ lives were fraught with 
incredible hardships and injustices. Perhaps it is not surprising then that clients were 
viewed by practitioners in terms of the extent to which they were ‘at risk’. These ‘at 
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risk’ identities were created by social workers. That is, social workers’ reflective 
narratives of their interventions indicate that they identified their clients as being ‘at 
risk’, as opposed to them relying upon other people’s, or means of, assessment. 
Specifically, clients were spoken of as ‘vulnerable’, ‘unsafe’, ‘abused’ and 
‘discriminated’.  
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The ‘vulnerable client’ was a powerful characterisation of an ‘at risk’ identity in the 
stories of Elaine, Frances, Josephine, Kaitlin, Linda, Mark, Narelle, Petra, Sebastian 
and Zoe. The genuineness of the care and concern of these practitioners for their 
clients was evident in their reflective accounts. The tragedy of the lives of their 
clients also echoed with a profound resonance. For example, Frances spoke with me 
about her work with Julianna, whose one-year-old child, Ellen, had been removed 
from her care. Frances was working with Julianna to try and establish some concrete 
measures that would support her to parent Ellen. However, attempts were being made 
to place Ellen on an extended order. Frances had worked with Julianna on previous 
occasions, so she knew her history and struggles. The following extracts exemplify 
how Frances spoke of Julianna in terms of her vulnerability and hence risk: 
Julianna was so very, very, very vulnerable. Like, she rings up people 
saying that she is going to kill herself when she gets in a bad patch and 
she does it regularly…This is a young woman who measures herself 
constantly and fails dismally. She knows that she hasn’t got a friend in 
the world. She knows she is one of the most lonely people in the world. 
She measures herself against these very real yardsticks.  
I thought that another place that risk was very, very much involved in my 
thinking and my actions was that, and it really was…the effect of the 
gaze…the Departmental gaze on this young mum. Julianna was so very, 
very, very vulnerable…So…here she is really wilting under the effect of 
many, many things: her depression, her childhood, all the stuff that I 
knew about her and now the Departmental gaze and I think there was an 
enormous risk to her and I was really conscious of this then. There was 
an enormous risk to her of that Departmental gaze and how it had played 
out and I became aware of it…right in the beginning of that process. 
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Being vulnerable to the scrutiny and power of investigative agencies was also spoken 
by Elaine. Elaine recounted her work with a family she was required to visit after a 
complaint was made following several previous investigations for child neglect. The 
family were not given prior warning of her visit, so that a more accurate assessment 
of the ‘true’ circumstances of their living conditions could be ascertained. What 
struck Elaine in this intervention was the sense of resignation that was felt by the 
parents. Elaine spoke of the vulnerability and risk of the parents in the following 
terms: 
the look on their faces was like, you know, ‘Oh here we go again’ sort of 
thing. And I just thought I’d never thought the service was about playing 
a part in making people feel like they have no power or that there are 
other people out there that can sort of turn up on your door and you have 
to do pretty much whatever they say. 
it was pretty much about disempowerment for me. Just, they were so, they 
just sat there while I was going through their house…I guess it made me 
feel sorry for them. It made me think that I would absolutely hate to be in 
their position for whatever reason. They were resigned to it.  
I think just within themselves, you know, to have people go through your 
house and look at your stuff and be judging the way you keep your home. 
I am guessing mentally, that wouldn’t be fantastic. That would be very 
bad for their self-esteem, I would imagine their self-worth. So that would 
have been the biggest risk that I saw for the client. 
 
Kaitlin spoke with enormous affection of a young boy she was working with. 
According to Kaitlin this little boy was being subjected to severe forms of physical 
and emotional abuse as well as neglect within his family. Kaitlin had formed a strong 
relationship with this child and his vulnerability touched her deeply. In reflecting on 
how she regarded this child, Kaitlin spoke of him thus:  
what touched me about him was that he was so, just so not loved. Oh it 
makes me feel really teary to even say that. He was so not loved. Nobody 
loved him. Absolutely nobody loved this child and he’s adorable. He’s 
just beautiful. Beautiful. Look, one of the most amazing things was…I’d 
been working with him a few months or something and he was outside 
one day and he was picking dandelions and putting them in his bag. A 
worker who saw him said, ‘What are you doing?’ ‘I’m picking these for 
Kaitlin for when I see her next.’ So I saw him on the Monday and he 
comes in with this bag full of dead dandelions and the smile just went 
from ear to ear as he gave me this beautiful, beautiful gift of the beautiful 
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yellow flowers that he’d picked for me and I was so touched by that. 
What touched me so much was you have so little love in your life yet you 
can so willingly give love. You still have the capacity to recognise love. 
And I’m talking about love in a universal sense here. You still are open 
enough to feel love and you’re more than open enough to give love. How 
can you do that when you have never ever been loved? How can that 
happen? And I was just so in awe of this child – at his heart and his 
capacity to love…So that’s what touched me the most – the fact that he 
was totally unloved and I think every child is loveable. Every child, well 
it’s one of our basic needs to be loved…Yeah it was like nobody loved 
him. 
For Kaitlin then, the construction of the vulnerability of this child as not being loved 
supported his being ascribed an ‘at risk’ identity. 
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‘Vulnerable clients’ were often ‘abused clients’. Frances, Josephine, Kaitlin, Linda, 
Maggie, Mark, Narelle, Peter, Petra and Sebastian spoke of how the clients they 
worked with had experienced in isolation, or in combination, physical, sexual and 
emotional abuse in the past or within the current contexts of their interventions with 
practitioners. Within these accounts, then, the ‘at risk’ identity of clients was 
intricately related to them having suffered some form of abuse within their life 
histories. For example, Josephine spoke about her work with a young boy who had 
been referred to her primarily on the basis of his aggressive behaviour. However, in 
her reflective account Josephine spoke mostly about his having experienced and 
witnessed violence within his home, which is captured in the following statement: 
there was a lot of violence inside the home…his actual wellbeing was 
always ‘at risk’ and since the last time I spoke to you there was a 
particularly nasty incident where the step-dad threatened to kill him and 
the other children… 
Kaitlin spoke of her young client in similar ways. She recounted a significant moment 
in which the nature of the abuse of the young boy she was working with became 
apparent to her. Kaitlin recollected: 
I encouraged them [the parents] to take the younger boy for a 
paediatrician’s appointment which we did. So I actually took them in 
there so he would get to be there. The paediatrician tried to get him up 
on the table and he was scared and he went to go to his father and his 
father moved his body out of the way. So I was the one who picked him 
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up and put him on the table and held his hand and all of that sort of 
thing. I’d arranged for a guidance assessment during that interview with 
the father. He was asked, you know, ‘What are the positive things about 
your son?’ And he thought for five minutes and couldn’t think of one 
thing that was positive about his son. So it was becoming clearer and 
clearer about the emotional abuse that this child was experiencing and 
the deprivation on so many levels... 
 
The ‘abused client’ identity is further illustrated by Linda’s story of her work with an 
adult woman who had been physically and sexually abused as a child. Linda had been 
working with her for quite some time as she made steps to recover from the disabling 
effects of the abuse she had suffered. In the course of this work the client had 
attempted suicide. In speaking of this woman, Linda said: 
She’s had a history of systematic physical and sexual abuse for a long 
period of time in her childhood. And the more she was coming to terms 
[with the abuse], the more she was being confronted with memories, the 
more the self-harming was increasing…there’s a history to her kind of 
being overwhelmed by this stuff and in turn that overwhelms me…it’s 
almost like I saw her and sort of saw the problem…as totally crushing 
her… 
While Linda was committed to envisaging a positive future for this woman, the 
effects of the abuse at times seemed overwhelming for the client and Linda also 
wondered about the capacity of someone to be able to overcome the effects of such 
awful abuse. Linda wondered if this client’s suicide would have signified that the 
abuse she had suffered had ‘marked’ her forever. As Linda explained: 
You know she had a long history of abuse and…I was questioning will 
she get through this?…So that was there. Can you be really scarred 
forever and does death mean that? That you’re scarred forever? So I was 
really looking at risk and suicide within a sexual assault context. 
As Linda’s story indicates, the ‘abused client’ ‘at risk’ identity had a powerful impact 
upon how practitioners recognised their clients. 
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Clients were also constructed as being ‘unsafe’ by Frances, Graham, Jenny, 
Josephine, Kaitlin, Narelle and Peter in terms of their physical and emotional well-
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being. This was particularly striking in Graham’s account of an adult male he was 
working with who had a mental illness, was homeless and lived, though was not 
housed, in a remote and isolated area. Graham was attempting to find accommodation 
for this man. During periods when the client’s illness was exacerbated his behaviour 
would become quite extreme. Given he did not like taking medication the effects of 
the illness were often apparent to others. As a consequence of the illness Graham saw 
him as being unsafe in many regards. In speaking of this client, Graham noted that: 
There were a lot of people who found him…to be quite spooky and there 
were people who were not aggressive towards him but they were, you 
know, very non-welcoming, so he was being bullied a bit…So I guess we 
were there just to check on his needs as far as that was concerned and 
make sure that he was OK…because of his mental health situation we 
had some really big concerns for his safety…he wasn’t welcome…So 
that’s another concern to think here’s this guy without any family and 
without any support or any emotional support, not friendship and he’s on 
his own in a tent with these two dogs and wet, cold… 
 
Peter also feared for the safety of a client who was living in a remote area that he was 
attempting to house. In Peter’s story an adult male client had said that he was being 
physically abused by his female partner and that he would ‘take it on and then…he’d 
burst…and fight back’. Peter explained that he advocated for this client to be housed 
on the basis of his being ‘at risk’ of further abuse: 
I said, ‘Given that he’s a male, that he finds it very difficult to talk about 
being a victim of domestic violence, it took two – three interventions or 
interactions before he disclosed the full story to me, I think he’s probably 
at high risk. Not necessarily of high risk of being hurt more than he has 
been, but high risk of continuing to live in a very volatile situation’. 
Consequently the ‘unsafe client identity’ resembles the ‘vulnerable client identity’ as 
both identities reflect social workers’ concerns that clients had been or could have 
been harmed in some way.  
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Geraldine, Moira, Narelle and Sebastian were cognisant of their clients’ identities in 
terms of their potential or actual experience of discrimination. In turn, their 
experience or susceptibility to discrimination positioned them as ‘at risk’. For 
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Geraldine, Narelle and Sebastian, this discrimination was linked to the sexual and 
gender identities of their clients. As Sebastian noted of a young gay man that he was 
working with, ‘This person is already oppressed as a young gay man. He is oppressed 
as a young man and then as a gay young man…’. This sentiment was also apparent in 
Narelle’s explanation of the ‘at risk’ identity she had ascribed to the transgendered 
client with whom she was working: 
She is ‘at risk’ of isolation. You know, the whole violence, abuse, walking 
down the street – all of that sort of stuff. Being called a freak, not having 
access to resources. Not being treated fairly in the legal system. Also if 
she says she was a victim of violence and she went to, say, the police, and 
she got a police officer who was a bit of a wanker, she could have just 
been laughed at.  
Geraldine’s story further illustrates how ‘discriminated clients’ were ‘at risk’ clients. 
Geraldine was acutely aware of the discrimination that lesbian clients within her 
service were experiencing. Geraldine wanted to tell clients, through some means, that 
she was a lesbian. Geraldine thought this would be important for lesbian clients, who 
she believed experienced discrimination as a result of the dominance of hetero-sexual 
identities in the workplace. In speaking of clients as discriminated, Geraldine said 
that: 
I knew that many gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans-sexual people were not 
having their needs met through social workers, because social workers 
did have a lot of assumptions about what they needed…what this means 
is that these people don’t access services...and you don’t come out to the 
worker because you’re afraid of her judgements…So you avoid services 
‘cause you’d rather not have a judgement than deal with the issues with 
those people. And so you go looking for someone who does understand 
the issues and it means going and checking people out and walking away 
and checking another one out and walking away. It’s a lot of work. And it 
involves putting yourself at risk. At risk of being abused, in effect. And so 
I knew all that…so a lesbian comes into the agency, she won’t come out 
because she thinks, she assumes that the worker’s heterosexual and most 
people do assume that workers are heterosexual. 
 
For Moira, discrimination was spoken of in different terms than to Geraldine, Narelle 
and Sebastian. Moira viewed her client as potentially being discriminated against by 
her as a result of her not wanting to work with him. She knew that he had been 
physically violent towards a female client she had seen. In speaking of his 
‘discriminated client’ identity, Moira clarified: 
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The risk to him was that I wouldn’t provide him with the service that I 
guess anybody deserves to be provided with regardless of whether they 
have been violent or not; and holding those principles and ethics of 
social work that are dear to my heart; and not wanting to discriminate 
against him and deny him the service that anybody should get if they 
didn’t have that knowledge that I had about him.  
Thus Moira’s story demonstrates that client ‘at risk’ identities can conflict with other 
knowledge and client risk identities, which is discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
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The personification of clients (and colleagues, as in Joseph’s case) as ‘a risk’ was the 
foundation for practitioners ascribing clients (and colleagues) with an ‘a risk’ identity. 
In common with the construction of ‘at risk’ client identities, the ‘a risk’ client 
identity enabled risk to become embodied at the site of persons. ‘A risk’ client 
identities defined who clients were. Two ‘a risk’ client identities were apparent in 
practitioners’ stories – being ‘the violent’ client and ‘the problematic’ client. 
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Overwhelmingly, the most often ascribed ‘a risk’ client identity that was evident in 
social workers’ interventions was the ‘violent and/or neglectful client’ (Elaine, 
Frances, Graham, Jenny, Joseph [colleagues], Josephine, Maggie, Moira, Narelle, 
Peter and Zoe). ‘Violent clients’ were most often spoken of in terms of their latent 
potential to be physically or emotionally violent towards practitioners and/or others. 
For example, it came to Narelle’s attention that the transgendered client she was 
working with had not only been physically assaulted herself, but had also been 
physically abusive towards others. Narelle became concerned that the client might 
become aggressive towards her within and outside of her workplace when she told the 
client she couldn’t keep working with her. In speaking of this ‘a risk’ identity Narelle 
said: 
I had read she could be quite violent...I thought she might fly off the 
handle…What would happen if I ran into her…what would happen if I 
came across her…So I was a bit worried about, oh God, what if I am at a 
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party and she is there and I have told her that I couldn’t help her? What 
would she do? Would she come up and punch me? 
 
Moira was in a similar position to Narelle. Moira was fearful that the client she was 
working with might become violent towards her on the basis of her not wanting to 
work with him and/or as a consequence of her having supported his female partner 
who had been physically assaulted by him. As Moira explained: 
So he was an extremely violent man. And he pulled out a copy of a 
restraining order and he wanted me to have a look at it, and he’s 
basically accusing his partner of telling lies about him and he’s virtually 
throwing this at me and saying, ‘Look. Have a look at this…’ 
actually sitting in a room and being confronted with a perpetrator of 
violence and knowing that the way that the violence – that I knew what he 
had subjected this woman to, was going to affect the way that I viewed 
him as a person. And I think as a social worker it’s a really hard thing to 
say and really hard thing to acknowledge because you know that you 
want to think, ‘Yes. People are capable of change. He is not a walking 
monster, you know’. I didn’t want to think about him like that. But I was 
scared of him. 
Thus Narelle’s and Moira’s stories illustrate the presence of fear within constructions 
of ‘violent client identities’. It is apparent that this identity had a profound impact 
upon these social workers and, in turn, was instrumental in how they positioned 
themselves in relation to their clients.  
 
Graham also spoke of how the client he was working with had a reputation within his 
community and across a number of services as being violent. This was made evident 
to Graham in his first contact with the client. He was asked to accompany another 
worker to visit the client. Graham explained, ‘I was going along because the worker 
was fearful of her own safety’. As Graham became more involved with the client he 
began to hear more stories of him having been violent. The consequence of his having 
been identified as being ‘a risk’ was that he was denied access to emergency 
accommodation services. As Graham explained in the case of one service: 
Because he’d previously been there…and pulled the TV off the wall and 
now that he was back, they didn’t want him back. I think that basically 
was what it was.  
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The identity of this man being ‘violent’ and thus ‘a risk’ was also emphasised on 
another occasion to Graham. This ‘violent client identity’ was ascribed through the 
retelling of another incident between the client and another worker. In this instance 
Graham said: 
It was explained to me by the previous worker that he could become 
violent if he thought he wasn’t getting his own way or if he thought that 
he was being challenged in an inappropriate manner. Especially around 
medication…we had a visiting professional there who just happened to 
be there when he came to visit and he didn’t know who she was and she 
started asking questions and everything was OK until she got on to the 
medication part of it. And he threatened to pull her down the stairs and 
he walked across the road and started throwing rocks at the building. 
She did then take an order out on him to say that he was violent and 
people needed to be careful with him… 
Graham’s example demonstrates the profound impact of an ‘a risk’ client identity. A 
‘violent client identity’ precluded recognition of the client in any other terms and 
became historically embedded within narratives about him within Graham’s and other 
organisations. 
 
A young person that Jenny was seeing was spoken of as a ‘violent client’, although in 
this instance Jenny did not fear the client would be violent towards her. This young 
woman had a history of self-harming, suicide attempts and dramatic mood swings. 
She was also on medication. What Jenny found striking about this young woman was 
her capacity for violence and her seeming lack of recognition of the seriousness of her 
behaviour. In speaking of her ‘violent client identity’, Jenny said: 
a lot of the behaviour is around being aggressive and violent and things 
like that…We are talking about a young person who will threaten to cut 
grandma’s throat and she will be giggling and smiling as she is talking 
about it…And I find it really difficult to engage in some way when they’re 
laughing. And she does, like, she threatens to cut gran’s throat. She 
threatens to cut up her brothers and sisters and she argues and fights 
with mum all the time.  
 
A final example of a ‘violent client identity’ is presented in Maggie’s story. Maggie 
was working with an adult man who had been convicted of a sexual offence. Maggie 
did not fear for her own safety in her work with him. Instead she spoke of how he was 
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‘a risk’ to the children he had assaulted and to other children he might come in to 
contact with. In speaking of him, Maggie explained: 
It is the risk of turning him out there. It is a risk…to those young 
children. It is the risk to the children out there that a person like him 
poses and the flak that we will cop if he re-offended…he is very damaged. 
Maggie was very concerned that this client would re-offend and she saw herself as 
being charged with the responsibility to prevent this from occurring. Thus in common 
with the other practice examples presented here, Maggie’s story demonstrates how 
‘violent client identities’ presented challenges to social workers in terms of how they 
should respond to them. This was further complicated if these clients were also 
recognised as having an ‘at risk’ client identity which is discussed later in this 
chapter.  
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The second ‘a risk’ client identity in evidence in the stories of social workers’ 
interventions was the ‘problem client’ identity. In addition to speaking of their clients 
as having a ‘violent client’ identity, Graham and Jenny also spoke of them as 
‘problem clients’. The client that Graham was working with was getting a bad name 
within and outside of his service. In part, this ‘problem client’ identity was connected 
to him being seen as a ‘violent client’. However, the identity of ‘problem client’ was 
also based on how he was seen to be a problem to workers in their attempts to provide 
him with accommodation options. The agency could not house him and as a 
consequence he was living in a tent. He would return to the agency over and over 
again asking them to help him. As Graham recounted, ‘I’m getting a phone call from 
our Secretary saying, “He’s back. He’s on his way back…”, and I thought, “Oh no” ’. 
Jenny similarly spoke of how the young woman she was working with had developed 
a ‘problem client’ identity within a network of services. As Jenny explained:  
Mum calls the police and the police go, ‘Oh not her again’, because she 
is so well known. Mum will take her to the hospital and they will tell her 
to go away. 
The presence of this problematic client identity was also evident in how Jenny spoke 
about this client and her family, saying:  
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These sort of families don’t take responsibility for their actions…They 
expect that everyone in the world will come and fix everything for 
them…I have a message and it has sat on my desk now for three days to 
ring this young person. If I do I will get sucked in again. 
 
Mark also ascribed a ‘problem client’ identity to the young man named Geoffrey he 
was working with, as he thought he might somehow ‘set me up’. In speaking of 
Geoffrey, Mark stated: 
Well there’s a client, it’s a bit of a problematic client for me at the 
moment…I suppose he’s a pretty challenging client…he sends me emails 
all the time…insisting that we get together…he was very, very 
demanding… 
This young man had made a complaint against another worker and Mark was 
concerned that he could do the same to him. Mark reflected that: 
I’ve had to be a little bit careful there…Careful that I might say 
something that might not be understood or might be misinterpreted and 
maybe that could be used against me. 
Consequently Mark was quite wary of Geoffrey and was undecided about whether he 
should continue working with him. Thus in common with ‘violent client’ identities, 
the construction of ‘problem client’ identities by social workers created challenges for 
how they would respond to their client’s situations and needs. This is discussed in the 
following chapter. This challenge was further exacerbated by the presence of 
practitioner ‘risk identities’, which are presented in the following section.  
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Social workers spoke of themselves as being ‘at risk’ within their interventions. Risk 
in this context was used to refer to how social workers saw themselves ‘at risk’ of 
some form of negative consequence or harm as a result of their interactions with 
clients, or from external sources such as from the organisations they were working 
within. These identities were pivotal to the narratives of how social workers spoke 
about and identified themselves. These narratives reflected the identities of the 
‘vulnerable’, ‘compromised’, ‘judged’ and ‘vexed’ practitioner.  
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The ‘vulnerable practitioner’ was a common identity amongst social workers who 
participated in this study. This practitioner ‘at risk’ identity was associated with social 
workers feeling vulnerable in terms of their physical or emotional safety (Frances, 
Joseph, Mark, Moira, Narelle, Sebastian Zoe), being sanctioned or penalised for their 
actions (Geraldine, Kaitlin, Mark, Moira, Petra, Zoe) and as a result of the emotional 
demands of the interventions they were involved in (Geraldine, Graham, Kaitlin).  
 
Sebastian was fearful after he and the young gay man (Trevor) he was working with 
were threatened with physical and sexual violence during an anonymous phone call. 
Somehow the caller knew that Sebastian had been helping Trevor. Very serious 
threats were made against them by this unknown male caller. In explaining his 
reaction to these threats, Sebastian said he was ‘very scared. I think that was the first 
time I’d felt, it would’ve been the first time I’d felt fear in the work like that on that 
level’. The threat of this assault had a dramatic impact upon Sebastian. In speaking of 
the vulnerability it engendered, Sebastian said:  
I guess on a personal level it threw me…I guess that sense of 
vulnerability is always there, was always there in terms of being on your 
own…being in a kind of what could potentially be a very hostile 
environment…to be working in and keeping a low profile and being 
aware of that. But it sort of brought it home that particular incident for 
me on a personal level too and it sort of made me question, ‘Is this for 
me?’ 
Moira also spoke of her vulnerability in the situation where she realised her client was 
the partner of another client she had been working with and that he had been violent 
towards her. Quite simply Moira said she was ‘just scared. I think I felt 
vulnerable…vulnerable to him. Vulnerable to the possibilities of what could 
happen…’. When Moira realised who this man was she said: 
I started physically feeling quite ill about it. Yeah, just like feeling like a 
horrible feeling in the pit of your stomach and all I wanted to do was get 
out of there and not have to help him really and not have to talk to 
him…It’s the fear that this man will find out who I am and will put two 
and two together and think this woman has provided my ex-partner with 
a service and is helping her to work against me and all those sort of 
things…I was thinking all sorts of things. I was thinking why was he 
wanting my name?…And I just felt extremely uncomfortable. I thought I 
had put myself at risk and I would remain at risk from him you know 
because he could recognise me out in the street…I hoped that nothing 
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would ever come of it. It worried me because I thought, I even went to the 
extent of thinking this is the time to have my phone number taken out of 
the phone book…have a private number, so I called Telstra and had that 
organised and thought the old phone book has my name in it and 
somebody could find the address and come to my house and it was a form 
of, I don’t know, of paranoia. 
 
Zoe also commented upon the extent to which she believed she was ‘at risk’ in terms 
of her physical safety when she investigated an allegation of child physical abuse. 
When first arriving at the parents’ home, Zoe and her co-worker interviewed the 
child’s mother. The mother warned them that if they wanted to remove her child from 
her care they would ‘have to do it with the police’. Her male partner then came home 
and he was ‘standing there quite aggressive…and a face with like thunder…the 
father…was very angry…’. When reflecting on how risk was present in the situation, 
Zoe claimed: 
I was experiencing risk of my safety, physical safety in the house 
particularly when we went back the second time and the father was home. 
We were quite prepared…we had the mobile in our hand to call the 
police and we parked really close so that we could get in the car and 
leave. It was kind of a bit of an adrenalin rush as well when you think 
that you are going to get the shit kicked out of you because we had to be 
prepared for that because of what the mother had said about the father 
and what he had said about us and things like that. So we were quite 
prepared to be in danger. 
Mark and Josephine spoke of how they felt vulnerable to physical assaults as a result 
of the clients they sometimes worked with. Mark spoke of how he saw himself ‘at 
risk’ in the following terms: 
One of the things that just occurred to me was that a lot of the work that I 
do is with men who use abuse and violence in their lives…I am afraid of 
some of the men that I work with. And I am. I know I am. God that’s a 
horrible thought. I get scared of them sometimes, but I say I don’t but I 
do. I do. That’s a scary thought.  
Echoing the sentiment that ‘risk is everywhere’, Josephine said, ‘In a small 
community…violent perpetrators are very easily going to recognise you and 
recognise your family’. 
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The ‘vulnerable practitioner’ also felt ‘at risk’ because of fearing reprisals as a result 
of the interventions they implemented. This was evident from the stories that social 
workers told about how they thought their own or other organisations might take 
actions against them. For example, Moira thought her organisation would not 
understand that she did not want to work with the male client she knew to be violent. 
Moira spoke of herself as: 
vulnerable as far as my position in the organisation went and not feeling 
that I could really, I guess I thought at the time that they wouldn’t be 
terribly tolerant of the situation that I thought I found myself in if I went 
to speak to my direct manager. 
However, the most extreme example of this form of vulnerability was recounted in 
Geraldine’s story about how she effectively lost her job on the basis of her refusing to 
sign a document saying that she would not disclose to clients that she was a lesbian. 
As Geraldine explained: 
I don’t think I have explained how much that hurt. Like to lose your job is 
bad enough but to lose your job because you are a lesbian and I think 
one of the things that hurt most was that they actually thought they were 
doing the right thing. 
In speaking of its impact upon her, Geraldine tearfully recalled, ‘I am still emotional, 
but I was suicidal for six months’. Geraldine stated that she believed social workers 
who were lesbians were vulnerable on the basis of the profusion of homophobic 
attitudes towards lesbians within workplaces. In explaining this, Geraldine said that: 
Well I think that social workers are actually more vulnerable than clients 
in situations because they [clients] only have to go, ‘She says that she is 
a lesbian’, and that worker is in so much trouble. 
Thus Geraldine’s story demonstrates the power of risk identities in terms of their 
consequences for people. In Geraldine’s case the assimilation of ‘lesbian’ and ‘risk’ 
identified Geraldine as a target for extreme measures within her organisation. Thus 
Geraldine was ‘at risk’ within her organisation as a result of her being ascribed an ‘a 
risk’ identity in regard to her practice of telling clients that she was a lesbian. 
 
The final characterisation of the ‘vulnerable practitioner’ identity were practitioners 
who felt ‘at risk’ from the emotional impact of their work with clients. In speaking of 
themselves in these terms social workers identified themselves as ‘stressed’, ‘burnt 
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out’ or unable to ‘cope’. This is dramatically captured in Kaitlin’s account of how she 
was affected by the little boy she had been working with who had been physically and 
emotionally abused and neglected. Kaitlin recollected: 
I kept seeing these children’s eyes in front of my eyes. You know these 
haunted eyes…and I thought, ‘My God what’s all this about? All these 
kids’ eyes I can see’…and what it came down to was it was one pair of 
eyes and it was this little fella’s eyes that I was seeing in front of my eyes. 
Just this haunted look that he had. You know that empty haunted look and 
they just kept floating, floating in front of my eyes and so that was a good 
understanding to me of how that had impacted upon me…that’s when I 
thought I’m giving up social work. So I think part of the risk to me and 
how I was experiencing risk was that I became very emotionally attached 
to him and the stress levels that I experienced…I was seeing his eyes 
floating in front of my eyes… 
Similarly, Graham noted that he felt his ‘emotional health’ was ‘at risk’ as a result of 
his efforts to assist the man he was working with who had a mental illness and was 
homeless. Graham suggested that he could no longer ‘cope’ with him, which is 
evident from the following statement: 
There was one other person who was trying to look after him but they 
kept ringing us saying it was too much for them. They couldn’t cope. So 
we were thinking, ‘Well, how can we cope?’ 
Thus the ‘vulnerable practitioner’ risk identity indicates the presence of actual or 
potential experiences of physical and emotional harm to social workers in the course 
of their work. While the materiality of the harms that were experienced are spoken 
most clearly by Geraldine and Kaitlin, it is apparent that for the remaining social 
workers their ‘at risk’ identities were fuelled primarily by fear, being the fear of what 
could happen.  
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The narrative of the ‘compromised practitioner’ was apparent in a number of stories. 
Practitioners positioned themselves as ‘at risk’ within the context of these accounts in 
terms of how they thought they could be ‘used’ by clients or colleagues (Joseph, 
Peter) and/or that their personal and/or professional integrity was in jeopardy (Elaine, 
Geraldine, Joseph, Maggie, Moira, Narelle, Peter, Petra).  
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The sense of feeling used was spoken by Peter as he recollected his efforts to help a 
male client who had said he was being physically assaulted by his female partner and 
who needed help to find alternative accommodation. In speaking of how he was ‘at 
risk’ within the situation, Peter said: 
I felt compromised. Yeah, at risk of being used by the client and he was a 
together, intelligent bloke and he was stuck in a very difficult place. 
There’s no question about that. But I must admit I have thought whether 
he recognised to make this happen I need people like this on my side to 
act on my behalf and say these types of things to make this happen you 
know…to be used in a successful way is probably exactly what social 
work is, but it’s the first time really I’ve really felt like that. Like it’s just 
where I asked the question, ‘How much was I used this time?’ 
By means of another example, Joseph spoke of feeling ‘at risk’ within his team when 
a number of colleagues banded together in their attempt to convince him to agree with 
a decision they had made. Joseph spoke of this situation in terms of how his 
vulnerability to the ‘wilfulness’ of others meant that he could be used to achieve other 
people’s agendas. In his attempt to clarify the significance of this moment, Joseph 
explained: 
What I have come to see is that the wilfulness in that group of workers, 
the wilfulness that came out of believing for all kinds of reasons that 
something needed to be done…I gave into…deferred to the energy of the 
wilful nature of their request…The risk for me is that there is a wilful 
component in there that is directed at me because I can give you 
something that you are particularly after… 
Thus Joseph notes how his ‘fear of wilfulness’, personal history and the attempts by 
workers to ‘roll’ him could have undermined the organisation’s decision-making 
process. Within this narrative, then, Joseph identified how his fear of wilfulness 
placed him ‘at risk’ of being used.  
 
Joseph’s account also illustrates how social workers spoke of themselves in terms of 
feeling that their personal and/or professional integrity was ‘at risk’. As Joseph 
further explained: 
I haven’t deliberately set out to muck anyone up and I don’t believe that 
has happened…[it] was a start to hitting my head, you know, ‘What’s 
going on? You just made a call where you…allowed yourself to be rolled 
over. That is not what you are about’…And so I just made a call to do 
something which might be a right call ’cause I trust the workers…but my 
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process, it was a bit questionable…where I gave into the wilfulness 
because I read their energy…as wanting to roll me.  
Petra’s sense of seeing herself as compromised was related to how she felt 
constrained by organisational protocols in her wanting to support a young girl who 
had been sexually and physically abused by her mother’s partner. In speaking of the 
tension between what she ought to do according to her organisation and what she 
ended up doing, Petra said: 
there was this requirement that we are meant to refer…which is 
potentially going to take a long time, weeks in fact, and because this 
young person was inclined to go back home…even though she had 
chosen to leave the home at this instant, she was inclined to go back with 
the mum….I opted to go against what would be considered the required 
thing for me to do…I was clearly going against what was the required 
process…So if you’re looking for elements of risk they’re huge. There 
seemed to be, to me anyway, a number in that particular scenario with 
my professional role, the impact it may have on me if I didn’t go through 
with what I was seemingly obliged to do… 
 
Geraldine and Elaine’s accounts are further evidence of how social workers 
positioned themselves as ‘at risk’ as result of tensions that arose from contradictions 
between the requirements of agencies and their own perspectives and viewpoints. For 
example, when Geraldine was asked to sign a document in which a stated condition 
of her employment was that she would not tell clients she was a lesbian, she realised 
that: 
apart from the risk of losing my job there was also a risk to my 
integrity…to my integrity as a person that I wasn’t prepared to back out 
on that journey of accepting myself and as a principle of social justice 
that I saw for myself.  
Similarly Elaine was reluctant to take part in an unannounced home visit. As Elaine 
explained, she felt ‘at risk’ in the sense that: 
the job…just didn’t sit right with me…so I saw that as a risk as well 
because I would never want to be in a position where I…walked in there 
and looked at that family and not given two hoots…In that particular 
circumstance, I would never want it to feel OK to see someone being 
disempowered. So at that point I thought, ‘Do I really have to do this?’. 
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Thus the ‘compromised worker’ identity was characterised by the presence of doubt, 
fear and conflicts between organisational and personal/professional ethics. 
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The ‘judged practitioner’ was an ‘at risk’ identity which was apparent within the 
stories of Elaine, Geraldine, Josephine, Mark, Sebastian, and Zoe. Being judged 
related to the extent to which these social workers felt as though they were being 
watched by others (Elaine, Josephine) and in terms of negative judgements that could 
be made about their practice (Geraldine, Mark, Sebastian, Zoe). The sense of being 
watched was particularly strong for Josephine as a consequence of her job being a 
newly created position, and she had a sense that people were watching her to see if 
she could demonstrate the viability of the position. In speaking of feeling as though 
she was being watched, Josephine explained: 
The family have an agenda. They are watching me. The organisation has 
an agenda and they are watching me. The police have a different agenda. 
My own organisation. And they are all watching very closely and they 
are all being very supportive in that. However, it is still, that is at the 
fore. So it is terrifying.  
This feeling of being watched was also felt by Elaine. Elaine had an acute sense of 
how she was being judged in her work as a result of being a new social work graduate 
as well as a new worker in her organisation. Elaine stated: 
I guess I was feeling evaluated every day while I was there because I was 
the new worker and all that sort of stuff. But certainly at that particular 
time I thought all eyes were on me. 
 
Mark was acutely sensitive to the possibility of being judged by Geoffrey, the male 
client he was working with. As mentioned previously, Geoffrey had ‘sacked’ a former 
worker. Geoffrey was also extremely critical of the help he had received from other 
professionals. Consequently, Mark spoke of himself as being ‘at risk’ in the following 
terms: 
So there are risks around…the judgement. I wonder knowing what he’s 
done to other people, I wonder, you know, when it is going to happen to 
me. 
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In addition, Mark feared for his professional reputation if he was judged in negative 
terms by Geoffrey. Geoffrey was being seen by another professional and Mark saw 
the potential for the two professions to be played off against the other. In speaking of 
the risk this posed to Mark, he stated: 
This is why it’s risky for me in many ways. I said to him, ‘Look, I think if 
you are seeing another worker you maybe should consider continuing 
with that worker. Because…he said, ‘I’m here because I want to see how 
you might be different to the person I’m already seeing’. And I thought, 
‘Oh shit’. And so I thought, ‘Look, tread carefully here because I don’t 
particularly want to be upsetting another worker or him going back and 
saying, ‘I’ve found this person that’s really good and you’re useless’…So 
these are some of the risks that are involved with this young man. 
Especially when he’d been working with a worker who could throw a 
spanner in the works and has…particular ideas about what should be 
done about it and how this man can be fixed…and I know that he’s the 
sort of person that would talk about these things quite openly in public. 
He’s not backward in talking about his own life and things that he 
does...I think too the more I look back at it I also didn’t want to be judged 
by this other person in terms of my own, by the other worker in terms of 
my own practice and I didn’t want Geoffrey to be telling him that he was 
seeing me…I suppose I felt like I didn’t want to be judged by this other 
professional.  
 
The potential to be judged by people was a sad consequence for Sebastian of the 
threats that were made during the abusive phone call that Trevor received. One of the 
things the male caller had said to Trevor was, ‘I’ve seen you with your 
…counsellor…Don’t trust this person. Don’t trust him’. Consequently, Sebastian was 
worried that Trevor would lose his trust in him and that other people who might hear 
of this story would also think negatively of him. In speaking of this, Sebastian 
clarified: 
There was this pride in me that what would people think about me based 
on what this man had said about not trusting this person?…I kind of 
worried about other people’s perceptions. I guess it’s that whole thing 
about what does it say about me or what, that’s not right, because I know 
it doesn’t say anything about me. I knew that was more about what would 
other people think it says about me as a person and as a worker. 
Zoe’s fear of being judged related to how her decision to leave a child with his 
parents in spite of substantive evidence of physical abuse might be criticised by 
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others in the present or future. Zoe explained that workers like herself were often ‘at 
risk’ of criticism of their practices: 
It is a small network and things get spread incredibly quickly about, like, 
‘This worker is crap’ or ‘This worker has got a big mouth’ and ‘This 
worker is such and such’…Things spread very quickly, negative things 
spread quickly and positive things less so…  
In the context of this investigation, Zoe identified herself ‘at risk’ in immediate and 
future terms and thus had to employ a number of strategies to protect herself from 
negative judgements. In speaking of herself as ‘at risk’, Zoe stated that:  
it was key to the decision how I thought others would see me or see my 
practice particularly in regard to…people who would read the file in the 
future – if there was another notification made and how they read this 
file note…it happens where something bad happens so you shift the 
blame. This happens in a management level as well…You kind of write a 
file note about your discussions…You are kind of putting the blame on 
some imaginary person…So even though you are worried what people 
think about you and your practice, that is, how you get rid of that feeling. 
You justify it to yourself…it helps you cope…Otherwise you would go 
really nuts…  
Thus it is apparent the identity of ‘judged worker’ was in part constituted by social 
workers fearing what others might think of them and their practice. 
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The ‘vexed practitioner’ was an ‘at risk’ identity that was in operation within 
Graham’s and Jenny’s accounts. Both of these practitioners positioned themselves as 
being ‘at risk’ within their work with their clients. Graham’s and Jenny’s stories 
illustrate their sense of exasperation in their work and the seeming futility of their 
interventions in responding to the complex and demanding needs of each of their 
clients. For example, Graham recounted that:  
there were…two or three of us who worked with this chap at different 
times, and we would all just look at each other afterwards and just, 
‘Where do you go from here?’. You could make suggestions and offer 
support, but – and he would seem to accept that and then come back half 
an hour later and say, ‘No. I’ve changed my mind. I don’t want to do that 
now. I want to do this’…so it can be quite frustrating. 
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The lack of progress in resolving this man’s difficulties regarding his accommodation 
began to take their toll on Graham and in turn he began to identify the client as a 
‘problem client’ and positioned himself as being ‘at risk’ from him. In speaking these 
two identities into existence, Graham recollected that: 
I used to enjoy visiting him and we used to have some great discussions. 
But then it just got to the point where his illness began to become a little 
worse because of whatever reason, his paranoia, and I just found it so 
frustrating at times. It used to make me really angry so towards the end I 
was – I think I was getting little bit burnt out. I mean everyday he was 
coming in with another situation and it was the same old situation, and 
he’d get so far with that part of it and all of a sudden he would jump back 
three or four years…Yeah, so I started becoming very impatient I think 
and very frustrated to the point where I was actively making sure I just 
wasn’t around if he was coming in. I’d think, ‘Oh no, I just can’t handle 
this again. And tell him I’m with a client or tell him I’m out’…Yes, 
because I just felt that I was just being totally overcome by his situation.  
 
Jenny also felt like she had gone as far as she could with the young woman she was 
working with, who threatened violence against family members, had attempted 
suicide on a number of occasions and who laughed during her times with Jenny. In 
speaking of this client as ‘a problem’, Jenny’s identity as a ‘vexed practitioner’ is 
clearly apparent. Jenny reflected that: 
I was getting angry and I was getting frustrated…I think I just needed to 
nail it up. Some days I get so pissed off with clients. I think, ‘Bugger you. 
I am just going to tell you what I am thinking because I am sick to death 
of you just not giving me the full story or treating me like – yes’. I have 
days like that and she kind of caught me on one of those days.  
Therefore the ‘vexed practitioner’ ‘at risk’ identity was often spoken of in association 
with practitioners describing their feelings of frustration, stress and anger. 
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Six practitioners spoke of themselves as being ‘a risk’ to clients – Elaine, Kaitlin, 
Josephine, Linda, Maggie and Moira. Within their narratives, the characterisations of 
‘ineffective’, ‘persecutory’, ‘overzealous’ and ‘discriminatory’ practitioner risk 
identities have been identified. Geraldine was identified as ‘a risk’ to clients by the 
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organisation she worked in. Within Geraldine’s account the ascription of her as a 
‘dangerous worker’ is evident. 
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Elaine, Linda and Moira spoke of how they questioned their competence and ability 
to respond to their clients. In this respect, these social workers questioned whether 
they might have put their clients or others ‘at risk’ as a result of not having 
implemented effective interventions. In Elaine’s case, she felt as though her 
inexperience had put her client ‘at risk’ when she conducted an unannounced home 
visit. She said: 
I guess most of my decision was based on what other people were telling 
me but that only because I had never worked with this family before 
’cause I’d only been in the job for five minutes…If I had a choice I 
wouldn’t have. 
Linda spoke of her work with a woman who had been subjected to ritualised sexual 
abuse over a significant period of time. The client had been self-harming, and this 
was escalating. Linda was seeing the woman during the time that the self-harming 
was escalating. Then the client made a major suicide attempt. Consequently, Linda 
questioned if she had somehow failed the client by not helping to connect her to a 
more enabling story of herself. In speaking of being ‘a risk’ to the client, Linda asked 
herself: 
Could I have done something else? What if she did die, then where would 
I be...the kind of evaluations…of what I was doing, you know, about 
myself in the role and…maybe I’m not skilled enough to do this, you 
know, that sort of crept in at one stage. You know that thing between 
psychologists and psychiatrists and social workers – maybe they do know 
something after all that I don’t, that can help in that particular time of a 
person’s life…I immediately went to what I didn’t do and what didn’t I 
do, and how that could be linked to something negative rather than all 
the possibilities it actually could have given here…So immediately 
thinking that there was some kind of lack there. That was the first point of 
call. 
Maggie was also concerned how her interventions might create risk for people. 
Maggie felt overwhelmed by her lack of knowledge about how to work effectively 
with a sex offender and she was quite certain that the client would re-offend. Maggie 
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was anxious to prevent this, but felt out of her depth in responding to the situation. In 
speaking of herself as ‘a risk’, Maggie asked: 
What do you do with someone like him when you are me? What sort of 
interventions? What do you talk to him about…I am just – I have been 
really nervous about working with this person because there are 
obviously huge concerns, but no-one is doing – what can we do with 
him? What are we going to do with this person? There is no-one that has 
the skills to manage a client like this. I don’t have the skills to…I just feel 
like I am putting a whole lot of people at risk, but I don’t really know 
what to do with the person … 
Therefore, Elaine, Linda and Maggie spoke of themselves as ‘ineffective 
practitioners’ on the basis that they thought they had put others ‘at risk’. 
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Kaitlin stated that she was tempted to use her professional power inappropriately with 
the father of the little boy she was working with. In speaking of her involvement with 
the family, Kaitlin recounted how the father of this young boy became increasingly 
hostile towards her involvement and she felt extremely ‘tempted to misuse my 
professional power to persecute him’ and believed she had ‘started to go there’. To 
support this positioning of herself as ‘a risk’ in this regard, Kaitlin explained: 
What I knew…was that I have incredible strength, incredible strength 
and I have a very strong mind and I used it to resist the temptation to try 
and just tear this guy apart basically. I knew I could because I knew I 
had the intelligence to do it, which is not to say that he wasn’t intelligent 
because he was. But I had the education and I had other things that he 
didn’t have available to him and I know I could’ve done it….wow, it was 
so tempting. I used to have to bite my tongue to not do it. So I knew from 
then like I had this issue and it wasn’t only with him…I knew very 
clearly…I could very easily go down that line of persecution. Very easily. 
So I became very aware that I’ve got to be very, very careful when I am 
working with angry violent men who are perpetrating abuse, particularly 
abuse of children, because I can come down that line so quickly. So that’s 
what I’m talking about in relation to this father. I knew that in one sense 
I could’ve chewed him up. 
Kaitlin thus identified herself as ‘a risk’ to the young boy’s father. Kaitlin was aware 
that this ‘a risk’ identity, if enacted, could have a detrimental impact upon her 
relationship with the father and in turn limit her influence to secure the safety of the 
child within the family.  
  
155 
	&7		

Kaitlin and Josephine were sensitive to how their respective practices with their 
young clients could have put them ‘at risk’ of further abuse by family members. 
Kaitlin realised this when she recalled that her client’s behaviour towards her changed 
as her relationship with his father capitulated. Consequently, Kaitlin asked him: 
‘When you go home does your dad ask if you’ve seen me?’ And he said, 
‘Yes’. And I said, ‘Is it really, really, really hard for you?’ And he said, 
‘Yes’, and he started crying. I said, ‘So is it easier for you not to see me? 
And he said, ‘Yes’. 
This disclosure placed Kaitlin in a difficult position, as she was extremely concerned 
for his safety and wellbeing and thus wanted to continue to support and monitor him 
within his family. However, Kaitlin reflected that the acknowledgement by the child 
that he was experiencing hardship as a consequence of him seeing her: 
made me much more aware of his vulnerability and how I could actually 
contribute to his vulnerability and just by virtue of my presence and me 
thinking that this child has a right to have an adult intervene and 
advocate. I could take that ground but what I was doing was actually 
increasing the potential of a real harm to him by doing that. 
Josephine spoke of her work with her young client in similar terms. Josephine 
realised that if she went to court to advocate for the child he could have experienced 
some form of retaliation. Josephine recalled that: 
it is a reality that he might get killed. It is not just words…the 
ramifications on him were potentially huge…it is a real risk because the 
reality is that there may be repercussions… 
Being ‘a risk’ to their clients was thus recognised as an unintended consequence of 
Kaitlin’s and Josephine’s action.   
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Moira felt incredibly conflicted when she realised the client she was seeing was the 
partner of a woman she had been helping who had been physically assaulted by him. 
As has been discussed above, Moira was fearful of this man. However, she was also 
cognisant of his right to receive a service from her agency, and how this would have 
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happened without question if she didn’t have this other knowledge of him. As Moria 
explained: 
I would have found that very difficult to continue working with him 
knowing those things about him. And it probably would have coloured 
the way that I provided a service to him which is, you know, unfair to 
him… 
Thus in common with the other social workers who spoke of themselves as ‘a risk’ to 
clients, Moira recognised how she could place her client ‘at risk’ through her 
interventions.  
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In point of difference to the self-ascribed ‘a risk’ practitioner identities mentioned 
above, Geraldine was ascribed an ‘a risk’ worker identity by others. Geraldine was 
spoken of as a ‘dangerous practitioner’ by her organisation. Geraldine tearfully 
recalled that: 
They saw me as dangerous for clients. That’s how they described me or 
thought of me…they did say women would be frightened of me…And it 
hurt to be told that women would be frightened of me. It felt like they 
were saying ‘you’re dangerous’ which by implication if you’re frightened 
of somebody you think they were dangerous to you… 
As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, the impact of the ascription of this 
‘a risk’ worker identity had devastating consequences for Geraldine. However, her 
organisation was uncompromising in its view that if Geraldine was to disclose that 
she was a lesbian to clients she would be placing them ‘at risk’. As Geraldine 
clarified: 
I was the risk to clients. I was talking about my personal sexual issues, 
that is what they said, with clients…I was talking about my own personal 
sexual issues with clients just because I said I was a lesbian or wanted to. 
I didn’t actually even say it. And what did they think I was? That’s what 
hurt so much, that they did think I was perverted. That you would want to 
say that – oh, that still makes me feel sick in the stomach…I didn’t realise 
that before, that they [the workplace] only saw it as being about 
somehow being associated with, only with sex, with a way of just 
dismissing or making it perverted. That hurt. That hurt a lot. I saw myself 
as hurt. I saw myself as really different. 
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Geraldine thus experienced the totalising effect of this ‘at risk’ identity within her 
workplace. The influence of the heterosexist assumptions that were made about her 
and the agency’s clients in the construction of this identity are starkly present in 
Geraldine’s narrative. The power of this identity was such that it overtook the positive 
relationships that Geraldine had previously shared with her work colleagues and 
friends.  
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The ascription of risk identities to clients and practitioners that has been presented in 
this chapter demonstrates the complexity involved in how ideas about risk were 
constituted and integrated into social workers’ practice. The depth of this complexity 
becomes more evident in Table 2, which assimilates all of the risk identities that were 
spoken into existence by each practitioner within their reflective narratives of their 
interventions.  
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Client Risk Identity Practitioner Risk Identities 
 
Client ‘at risk’ Client ‘a risk’ Practitioner ‘at risk’ Practitioner ‘a risk’ 
Elaine • Vulnerable • Violent/Neglectful • Compromised 
• Judged 
• Ineffective 
Frances • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
• Unsafe  
• Violent/Neglectful • Vulnerable  
Geraldine • Discriminated   • Vulnerable 
• Compromised 
• Judged 
• Dangerous 
Graham • Unsafe • Violent/Neglectful 
• Problem 
• Vulnerable 
• Vexed 
 
Jenny • Unsafe • Violent/Neglectful 
• Problem 
• Vexed  
Joseph  • Violent/Neglectful 
     (colleagues) 
• Compromised  
Josephine • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
• Unsafe 
• Violent/Neglectful • Judged • Overzealous 
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Kaitlin • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
• Unsafe 
 • Vulnerable • Persecutory 
• Overzealous 
Linda • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
  • Ineffective 
Maggie • Abused • Violent/Neglectful • Compromised • Ineffective 
Mark • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
• Problem • Vulnerable 
• Judged 
 
Moira • Discriminated • Violent/Neglectful • Vulnerable 
• Compromised 
• Discriminatory 
Narelle • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
• Unsafe 
• Discriminated 
• Violent/Neglectful • Vulnerable 
• Compromised 
 
Peter • Abused 
• Unsafe 
• Violent/Neglectful 
 
• Compromised  
Petra • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
 • Vulnerable 
• Compromised 
 
Sebastian • Vulnerable 
• Abused 
• Discriminated 
 • Vulnerable 
• Judged 
 
Zoe • Vulnerable • Violent/Neglectful • Vulnerable 
• Judged 
 
 
Table 2 clarifies that, with the exception of Joseph, all clients were ascribed an ‘at 
risk’ identity within social workers’ reflections of their interventions. Joseph, who 
had spoken about an intervention with colleagues, did not identify his colleagues as 
‘at risk’ in any way. Table 2 also demonstrates that clients were often ascribed 
multiple risk identities within each risk identity category. This table also indicates 
that some clients were spoken of as having both ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities within 
practitioners’ reflective narratives of their interventions. Narelle succinctly explained 
this situation in her intervention in the following terms: 
There were two types of risk that were going on there. Initially there was 
the risk of the client – the client’s risk and I saw her as being at risk from 
violence because I immediately saw her as a victim and that was because 
of a whole number of things, mainly because she was transgendered, I 
think, and a woman. Then it was revealed that she is a perp [perpetrator] 
and so that is when the risk changed and I saw myself at risk. 
This is an important finding, as it alludes to a tension between ‘a risk’ and ‘at risk’ 
identities. While the stories that have been presented thus far indicate that there is a 
measure of compatibility within the sub-identity categories that constitute ‘at risk’ 
and ‘a risk’ client identities, this is not the case between these broad identity 
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categories. As will become clear in the following chapter, varying degrees of tension 
and conflict existed between client ‘at risk’ and client ‘a risk’ identities. Social 
workers were required to make a decision about which, if either, identity would be 
emphasised within their interventions.  
 
This conflict was exacerbated by the presence of practitioner risk identities, which are 
also assimilated in Table 2. An important finding here is that in all but one instance 
these practitioner risk identities were reflexively constructed by social workers 
themselves. That is, social workers either identified themselves as ‘at risk’ from 
clients and others or ‘a risk’ to clients and others. Thus the interdependence between 
practitioner and client risk identities can be noted. The exception to the reflexive 
construction of a practitioner risk identity was Geraldine, who was ascribed an ‘a 
risk’ identity by her organisation. The way that Geraldine speaks of this identity 
contrasts sharply with other practitioners, particularly the other social workers who 
spoke of themselves as ‘a risk’. In Geraldine’s case, the identity of ‘dangerous 
practitioner’ operated with significant power in localising her as the embodiment of 
risk. The other exception that can be noted in Table 2 is Linda, who is the only social 
worker who did not ascribe herself an ‘at risk’ practitioner identity. Instead Linda 
spoke of herself as ‘a risk’ to the ‘at risk’ client she was working with.   
 
Further insight into the complexity of how risk operated in practitioners’ 
interventions is in the recognition of the multiple risk identities that practitioners 
spoke of in relation to themselves. This complexity is most visible in Elaine, 
Geraldine, Josephine, Kaitlin, Maggie and Moira’s reflective accounts in which they 
positioned themselves as simultaneously ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’. Thus, as was the case 
for client risk identities, tension existed among practitioner risk identities. This 
tension is also explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
 
Accordingly, Table 2 illustrates that multiple client and practitioner risk identities 
were simultaneously in operation in many of the interventions spoken of by social 
workers. The configurations of these co-existing, multiple risk identities are 
summarised below in Table 3. 
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This table hints at the tensions that were manifest among client and practitioner risk 
identities in social workers’ interventions. As is discussed in the following chapter, 
these risk identities were often in competition with each other, and in many situations 
social workers had to make a choice regarding which, if any, of these risk identities 
would be emphasised within their interventions. Thus Table 3 indicates that the 
integration into practice of ideas about risk that had been constituted in social 
workers’ interventions was a complicated process.  
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Craig was the sole practitioner who did 
not narrate a ‘risk story’ in his reflective account of his significant intervention. In 
addition, two other practitioners (Linda and Peter) offered additional, alternative ways 
of understanding risk in their interventions. The contributions of these three 
practitioners for extending an understanding of the meanings and qualities attributed 
to risk and its significance in the construction of client and practitioner identities is 
reviewed in this final section of this chapter. 
 
Configurations of Client and Practitioner Risk Identities 
1. Colleagues 
a risk 
2. Practitioner 
at risk 
 
Joseph 
1. Client/ 
colleagues 
at risk 
2. Practitioner 
at risk 
 
Petra, 
Sebastian 
1. Client at risk 
2. Practitioner 
a risk 
 
 
Linda 
 
1. Client at risk 
2. Client a risk 
3. Practitioner 
at risk 
 
Frances, 
Graham, 
Jenny, Mark, 
Narelle, Peter, 
Zoe 
1. Client at risk 
2. Practitioner 
at risk 
3. Practitioner 
a risk 
 
Geraldine, 
Kaitlin,  
1. Client at risk 
2. Client a risk 
3. Practitioner 
at risk 
4. Practitioner 
a risk 
Elaine, 
Josephine, 
Maggie, Moira 
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Risk was spoken of as being everywhere and as a negative construct by Linda and 
Peter. However, in addition, these two social workers emphasised the importance of 
time in their conceptualisations of risk. Peter had spoken about the concerns he had 
for a male client who said he had been physically assaulted by his female partner and 
whom the client had also physically assaulted. In the course of his work with this 
client, Peter realised that this client had faced a big decision in choosing whether or 
not to leave his partner and find alternative accommodation. Peter spoke of this 
client’s circumstances as exemplifying the difficulties in having to make choices 
when risks existed in both the immediate and future contexts of client’s lives. In 
explaining this concept of risk, Peter said:  
Sometimes I think we cannot take a short term risk, of current risk right 
now…because the short term, perceived risk might actually be more risky 
in the long term and vice versa…I think our clients have got a very 
present risk, right here, right now and also have that longer term [risk] 
and I think there’s a connection between the long term and short term. 
Thus Peter understood that clients faced different kinds of risk that were defined by 
time. Accordingly, Peter emphasised the temporal quality of risk.  
 
 While Linda also emphasised the temporality of risk, she conceptualised this in 
different terms to Peter. Upon receiving the questions that I would be asking her in 
the second interview, Linda reflected some more about her intervention with a 
woman who had been physically and sexually abused as a child and who had recently 
made a suicide attempt. To use Linda’s words she had, ‘unpacked what it all meant’. 
After doing this reflective exercise Linda realised that her conceptualisation of risk as 
a ‘negative construct’ had been unhelpful in this intervention. In the space of time 
since we had met, Linda had reconceptualised risk as ‘ongoing’. Linda phrased this as 
‘the person is not out of the woods yet’. To clarify this point, Linda said:  
I think I see that…there is time associated with risk and quite a bit of 
time. Not a couple of hours, like months or weeks, depending on how 
much the person is struggling with it…risk is not just one-off or two-off, 
you know, it’s like a block of time... 
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Thus Linda had begun to construct an alternative conceptualisation of risk in which 
she had integrated the significance of time as a defining aspect of ongoing risk. In this 
respect, Linda had begun to extend her understanding of the meaning of risk.   
 
Craig spoke of risk in very different terms to the other social workers who 
participated in this study. Craig spoke about his work with a young adolescent woman 
who was described to him as ‘a little bit anxious and a little bit depressed’ and that 
she experienced ‘visitations, voices, experiences, that weren’t hers…it was like out of 
body experiences. Like other people coming into her body, her head’. She was also 
having terrible nightmares. When asked about whether risk was present in his 
intervention with this young woman, Craig said that while he thought there was, ‘risk 
involved for the young person...[and] the risk for me emotionally is another risk’, he 
had, ‘never thought of it [the risk to himself] as a risk’. Instead, Craig conceptualised 
his work in terms of his working to reduce ‘the odds’ that he thought were stacked 
again his client. In elaborating this point, Craig explained:  
It’s what you’re prepared, in gambling terms, what you’re prepared to 
stake you know, it’s the wager, it’s the bet. And the odds are stacked, the 
odds are always stacked, and it’s about reducing that…how I sort of saw 
it, the odds are stacked. If I can reduce the odds in a way, that’s cool, 
then I’ll do it and I’ll wear the consequences. 
Thus Craig emphasised the significance of ‘choice’ as an organising concept in his 
intervention. Acknowledging that he had choices in how he intervened meant that 
Craig was cognisant of there being numerous options for how he might respond to the 
needs of this young woman. As Craig said: 
the degree of choice is that I can probably choose out of one of a million 
things at the time and my choice would be based on how I feel, how I 
assess the situation.  
Thus whilst Craig spoke of risk as being present for the client, he did not speak of it 
as a relevant concept in his practice.  
 
An emphasis on choice and his acceptance of his need to accept responsibility for the 
outcomes of his choices meant that Craig did not think that risk could enter into the 
situation for himself. This was because Craig was guided by a principle of ‘harm 
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reduction or harm minimisation’ in making his practice choices. This was different 
from risk. Craig conceptualised risk as a conscious act of doing harm, which Craig 
referred to as ‘gross risks’. Gross risks included ‘abusing somebody, or treating them 
unethically’. According to Craig, these kinds of risks: 
don’t even enter it [the professional setting] with me…I don’t operate 
like that…I don’t operate from a position where I would think that 
abusing somebody or being dishonest is part of how I work with them. 
It’s like I keep it out because I don’t want it. 
Consequently, risk was not conceptualised as an integrated aspect of Craig’s 
intervention with the client he was working with. Essentially, Craig spoke against the 
possibility of risk in his practice given his stance against harming others in his work 
and choosing instead to ‘advance the odds’ in favour of the client. Thus Craig’s story 
stands as a radical disjuncture to the conceptualisations of risk that are presented 
earlier in this chapter. 
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The alternative conceptualisations of risk that were spoken by Craig, Linda and Peter 
influenced their thinking about clients’ and their own risk identities. Peter indicated 
that he thought that the short and long term nature of risk was constitutive of the 
formation of ‘at risk’ client identities. Peter’s reasoning was that clients fear the 
unknown consequences of the future and thus choose to stay in the familiar 
environments of the present. Thus in the case of domestic violence, Peter said that 
clients remain ‘at risk’ of being ‘unsafe’ and ‘abused’. In expanding upon this point, 
Peter stated: 
sometimes I think that these two risks, the risk of the current 
situation…and then the perceived risk for change that inhibits people…I 
think that while people stay in domestic violence…people recognise that 
where they are, it is risky, right, I could get a smack under the ear 
tonight, but moving out in a way is a far more risky and this 
risk…outweighs that one. 
Thus Peter noted that the ‘at risk’ client identities of being ‘unsafe’ and ‘abused’ were 
sustained by a client’s fear of the risks they might encounter in their unknown futures.  
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Linda’s conceptualisation of risk as ‘ongoing’ did not mean that she thought clients 
were continuously ‘at risk’ for the rest of their lives. She believed that clients could 
heal and risk would dissipate. However, in reflecting about how she conceptualised 
risk in her practice, Linda realised that the temporal dimension of risk had become 
integrated into her understanding of the healing process in her subsequent 
interventions with her client. Within this framework, being ‘at risk’ was seen as a 
natural state by Linda for the woman she was working with who had been so terribly 
abused. It was simply going to take time. Being ‘at risk’, then, did not need to be seen 
as problematic in this sense. As Linda explained: 
I think I have been looking at risk as maybe a symptom and that is not 
necessarily helpful when it comes to risk…Risk is ongoing…I thought, 
well, I make the assumption that it takes time for a person not to be at 
risk to themselves. And that with insight, self-knowledge and alternatives 
they can build this up as a force over time to conquer or extinguish the 
risk. Then risk suddenly disappears from the story. 
The integration of this concept of risk into Linda’s practice changed the way Linda’s 
‘risk beliefs effected my view of the client’. Having an ‘at risk’ client identity was 
naturalised in a sense. An acceptance of the time it would take to heal meant that an 
‘at risk’ client identity did not need to be recognised by Linda as a problematic 
identity.  
 
Craig spoke against the ascription of an ‘at risk’ client identity in his work. While he 
acknowledged that the young woman he was working with could be seen to be ‘at 
risk’ in one sense, he did not construct an identity for her that was mediated by the 
concept of risk. Instead, Craig spoke of this young woman as being ‘the expert of her 
own life’. This was a perspective that Craig said typified his work with all his clients. 
Within this framework there was little space to acknowledge a risk identity. Instead, 
Craig explained: 
I think [clients are] already in touch with who they are, but I think 
they’re in touch with a bit of them that has somehow blocked out the 
other bits of them. I’m in touch with the part of me that’s depressed, 
suicidal, psychotic, behaviour damaged, traumatised, whatever other 
labels are put around. However, somebody thinking and feeling like that, 
and it’s almost, I don’t like to use the word ‘never’, but it’s almost never 
true. It’s only true for little bits. 
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Thus the concept of risk had not been integrated into Craig’s intervention. Indeed, he 
had actively denied its relevance within his framework of practice. 
 
The alternative conceptualisations of risk that were spoken by Linda and Craig were 
evident in how they spoke of themselves in their practice. In Linda’s example the 
realisation that her client was ‘not out of the woods yet’ meant that Linda did not 
have to continue to ascribe a practitioner risk identity to herself as an ‘ineffective 
practitioner’. Accepting that the client would take time to heal meant that Linda 
didn’t have to position herself as needing an immediate solution for the client. As 
Linda explained: 
I think I attached with the risk a sense of prescribed time...and...I think 
the risk in it made me want to kind of get a sense of control about her, or 
pathology or prescription...I kind of turned it around…Like the static side 
of risk is thinking like you’ve got to get in there…but when you unpack 
that you can just hope that they can challenge it in whatever way and 
consult with them. So I kind of went, hoping is more linked with 
consulting and prescribing is more linked with those unhelpful ideas that 
tell you what they should be doing...that narrow, unhealthy risk stuff 
made me prescribe for her, my job was to keep her alive to avoid this 
worst consequence, you know…  
Thus Linda was able to let herself ‘off the hook’ in her work with this woman. 
Consequently, Linda had integrated her reconceptualised understanding of risk into 
her practice through a story of ‘hope’ for the client. In this alternative practice story, 
the practitioner risk identity that Linda had spoken about had lost its relevance and 
power. 
 
Given that Craig had not centred risk as an important concept in his practice, a 
practitioner risk identity was perhaps unsurprisingly absent from Craig’s reflections 
about his intervention. Craig recognised that he could have felt scared about working 
with a young woman who could be seen to be experiencing a psychosis. As Craig 
said: 
Things always lose their scare. I often get nervous and a bit scared when 
I first hear some stuff because, you know, underneath – fuck! But that’s 
just my own head stuff. Then a couple of minutes, you’re five to ten 
minutes into a conversation, it just disappears. 
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In explaining how he had integrated these ideas into his practice, Craig explained: 
There’s no mystique around psychosis. It’s just somebody who is in pain 
from something and they want it to stop or they want something else. I 
think it’s just the same process of conversation and discussion. At times it 
might be on a really different plane of reality…but it’s still the same sort 
of process, so it just looses any of that sort of negative type mystique 
fairly quickly. Yeah, so there’s no scare involved for me at all around 
that stuff...Apart from the beginning, when you first hear, ‘Geeze the 
woman’s hearing voices. Oh God’, you know. Then I started talking with 
her and there’s this very scared, terrified young girl who is just like 
anybody else... 
Accordingly Craig’s resistance to the place of risk and fear in his practice meant that 
he constructed an alternative understanding of his role in his work. He actively took 
steps to avoid being ‘a risk’ to clients and his emphasis on accepting the 
consequences of his practice choices and to normalise feelings of fear meant that he 
did not position himself as ‘at risk’ in his work. 
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Craig, Linda and Peter’s stories provide another layer of understanding to the 
question of how ideas about risk are constituted and integrated into social workers’ 
interventions. In addition to understanding risk to be a pervasive and negative force in 
social workers’ practice, Linda and Peter’s narratives indicate the importance of time 
in generating an understanding about what risk is and what risk does. The ongoing 
dimension of risk that Linda spoke of resonates with social workers who spoke of risk 
as being everywhere. These practitioners also spoke of the presence of risk over time, 
such as in Josephine’s statement that ‘risk walks by that child every day’. Thus the 
conceptualisation of risk as everywhere integrates the ideas that risk is present in 
social workers’ practice, it is dispersed across their relationships with clients and 
colleagues, and it is also dispersed across time. 
 
Overwhelmingly risk was spoken of by practitioners as a negative construct in their 
practice. Risk meant threat, harm, abuse, violence and negative consequences. Craig’s 
discussion about ‘gross risk’ resonates with these ideas. However, in Linda’s re-
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conceptualisation of the significance of time, risk is disrupted as a negative lens for 
viewing the client or herself. Instead, Linda reconnects risk with hope, given that risk 
is reconceptualised as a natural part of the healing process. Thus in addition to the 
negative construct of risk, Linda’s account offers an understanding of risk as ‘a 
natural consequence of being harmed’. 
 
Linda’s, Peter’s and Craig’s conceptualisations of risk also offer another layer of 
depth to understanding how risk is integrated into social work practice. Linda and 
Peter demonstrate that risk identities can lose their power as problematic and 
totalising identities. Thus in addition to social workers speaking of risk as being 
integrated into practice through the ascription of multiple risk identities, Linda’s and 
Peter’s reflections add that these risk identities can be seen as contingent upon time 
and can change. They are not fixed identities nor do they speak the whole story of 
who clients are. Craig’s reflection about his practice is a powerful reminder of this. 
Craig’s story demonstrates that risk can be absent from social work interventions. It is 
not necessarily a dominant concept upon which identities and practices must be 
based. Thus while risk can be a dominant feature of social work interventions, as was 
discussed by many of the participants in this study, Craig’s story indicates it is not 
inherent to social work interventions. It is possible for social workers to discursively 
position themselves in other ways to risk.  
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In this chapter I have indicated that, in all but one instance, social workers 
conceptualised risk as a ‘reality’ of their practice. In addition it was considered by 
them to be ubiquitous and each practitioner spoke of risk primarily as a negative 
concept. Risk was spoken of as a pervasive and persistent force within clients’ and 
practitioners’ lives. Constructed in these terms the negative presence of risk was 
rarely questioned by practitioners. Instead it was considered inherent to events and to 
people. My study indicates that this dominant conceptualisation of risk was integrated 
into social workers’ practice through their ascribing ‘risk identities’ to clients, 
colleagues and themselves. Risk became embodied for practitioners in this process. 
More often than not fear was a formidable presence in how social workers spoke 
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about client ‘a risk’ and their own ‘at risk’ identities. Conversely, feelings of 
compassion were expressed when many practitioners spoke of their clients’ ‘at risk’ 
identities. I have also indicated that co-existing, multiple risk identities were spoken 
of as being in operation within the context of each practitioners’ intervention. That is, 
clients were often spoken of as being ‘at risk’ and/or as ‘a risk’ by social workers, 
who in turn spoke of themselves as being ‘at risk’ and/or ‘a risk’. I have indicated that 
a degree of tension existed between these co-existing risk identities. The following 
chapter explores this tension and conflict in the context of how these risk identity 
conflicts presented social workers with moral dilemmas in their intervention choices. 
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Each of the stories captured within this study were initially told as narratives of 
practice situations that were significant to social workers. Primarily these stories told 
a tale of the dilemmas that social workers faced in their practice. My study suggests 
that these dilemmas arose, at least in part, when practitioners were confronted with 
the presence of, and conflict between, co-existing, multiple client and practitioner risk 
identities. Building upon the results of the preceding chapter, I demonstrate that the 
source of the dilemmas most often confronting practitioners was their questioning 
their practice in response to the ‘moralisation’ of these identities. Practitioners 
‘moralised’ client, colleague and their own risk identities by attributing a moral value 
to them in terms of their being ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘innocent’ or ‘blameworthy’. Having 
spoken of clients and/or themselves in these terms, social workers then engaged with 
the difficult task of reconciling the moral tensions and conflicts that were attendant to 
each of these identities.  
 
I will show in this chapter that one of the critical issues that arose for practitioners 
was that practitioners felt conflicted about which risk identities they should respond 
to in their interventions – their client’s or their own? This was particularly the case 
when clients and practitioners were regarded as both being ‘at risk’. The other critical 
issue that arose for social workers was that ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities, be they in 
relation to themselves or clients, implied specific types of practice. ‘At risk’ identities 
required social workers to implement interventions directed towards advocating for 
and protecting people whereas ‘a risk’ identities required social workers to implement 
interventions that attempted to control or contain people’s behaviour. Essentially, 
then, practitioners were faced with a choice of either taking a stand ‘for’ or ‘against’ 
clients and/or taking a stand ‘for’ or ‘against’ themselves. The stance that social 
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workers came to adopt within their interventions thus reflected how they reconciled 
the moral tensions between the risk identities that were in operation within their 
practice situations.  
 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. I begin by presenting how social workers 
moralised clients’ and their own risk identities. Here I explore how social workers 
spoke of the moral adequacy of ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities. I then argue that these 
moralised risk identities presented practitioners with a particular kind of practice 
dilemma, that being whether they would take a stand for or against their clients and/or 
for or against themselves. Practitioners’ reflective accounts demonstrate that this 
practice dilemma was experienced by them, not as a professional or organisational 
issue, but as a personal moral dilemma and its resolution proved a struggle for each of 
them. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the stances that social workers 
enacted within their interventions.   
 
#	
$

	!	9

&
	

Tension between the co-existing, multiple, risk identities in operation within social 
workers’ practice situations was common to all but Joseph’s, Linda’s and Zoe’s 
narratives. These practitioners did not indicate a conflict between the risk identities 
that they had spoken of. Joseph felt ‘at risk’ from his work colleagues, thus 
positioning his colleagues as ‘a risk’ to him. Linda thought she was ‘a risk’ to her ‘at 
risk’ client. Thus there was a certain synchronicity between the risk identities that 
they had recognised. Zoe did not see herself primarily as ‘at risk’ from her ‘a risk’ 
client. Thus there was not a direct relationship between the client’s and her own risk 
identities. However, the other practitioners within this study each experienced various 
forms of discordance between the client and worker risk identities that were evident 
within their practice contexts. That is, clients could be ‘a risk’ and ‘at risk’ (Frances, 
Graham, Jenny, Josephine, Maggie, Mark, Moira, Narelle and Peter). Social workers 
could be ‘a risk’ and ‘at risk’ (Elaine, Geraldine, Josephine, Kaitlin, Maggie and 
Moira). Clients and practitioners could both be ‘at risk’ (Elaine, Frances, Graham, 
Jenny, Josephine, Kaitlin, Maggie, Mark, Moira, Narelle, Peter, Petra and Sebastian). 
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Clients and social workers could both be ‘a risk’ (Josephine, Maggie and Moira). 
Thus a time came for each of these practitioners where their practice deliberations 
reflected their asking, ‘Which of these identities is the stronger or correct version of 
who we are? Which version of these selves do I respond to in my practice?’. Joseph, 
Linda and Zoe, though not struggling with the first of these questions, nonetheless, 
also seemed conflicted within themselves regarding the stance they would take in 
their practice, given the risk identities that were present for them.  
 
Practitioners’ reflective accounts indicate that the tensions and conflicts surrounding 
risk identities were ostensibly related to moralising clients’ and their own risk 
identities. In moralising risk identities, practitioners made statements about the moral 
adequacy of clients, colleagues and themselves. The moralisation of client and 
practitioner risk identities was evident within social workers’ practice accounts in 
how they spoke of ‘at risk’ identities as indicative of the ‘goodness’ of people and ‘a 
risk’ identities as indicative of the ‘badness’ of people. ‘At risk’ clients were largely 
presented as guileless and without fault whereas ‘a risk’ clients were predominantly 
spoken of as being blameworthy in some way. A similar distinctive qualitative 
difference in the moral characterisation of ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ practitioner identities 
was also evident. In the crudest of terms, these moralised practitioner identities most 
often reflected a view of the ‘good’ social worker who could be or was wronged by 
others and the ‘well intentioned’ social worker who had acted in a misguided fashion. 
The particular ways in which these client and practitioner risk identities were 
moralised will now be discussed. 
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‘At risk’ clients were mostly spoken of as being virtuous or innocent people who had 
been victimised in some way (Elaine, Frances, Geraldine, Graham, Josephine, Kaitlin, 
Linda, Maggie, Mark, Narelle, Peter, Petra and Sebastian). For example in speaking 
of Julianna’s ‘at risk’ client identity, Frances said: 
She was one of the most lonely, isolated, sad little people…At Christmas 
time – you know those little crystal birds? I gave her one because she 
reminded me of a beautiful little delicate bird about to fly. And it was so 
beautiful though that she had to put it in a cupboard and not look at it. 
When I met her years later…she told me she had destroyed it. 
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Josephine also described her young client’s ‘at risk’ identity in similar terms. After 
meeting him for the first time, Josephine described him as: 
He was just delightful. This kid was absolutely delightful…he was very, 
very caring and very human and just a delight to work with. He really 
was just a delight and I wondered just how long it had been for him to be 
with an adult in a space where he could be a delight and kind of 
showcase some of the stuff that he knew about the world which was pretty 
impressive. 
Sebastian also spoke of his client, Trevor, in positive terms. Sebastian reflected that: 
Trevor was this wonderful young man who, you know, he just wore it and 
he needed to do that for him and, you know, I was just fully supporting 
him in that and he really just had this quest of wanting to be this strong 
individual…that he wanted to be this almost – well I’m thinking of him as 
kind of like a lamp almost, sort of beaming out. And that’s wonderful…  
 
In contrast, Jenny and Moira did not identify their client’s ‘at risk’ identities in these 
particular moralised terms. Jenny’s client’s ‘at risk’ identity was spoken of in 
response to her having self-harmed and attempted suicide. However, Jenny did not 
position her as ‘victimised’ or ‘innocent’. Instead this behaviour was spoken of as 
‘problematic’ and indicative of a lack of responsibility on the part of the client and 
her family. As Jenny said: 
I am sure she is needy. I am sure the whole family is needy, but I really 
want to say that it is not my problem – at the end of the day I can do 
nothing really…This is just a dysfunctional family and that is how hard 
you have to be at times. 
Moira spoke of her client as being ‘at risk’ of being discriminated against by her 
because she did not want to work with him. In speaking of him in these terms, his ‘at 
risk’ identity was ascribed on the basis of his being a ‘victim of chance’ – it was a 
‘chance’ occurrence that Moira, who knew about his abusive behaviour, was the 
worker he saw when he first made contact with the service. Thus Moira did not see 
him as ‘innocent’. Rather he had been ‘found out’. As Moira noted: 
People have conflicts of interests all the time that they are not even 
aware of and if he hadn’t had the same name as this woman or she had 
never mentioned his name to me I would never have known and may have 
continued working with him long term until maybe he told me a bit more 
about the circumstances of his life and I would have put two and two 
together. 
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Thus Jenny and Moira attributed a negative moral value to their clients’ ‘at risk’ 
identities.  
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‘A risk’ client identities were mostly cast in less favourable terms by social workers 
within this study (Graham, Jenny, Joseph [colleagues], Maggie, Mark, Moira and 
Narelle). In their moralising of this identity social workers spoke of their clients as 
being problematic in some respect – they were violent and difficult to work with – 
and there was a sense that these clients were tainted in some way. For example, Mark 
spoke of his ‘a risk’ client as manipulative. Mark stated that the client: 
was also trying to manipulate me in some ways in terms of his 
relationship with his partner…I think all the abuses he’d been through in 
his life had shaped his life in such a way that he believed that’s the way 
he had to behave with everybody I think, you know? It was getting 
everybody offside…he got so many people offside and anywhere he went, 
he was getting people offside because he was so demanding and so 
critical...  
Jenny also attributed negative qualities to the young client she was working with. She 
remarked: 
she has got that sort of personality where she just sits and laughs and 
giggles when you talk to her and that used to drive me absolutely berserk. 
Her mum did that too and I think that is a genetic personality giggly trait 
in that family…I don’t understand why people can – I mean, why people 
can just sit down and laugh about it. I actually said, ‘I can’t stand it. I 
can’t stand you giggling. This is such an important issue that you can’t’. 
I can’t think what she did now…oh, probably bashed up mum or did 
something like that. 
 
Frances, Josephine, Peter and Zoe did not impute that their ‘a risk’ clients were ‘at 
fault’. In a sense, these practitioners were quite ‘forgiving’ of their client’s actual or 
alleged inappropriate behaviour. For example Zoe, who initially saw the client (being 
two parents) as ‘bad’ due to a long history of notifications against them for assaulting 
their child, changed her mind upon meeting them. The parents had been in care as 
children and had told Zoe that they were struggling to manage the extreme behaviour 
of their child. In speaking of the client, Zoe said: 
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during discussion with the family they would talk about holidays that 
they’d been on and what they’d done with their child, you know, bike 
riding and all this stuff and what they’d been through over the years. And 
they’d given us so much, they’d given us everything like an admission 
that they’d hurt the child and…I realised how dangerous it would be to 
remove...The harm that had been done to the family, like the parents in 
the past and the impact on them if we did that to their children would be 
very harmful. 
Thus while this group of social workers recognised their clients were ‘a risk’ and 
viewed their alleged or actual behaviour as inappropriate or wrong, they also 
entertained the idea that their client’s behaviour could be understood in other terms. 
Most often this related to their seeing their clients as also being ‘at risk’ in some way. 
In entertaining this characterisation of their clients, social workers redeemed the 
moral virtue of their clients – they were ‘victims’ and hence not ‘at fault’. 
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In common with ‘at risk’ clients, social workers who spoke of themselves as ‘at risk’ 
primarily positioned themselves as having been or potentially being victimised or 
injured in some way through no fault of their own. For example, Kaitlin spoke of 
herself as having come close to ‘burn out’ in her work with her young client who had 
been severely abused. However, in speaking of herself in these terms Kaitlin argued 
that she had done the ‘right thing’ in becoming emotionally attached to the young boy 
she was working with, even though she consequentially felt emotionally vulnerable 
and thus ‘at risk’. In this regard Kaitlin presented herself in quite heroic terms. As 
Kaitlin explained: 
I don’t know how I could have done it without being emotionally 
involved…I don’t hold my professional self aside from my personal 
self…I can’t operate like that but then I think in terms of risk to self as a 
social worker – there is a higher level of accountability…We tend to put 
much more energy in and much more of yourself into your interventions 
and I think there is a definite price to pay for that and I think the price is 
the risk of burnout…So even with the benefit of hindsight and having 
some time distance from it in terms of reflection, I know I would still do 
the same thing… 
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This heroic characterisation of practitioners was common amongst many social 
workers who saw themselves as ‘at risk’ in some way (Frances, Geraldine, Josephine, 
Kaitlin, Maggie, Moira, Narelle, Peter, Petra, Sebastian and Zoe).  
 
Social workers also alluded to the moral righteousness of their ‘at risk’ identities 
when they explained how their colleagues and or management within their 
organisations failed or were unlikely to support them in their work (Geraldine, 
Graham, Joseph, Kaitlin, Maggie, Moira and Zoe). For example, Graham was 
troubled about how to help a client who was homeless and who had a diagnosed 
mental illness. In exploring options for this client, Graham spoke of how he was 
pressured by management to account for the cost of his attempts to resolve his client’s 
homelessness. Graham stated: 
It’s just trying to make decisions of not only what is best for them, it’s 
also our boss comes to us and says to us, ‘Well, how much is this going to 
cost us?’. So we can put somebody up in a unit, a holiday unit or a motel 
hotel unit and then he says, ‘Well this is costing us $400 this week. What 
are we getting in return?’. And then I think, is it all about dollars? Surely 
it should be about people, but no, it comes down to the dollar factor 
again. 
Maggie also spoke of how her attempts to work in a positive way with her client who 
had been found guilty of a sexual offence were thwarted by colleagues who 
undermined her. As Maggie explained: 
I am probably one of the few people…that actually takes that stance that 
everyone has some intrinsic worth – you know, there are the mad, the bad 
and the sad but there are very few bad ones – for want of a better 
description. There are more people who fit into the other two 
categories...I find it really frustrating that in your own team, people 
actually turn on you and say, ‘What are you going to do with that 
arsehole? He is no good. He will do it again’. Instead of saying, ‘Well, I 
can do this part’. Everyone just goes, you know, closing ranks and leaves 
you very alone… 
Accordingly, practitioners who spoke of themselves as ‘at risk’ positioned themselves 
as doing or attempting to do ‘good’ but in doing so they encountered personal and 
professional hardship. 
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‘A risk’ practitioner identities were also presented as faultless in certain regards. 
Those social workers who reflexively constructed an ‘a risk’ identity presented 
themselves as facing a hard decision in their work, given that their interventions could 
have negative results for clients (Elaine, Linda, Josephine, Kaitlin, Maggie and 
Moira). In speaking of themselves in these terms social workers spoke of how they 
acted with the ‘best of intentions’, thereby reclaiming a morally sound basis for their 
practice. For example, Elaine reflected: 
What did I want to do? I wanted to get out of there, like I just didn’t, I 
thought, well, I felt at that point in time I felt like it wasn’t a choice for 
me anymore. I felt like, well, I’ve got to do this now because I’m here. 
And there’s kind of an expectation that I’m gonna do this. I sort of 
wanted to be able to, you know, look through the door and go, ‘Yep, that 
all looks all fine to me’, and then go because I didn’t want to…I just, 
when they all stood outside and said, you know, ‘In you go’, and they all 
did that, they all came outside and sat on the front step…And at that 
point I thought, ‘Do I really have to do this?’.  
Linda also spoke of how her feeling of incompleteness in her work with a client who 
had attempted suicide could be understood as her having lost focus in her work 
because of the demands of the workplace at the time. As Linda explained: 
It’s like it was a loose end I didn’t tie up neatly…it was untied because of 
– for a number of reasons. Like we’d gone over time and I was tired, I 
had two other people to see, I’d already seen two other people in the 
morning, all that kind of stuff, yeah, the realities of that all came into 
play…I kind of have an obligation to do the best I can. And sometimes 
when you know you see a lot of people and you hear a lot of stories like I 
lose sight of that obligation. 
Thus while there was an acceptance within their stories that their actions were 
‘wrong’ or inappropriate in some way, these social workers also attempted to mitigate 
their culpability by emphasising the difficult circumstances they faced within their 
practice contexts.  
 
Geraldine was an exception to this form of moralising of an ‘a risk’ worker identity. 
Geraldine was ascribed an ‘a risk’ identity by her workplace. Thus in considering the 
morality of this identity, Geraldine spoke of it as an unjust action taken against her in 
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which fault had been attributed to her that did not exist. In trying to make sense of the 
basis of her organisation’s stance against her, Geraldine reflected that: 
I just had this gut feeling that it wasn’t my fault…the more I thought 
about it the more I realised I was right…So I still tried all the other 
things you know, well maybe we could put something on the admission 
form, or maybe we could take some photos or maybe we could put out a 
pamphlet out for lesbian women, maybe I could wear a tee-shirt. But they 
refused point blank every one of them. So it wasn’t actually only about 
me saying I was a lesbian. It was about letting anybody know that there 
was a lesbian at the place. 
For Geraldine, then, there were no mitigating circumstances to account for her 
organisation’s positioning of her as ‘a risk’. The attribution of an ‘a risk’ identity was 
simply a ‘wrong’ that had been done to her and in this she saw herself as victimised. 
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In moralising their own and clients’ risk identities social workers attempted to 
reconcile the tensions that existed between and surrounding their own and clients’ 
risk identities. That is, social workers attempted to resolve which of the risk identities 
in operation within their practice narratives they would respond to within their 
interventions – those versions of clients and themselves as ‘good’ or ‘innocent’ or 
those versions of clients and themselves as ‘bad’ or ‘at fault’. Accordingly, the 
practice dilemmas social workers encountered in deciding which identities they 
would respond to within their interventions can be understood as moral dilemmas.   
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Decisions regarding how social workers would respond to the moralised risk 
identities of their clients, colleagues and selves were a source of great consternation 
for them. Seldom were these decisions made without considerable anguish on behalf 
of the practitioners involved. These decision-making moments were sites in which the 
fears, anxieties, doubts and heartache of practitioners coalesced with their determined 
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efforts to make sense of what would be the ‘right’ or moral thing for them to do for 
their clients and/or themselves. This process often involved social workers in the 
seemingly constant activity of self reflection. As Jenny explained: 
You are constantly weighing – you are constantly thinking – should I do 
this? Do I need to do this? What is best? What is not best? What is the 
better outcome?   
Geraldine’s difficulty in deciding whether to sign a non-disclosure clause in her 
employment contract is also evidence of the emotional intensity of this reflective 
process. Geraldine recounted that: 
I went home and I bashed myself around the head – why would you want 
to frighten clients? And I examined everything that I could imagine that I 
could have been responsible for…because I really, really wanted to do 
the right thing and I wasn’t sure because it was only a gut feeling that 
they couldn’t do that.  
Reconciling themselves with the moral implications of their practice decisions then 
was an important, though difficult, process for practitioners.  
 
Doubt was a formidable force that accompanied social workers in their deliberations 
about how to construe a moral response to the risk identities that were in operation in 
their practice situations. Most often practitioners doubted the motivations 
underpinning their practice choices (Elaine, Geraldine, Graham, Kaitlin, Linda, Mark, 
Moira, Narelle, Peter, Petra, Sebastian and Zoe). In these instances, social workers 
struggled with whether their planned or enacted interventions were a response to their 
own or their client’s risk identities. That is, social workers questioned whether they 
were acting out of a sense of self-interest or their clients’ interests. This sense of 
doubt is exemplified in Kaitlin’s reflection where she remarked: 
I doubted myself all the time. I continually questioned my decision 
making and particularly my intentions and my own agenda – you know – 
around, what is my agenda here? I had to be very, very clear all the time 
so it was a continual process of, ‘Hang on. What is behind all this? What 
is your reason for doing this? What is your motivation? Is it about 
yourself wanting to – my desire to protect this child or is it really in his 
best interest?’. 
Similarly, Peter noted of his intervention with a male client who was both the ‘victim’ 
and ‘perpetrator’ of domestic assaults that: 
  
179 
I had a bit of a question mark about how I acted for myself in the 
reflection of it. But that’s okay – you know those competing stories were 
something that happened inside me.  Like I started to ask questions about 
is this guy telling me the truth when one of the primary things that we do 
with a client is believe them. 
Thus questioning the integrity of their positions regarding clients and their own risk 
identities was often fundamental to social workers’ processes for reconciling the 
practice dilemmas presented by risk identities. 
 
Not surprisingly, then, the moments in which social workers were confronted with the 
moral dilemmas of their practice were significant junctures in the histories of their 
interventions and the re-telling of these tales was accompanied by a truly palpable 
sense of drama. Frances’ story exemplifies this. Frances spoke of the crucial moment 
in her work with Julianna in which she re-established contact with her following the 
removal of her small child from her care. Frances recounted this visit in the following 
terms: 
I was coming down the driveway – and what I saw was two units co-
joined, and there was this unit was all garden and open windows and 
light coming in – and there was this unit with all the venetian blinds were 
shut, no garden – oh, well a tiny bit of garden, that is right, but just all 
shut up and closed in…When I walked down the driveway I walked into 
the garage off the closed up flat and there was – and I remember her 
rages and had been told about them by the worker – I have never seen 
this before. There was a TV that had had – a big old-fashioned TV that 
had its big glass thing bashed in…and the glass is that thick – two inches 
or so thick – an inch and a half right, jagged, right – sitting in the garage 
on the way to the front door…with great jagged edges and glass like that 
sitting there looking at me. And I turned around and there was an old 
washing machine that had been bashed in. It was just really powerful…it 
was just incredible and I said, ‘Fuck’, and banged on the door, thinking, 
‘Come on, Frances. This is a young woman that you have worked hard 
over the years to get through all of this…’ 
Frances spoke of this visit as a critical juncture in her work with Julianna because she 
was presented with conflicting images of her – as a vulnerable, isolated and sad 
woman (that is, ‘at risk’ and ‘innocent’) and as a woman of fury and destruction (that 
is, ‘a risk’ and ‘at fault’) as evidenced by the damaged property and bleak surrounds 
of the unit. What Frances did next was intricately related to how she reconciled the 
tensions between these two seemingly opposing risk identities. They would influence 
whether she would advocate for Julianna to be able to parent her child or work 
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towards limiting her contact with her by supporting the granting of an extended order 
for the child. That is, in common with the other practitioners who participated in this 
study, Frances faced a choice about whether she would take a stand for or against the 
client in her intervention. 
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The moral dilemmas of practice that were attendant to the multiple, co-existing risk 
identities of clients and social workers were starkly apparent in how practitioners 
spoke of their deliberations about the moral stance they would take within their 
interventions. Primarily these deliberations took three main forms. First, where the 
client was both ‘at risk’ (good) and ‘a risk’ (bad), social workers indicated that they 
faced a choice about whether they would take a stand for or against the client in their 
interventions (Frances, Graham, Jenny, Josephine, Maggie, Mark, Moira, Narelle and 
Peter). Frances’s story is a case in point. Peter also had to make this decision with 
regard to his client whom he saw as both a ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ of domestic 
assaults. This decision was difficult for Peter. In considering which of these ideas 
about the client he would recognise within his intervention, Peter said: 
I really felt for this bloke. You know he was really struggling and yet he’s 
known as somebody who has broken his wife’s jaw and he told me 
that…and there’s a part of me that says, ‘You’re a victim too’. And it’s 
like, it’s complicated you know. It was just such a complicated – you’re 
the victim and you’re the perpetrator and I guess I – you know – he 
seemed like such a nice fellow who really opened up to me and I 
recognised that – upon reflection that doing the interventions that I did 
with him where influenced by me liking him – not liking him, but – feeling 
an affiliation with this person. 
 
Second, where the social worker was both ‘at risk’ (innocent) and ‘a risk’ (at fault), 
social workers stated that they faced a choice about whether they would take a stand 
for or against themselves in their interventions (Elaine, Geraldine, Josephine, Kaitlin, 
Maggie and Moira). Geraldine’s situation exemplifies this kind of decision. Geraldine 
reflected that the dilemma about whether she should see herself as ‘a risk’ to clients 
or ‘at risk’ from her organisation caused her considerable anguish: 
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I went over and over it – maybe I am a bad social worker because I want 
to say I’m a lesbian. Maybe it was about my personal issues...And I, like, 
you’d sort of get sucked into thinking, you know, you owe it to yourself 
and your clients and everybody else to have a look and make sure that 
you aren’t a bad social worker because you say you’re a lesbian. But 
every time I came up with – if I can’t say I’m a lesbian it means there’s 
something bad about being a lesbian and there’s nothing bad about 
being a lesbian. 
 
Third, where clients and practitioners were both seen to be primarily ‘at risk’, social 
workers spoke of how they were faced with a choice about whether they would take a 
stand for the client or themselves (Elaine, Frances, Graham, Jenny, Josephine, 
Kaitlin, Maggie, Mark, Moira, Narelle, Peter, Petra, Sebastian and Zoe). Kaitlin was 
faced with this choice when the young boy she was working with came to see her one 
day when he was extremely upset. Kaitlin recollected this incident in the following 
way: 
I remember one day he was so, so, so sad and I said to him, ‘Would you 
like a hug?’…and he nodded his head so I picked him up and put him on 
my lap and he just had these big tears falling out and I just hugged him – 
hugged him and rocked him for about half an hour but the whole time I 
was being aware – what was going through my mind was – am I crossing 
a boundary here? What if somebody actually walked in this door right 
now – that places me in a really vulnerable situation. What is their view 
of this going to be? Does it hold me up to scrutiny? So the whole time I 
was hugging him I had all of these thoughts going through my mind…it 
was a constant thought within me and I felt this – and that opened up a 
whole lot of questions like: Why should it be? I know on the one hand 
what it should be. It is for protecting children. When I was hugging this 
child, I felt very uncomfortable. I did feel uncomfortable. Now the 
uncomfortability was my head – have you crossed this boundary? Is this 
OK? What if somebody actually came in? So there was a part that was 
considering myself in that as well. How would this be seen if somebody 
came in on this because it was in a room with the door closed? How 
would this be seen? The other part of me was going – this kid needs a 
hug…it was a definite struggle. It was a real struggle. 
Thus Kaitlin was faced with a decision about whether she would take a stand for the 
client and continue to hug the child, or take a stand for herself and find other ways of 
comforting him where she was not professionally vulnerable.  
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As mentioned previously, Joseph, Linda and Zoe did not face tensions between the 
risk identities in operation with their practice contexts. Nonetheless these three 
practitioners still questioned whether they would take a stand for themselves and/or 
their clients (or colleagues, in Joseph’s case) given the presence of multiple risk 
identities. Table 4 encapsulates the specific practice, risk identity and moral dilemmas 
that were evident in each social worker’s story. This table illustrates the connections 
between the difficult decisions social workers had to make in regard to their 
intervention pathways, the risk identity conflicts and tensions that were present within 
their practice dilemmas and the moral nature of these dilemmas for them.  
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Practitioner Client Risk 
Identities 
Practitioner 
Risk 
Identities 
Practice Dilemmas Risk Identity 
Dilemmas  
Moral Dilemmas 
Elaine At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk 
A Risk 
Should I conduct an 
unannounced home 
visit?  
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
How can I take a 
stand for both of 
us? 
Frances At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk Will I argue for or 
against an 
extended order of 
Julianna’s child?  
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities?  
Do I take a stand for 
or against the 
client? 
 
Geraldine At Risk 
 
At Risk 
A Risk 
Will I sign an 
employment 
contract containing 
a non-disclosure 
clause?  
Do I respond to my 
‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’ 
identity? 
Do I take a stand for 
or against myself? 
 
Graham At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk Will I send a client 
to another area 
without having 
secured housing for 
him? 
 
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity?  
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
Do I take a stand for 
or against the 
client? 
Do I take a stand for 
or against myself? 
Jenny At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk Will I ‘actively’ 
support the client?  
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities?  
Do I take a stand for 
or against the 
client? 
Do I take a stand for 
or against myself? 
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Joseph Colleagues A 
Risk 
At Risk Will I assert myself 
with my work 
colleagues? 
How do I reconcile 
my colleagues’ and 
my risk identities?  
Do I take a stand for 
myself?  
Josephine At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk 
A Risk 
Will I work with the 
client? 
Will I take steps to 
secure a restraining 
order against the 
client’s father?  
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
Do I take a stand for 
the client or myself? 
Kaitlin At Risk 
 
At Risk 
A Risk 
Will I continue to 
work with the client? 
Will I hug the client 
when he is upset? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
 
Do I take a stand for 
the client or myself? 
Linda At Risk A Risk Do I give in to the 
belief that the client 
cannot heal?  
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
How can I take a 
stand for the client 
and myself?  
Maggie At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk 
A Risk 
 
Should I act in 
controlling or 
supportive ways 
towards the client? 
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
Do I respond to my 
‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’ 
identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
Do I take a stand for 
or against the 
client? 
 
Mark At Risk 
A Risk 
 
At Risk Will I work with the 
client? 
Will I write a letter to 
support a complaint 
by the client against 
another worker? 
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities?  
Do I take a stand for 
the client or myself? 
Moira At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk 
A Risk 
Will I provide 
services to the 
client? 
 
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
Do I respond to my 
‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’ 
identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities?  
How can I take a 
stand for the client 
and myself? 
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Narelle At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk Will I support the 
client to apply for a 
restraining order? 
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
Do I take a stand for 
the client or myself? 
Peter At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk Will I provide all the 
information I have 
about the client’s 
situation?  
Do I respond to the 
client’s ‘at risk’ or ‘a 
risk’ identity? 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
Do I take a stand for 
or against the 
client? 
Petra At Risk At Risk Will I go against 
organisational 
protocols? 
Will I respond to the 
client’s or my ‘at 
risk’ identity? 
Do I take a stand for 
the client or myself? 
Sebastian At Risk At Risk Will I continue to 
work with the client 
or refer him on to 
another worker? 
Will I respond to the 
client’s or my ‘at 
risk’ identity? 
Do I take a stand for 
the client or myself? 
Zoe At Risk 
A Risk 
At Risk Do I remove or 
leave a child in the 
care of the client? 
 
How do I reconcile 
the client’s and my 
risk identities? 
Do I take a stand for 
or against the 
client? 
How can I take a 
stand for myself? 
 
In view of these practice, risk identity and moral dilemmas, social workers’ reflective 
narratives indicate that they were ultimately faced with a choice about whether they 
would take a stand ‘for’ or ‘against’ clients. The outcomes of these deliberations are 
discussed in the following section. 
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Social workers’ interventions indicate that they took one of three stances in relation to 
the moral dilemmas that were attendant to their own and client’s risk identities. These 
were: 
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1. Interventions where the social workers’ actions were directed towards taking 
a stand for their clients but not towards taking a stand for themselves 
(Frances, Josephine, Kaitlin, Linda, Peter, Petra and Sebastian); 
2. Interventions where the social workers’ actions were directed towards taking 
a stand for their clients and themselves (Geraldine, Mark, Moira, Narelle and 
Zoe); and 
3. Interventions where the social workers’ actions were directed towards taking 
a stand against clients/colleagues and taking a stand for themselves (Jenny 
and Joseph). 
These stances are apparent in the specific interventions that social workers 
implemented, and are presented in Table 5. This table illustrates that for all but three 
social workers (Elaine, Graham and Maggie) the implementation of practitioners’ 
interventions signalled a resolution of the moral dilemmas that were attendant to the 
tensions and conflicts between risk identities. However, Elaine, Graham and Maggie 
were unable to reconcile the moral stance of their interventions. In the end, these 
practitioners believed their interventions had placed their clients and/or others ‘at 
risk’ and hence they saw themselves as being ‘a risk’ to clients. 
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Practitioners Stand Taken Interventions Implemented 
Elaine Unreconciled Conducted an unannounced home visit but did not believe it was the 
right thing to do.  
Frances For the Client Advocated against an extended order of Julianna’s child and organised 
support for her to be able to parent her child. 
Geraldine For the Client 
and Self 
Did not sign the employment contract and lost her job.  
Graham Unreconciled Sent the client to another area without having secured housing for him 
but had misgivings for having done so. 
Jenny Against the 
Client 
Did not respond to client’s call after being hospitalised after a suicide 
attempt.  
Joseph For Self Spoke with his colleagues in a team meeting about them using their 
wilfulness against him. 
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Josephine For the Client Worked with the client. 
Spoke to the client about his wishes and then decided to go to court to 
secure a restraining order against the client’s father. 
Kaitlin For the Client Decided to stop seeing the child. 
Continued to hug the child.  
Linda For the Client Determined to make positive use of each moment of each session. 
Maggie Unreconciled Immobilised by doubt about how to respond to the client. 
Mark For the Client 
and Self 
Worked with the client but set clear boundaries. 
Did not write the letter to support client’s complaint against another 
worker. 
Moira For the Client 
and Self 
Organised for another worker to work with the client. 
Narelle For the Client 
and Self 
Organised to meet the client without telling colleagues. Planned to meet 
the client in a public area. 
Peter For the Client Did not provide the information about the abusive behaviour of the client 
to another organisation.   
Petra For the Client Did not refer the client as required by organisational protocols. 
Sebastian For the Client Continued working with client but met him in a more private setting. 
Zoe For the Client 
and Self 
Did not remove the child from the care of the client and kept detailed 
case notes of the decision making process. 
 
The resolution or irresolution of these practice stances by social workers will now be 
discussed.  
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In speaking of themselves as taking a stand for clients, social workers indicated that 
they had resolved to respond to the ‘at risk’ identities of clients as opposed to their 
own ‘at risk’ (Frances, Josephine, Kaitlin, Peter, Petra and Sebastian) or ‘a risk’ 
(Linda) identities. For example, Peter indicated that he had emphasised his client’s ‘at 
risk’ identity over his own, stating: 
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that decision was acting on behalf of the client but it wasn’t actually 
being true to who I am…You make so many choices as a social worker 
and because we’re interacting with another person they obviously have a 
huge influence on the choices you make and then you’re cognitively and 
consciously working in the best interest of this person, then you put a lot 
of yourself aside… 
Thus there was a sense within these social workers’ narratives of seeing themselves 
as having acted in a self-sacrificing manner within their interventions. Accordingly, 
for many of these workers (Josephine, Kaitlin, Peter, Petra and Sebastian) their 
actions were noted by them as working ‘against’ their own interests in some way. 
 
It was also clear that although these practitioners had initially struggled with the 
moral dilemmas of their practice, upon resolving to privilege their client’s ‘at risk’ 
identities over their own risk identities the moral ambiguity of their situations 
dissipated. For example, in speaking of her decision not to advocate for an extended 
order of Julianna’s child, Frances reflected: 
I positioned myself far more with the mum – some of Julianna’s issues – 
than with the Department’s. That is what I did…the Department can say 
until they are blue in the face that you can still get your child back, but if 
they are going for an extended order…why would they do that? They 
argue they do that for the stability of the child and I think there is a 
dominant discursive practice in that of punishing mum at play. That is 
what I was taking a stand against…I feel quite clear that the outcome of 
that intervention has not endangered this child in the slightest, but what 
it has done is refuted the whole thrust that was happening in this young 
woman’s life of silencing her…I didn’t feel like I was doing a wrong – I 
felt like I was doing a very ethical thing the whole way through. 
In a similar vein Linda spoke of the clarity she eventually was able to gain in her 
work with her client. Linda explained that: 
I saw her and sort of saw the problem…as totally crushing her and I was 
going ‘No. I can’t. I can’t be a part of sitting in the lack of hope or sitting 
in the despair. I can’t do that. I was clear…I clearly had that in my mind 
when I was working with her…It’s obvious…that she really is feeling 
totally overwhelmed by it and really scared for her own safety and – so 
building up her resources to deal with that. To combat that, that was kind 
of, that was what my intervention was about. 
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Thus these practitioners were resolute that their practice decision to take a stand for 
their clients within their interventions was a morally sound choice. As Petra 
summarised: 
The risk to the client, which to me is the moral consideration, overrode 
the other one, the systematic or personal risk. So to me that was the right 
thing to do. Yes. It just overrode it.  
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Taking a stand for clients and self was a complex matter for Mark, Moira, Narelle and 
Zoe. These practitioners’ interventions addressed their recognition that their clients 
were both ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’. Clients were both ‘good’ and ‘bad’. These 
practitioners stated that their resolution to take a stand for clients was done so 
primarily upon the basis of attending to the ‘at risk’, as opposed to ‘a risk’, identities 
of their clients. However, in addition, Mark’s, Moira’s and Narelle’s stand for 
themselves in their interventions was attributed to their responding to their clients’ ‘a 
risk’ identities. Thus these four practitioners’ practice decisions to take a stand for 
clients and themselves in their interventions was motivated by their recognition of 
their clients’ and their own ‘at risk’ identities. Mark’s explanation of his decision to 
continue working with his client (Geoffrey) whilst maintaining clear boundaries 
around what he was and wasn’t prepared to do for him, which included not writing a 
letter to support his client’s complaint against another worker, illustrates this point. 
Mark explained: 
I was clear about some of the boundaries. I’d say I would do this for you 
but I’m not going to do this for you. I’ll arrange, I’ll talk to the 
appropriate people about getting this information to you but I’m not 
going to do all of this for you…so he probably got a sense of my 
boundaries in the sense that I wasn’t prepared to allow him to 
manipulate or shape the way I was working with him…I keep using the 
word ‘manipulate’, but in a sense I felt manipulated in many ways…But 
if someone is trying to manipulate someone else I always think that it can 
be seen – it can be reframed. It’s not necessarily manipulation. There’s a 
reason for these things. And if this young man has been abused in so 
many ways and pushed around and found himself on the streets and 
having to engage in prostitution and all these things, well that’s what 
he’s learned…But…I suppose what I’m saying is I wasn’t going to be 
pushed around by him. 
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However, Mark was clear that his intervention with Geoffrey needed to reflect his 
taking a stand for him as well, and in this Mark attended to his client’s ‘at risk’ as 
identity. Mark stated that: 
I was thinking if I took a stand on this, before I took the stand I thought 
I’m really putting myself on the line here but then I decided to take a 
stand…we’re not sitting on the fence, we’re taking a stand when we’re 
advocating for someone against oppression. And the same with Geoffrey 
in many ways. Like I’m working with him like an advocate for him, I 
suppose, in terms of trying to make sense of the effects of abuse on his life 
and trying to make his journey and life more understandable to him and 
to move forward. 
Thus the decision of these social workers to take a stand for their clients within their 
interventions reflects their capacity to attend to their client’s ‘at risk’ (‘good’ client) 
identity whilst simultaneously attending to their ‘a risk’ (‘bad’ client) identities.   
 
Geraldine’s stance of not signing the non-disclosure clause of her employment 
contract was a painful and traumatic experience. In taking a stand for herself and 
clients Geraldine believed she was able to maintain a sense of personal and 
professional integrity. However, she also suffered emotionally and ended up losing 
her job. As Geraldine tearfully explained: 
I was suicidal for three months, but one of the things I’m really proud 
about me is that I did that. That I actually stood up and said, ‘No. That’s 
not OK. I’m not colluding in that sort of discrimination’…It was hard, 
though. And it is one of the things that I am proud about myself that I did 
do that even though it hurt so much and it still hurts [cries].  
Thus for Geraldine, taking a stand for clients and herself was not without negative 
consequences. Furthermore it is also apparent that Geraldine was the sole practitioner 
amongst those who participated in the study whose sense of being ‘at risk’ of some 
form of harm within their practice situations was realised.  
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Jenny and Joseph spoke about the stances they took in their interventions as being a 
response to their ‘at risk’ identities. Jenny’s intervention was centred upon her view 
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that her client’s ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities were both problematic identities. In 
addition, Jenny maintained that her sense of herself as ‘at risk’ in her work due to 
being tired and not being able to achieve a sense of success with her client directly 
impacted upon her decision not to actively intervene when the client was in crisis. In 
making this decision Jenny positioned herself in opposition to the client and 
accordingly her intervention is indicative of taking a stand against the client and for 
herself. In speaking of her intervention Jenny explained: 
She went into hospital – an adult psych unit – she made a visit up there 
after self-harming and threatened to kill mum. The police picked her up 
and put her into there but I haven’t even reacted to that at all. I would 
end up not doing a great deal anyway because I can’t engage with that 
stuff…I wanted to see if she could make some sort of link to the 
seriousness of her behaviour because that is why I get frustrated because 
I have gone on and told her time and time again that she can’t just go 
around and threaten people or whatever for a trivial reason – because 
you are desperate for a cigarette – so I was just hoping that she would 
make the link but she didn’t…I can’t stand it. 
Thus in not being able to ‘stand it’ Jenny’s intervention signifies her attribution of a 
primarily negative moral value to her client which in turn supported her decision to 
take a stand against her young client.  
 
Joseph positioned his colleagues as ‘a risk’ to him by virtue of their wilfulness. In 
positioning them in these terms Joseph moralised their risk identity in negative terms. 
Within this context Joseph saw himself as victimised. Joseph’s intervention then was 
to take a stand for himself by speaking about his sense of risk from his colleagues in a 
staff meeting. By doing this Joseph stated that he was taking responsibility for 
himself. As Joseph explained: 
We actually talked about it as a team and got to the stage…we got to a 
stage of agreements that we would acknowledge feelings in these 
[situations]…because I had to put it on the table with these guys…that if 
they came at me with this as an agenda, and this woman in particular…I 
had to talk about my own risk… 
In taking this stand Joseph positioned himself in opposition to his colleagues – they 
were ‘a risk’ to him. According to Joseph, the positive outcome of this intervention 
was that his colleagues could now identify when other staff members were attempting 
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to do a ‘wilful number on them’. Thus the oppositional stance that Joseph took in his 
intervention from being ‘at risk’ from wilfulness was maintained within the team. 
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A fourth group of practitioners (Elaine, Graham and Maggie) remained unreconciled 
with their interventions. These three social workers remained deeply troubled about 
the moral implications of their interventions for clients and others. They remained 
unresolved about the moral stand they had taken in their interventions. In part this 
was because they were unable to reconcile which of their clients’ and own risk 
identities they should have responded to.  
 
Graham explained that his decision to send his client to another area without having 
secured housing for him had not ‘sat well’ with him. His client had asked Graham to 
help him move even though he knew that he was likely to be without accommodation 
of any kind for an indeterminate period of time. The client also had been diagnosed 
with a severe mental illness and though prescribed medication did not take it. Graham 
explained that he felt incredibly frustrated and overwhelmed by the client’s problems 
so that in the end Graham thought: 
all we could do was comply with his wishes and drop him somewhere in 
the hope that there would be more services available to him than what we 
had. 
However, Graham had deep regrets about his decision. As he explained: 
It was awful. I remember saying to somebody outside later, ‘Oh, this 
doesn’t sit well. I’m not happy about it’, you know? As they drove off in 
the car I thought, ‘Oh gosh. You’re sending a person out, all we are 
creating is more suffering for this person’…I wasn’t happy with the 
decision. 
Thus Graham was uncertain about the moral implications of his intervention. Hence 
he wondered if his actions intimated that he had been ‘a risk’ to the client. 
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Elaine reflected a similar sense of disquiet regarding the moral implications of her 
intervention to conduct an unannounced home visit when allegations of neglect were 
made against her client. According to Elaine, repetitive allegations had been made 
which, while initially confirmed, were later found to be without substance. In 
deciding to do the home visit Elaine had wanted to take a stand for the client and 
demonstrate once and for all that these allegations were simply unfounded. However, 
Elaine remarked, ‘I had doubts about it. Definitely’. Her doubts were confirmed by 
her client’s abject response. Elaine explained: 
I wasn’t thinking about disempowering the people but I wasn’t thinking 
about empowering them either. I was just thinking about doing something 
for them which isn’t very empowering at all but at the same time it felt 
right because I thought this family obviously has trouble sticking up for 
themselves so I will go and do it for them…it’s weird, isn’t it, how you 
think about some things one way and then it doesn’t happen the other 
way. 
Thus while Elaine had intended to take a stand for her client she believed she had 
compromised the moral integrity of this aim and accordingly had acted in a way that 
suggested she was ‘a risk’ to her client. 
 
The dilemmas of the competing identities of her client’s and her own ‘at risk’ and ‘a 
risk’ identities seemed unresolvable to Maggie and as a consequence Maggie had 
become immobilised in her practice. In speaking of her anguish over her intervention 
with this client, Maggie said: 
I haven’t done anything with him. I don’t think he has a mental illness. I 
don’t think he should be put on medication to lessen his libido or 
something. I read all that sort of stuff yesterday and I thought – you know 
– I can’t do that ‘just in case’….But how can I come down on him like a 
ton of bricks about something he hasn’t done? It is easy when [clients] 
do muck up in a way. When that time comes, it is easy to – ‘we talked 
about this and this is very serious.’ That is really easy…but when you are 
putting a person out that might hurt another human being, that is when it 
gets much more tricky…I don’t rest easy with that knowledge as you put 
them out the door…But I sense a need…So it is a dilemma. 
Thus Maggie remained conflicted about the moral stance she should take in her work 
with this client. She was unsure whether she should take a stand for or against him. In 
the process, Maggie doubted the integrity of her action to ‘do nothing’. Maggie 
believed she was still ‘a risk’ to her client and others.  
  
193 
	

	
	
In this chapter I have illustrated that social workers attributed moral values to their 
clients’ and their own risk identities. Thus not only were clients and practitioners 
recognised in terms of their being ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’, they were also recognised 
according to considerations of the moral adequacy of these identities. Each 
practitioner recognised that their client’s and their own risk identities posed specific 
moral dilemmas for them in their practice. Determining which risk identities they 
would respond to was not a straightforward matter by any of their accounts. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the moral quandaries attendant to the presence of multiple, 
co-existing risk identities, most social workers indicated that they were able to 
resolve their dilemmas and could determine which moralised risk identities they 
would respond to in their interventions. Still, three practitioners remained 
unreconciled about their interventions. Elaine, Graham and Maggie questioned 
whether their actions had contributed to their client’s being subject to further risk. 
Accordingly these practitioners questioned if they had become ‘a risk’ to their clients. 
Thus in addition to the insight gleaned about the operations of risk from the preceding 
chapter, this chapter has demonstrated that risk was constituted and integrated as a 
deeply moral concept in social workers’ interventions and required a moral response 
from them: to take a stand for and/or against their clients and/or themselves.  
 
Social workers referred to five primary reference points for orienting the moral stand 
of their interventions. Each of these reference points was spoken of as having played 
an important role in supporting social workers’ attempts to reconcile the tensions 
attendant to the risk identities that were in operation in their practice situations. How 
these reference points were constitutive of the moral stance that social workers 
assumed in their interventions is the focus of the following and final results chapter.  
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Social workers’ practice narratives reverberated as an intensely reflective and 
personal process of moral deliberation. As noted in Chapter 6, doing the ‘right’ thing 
was extremely important to practitioners in their response to the moral dilemmas 
posed by the tensions and conflicts accompanying the presence of co-existing 
multiple risk identities. Seemingly, then, doing the ‘right’, moral or ethical thing in 
their interventions equated with social workers feeling assured that they had done 
‘good practice’. Conversely, being unable to reconcile the morality or ethics of their 
interventions equated with social workers feeling deeply troubled about their 
intervention choices. Thus social workers’ practice narratives indicate that they were 
concerned to not only reconcile the moral dilemmas of their practice situations, but to 
resolve their identity as moral agents within their interventions. That is, social 
workers were concerned to present themselves within their practice stories as having 
acted with integrity when enacting their responses to the tensions surrounding their 
own and client’s risk identities; that there were ‘good’ reasons for why they acted as 
they did. This seemed to be the case irrespective of whether practitioners were able to 
fully reconcile their final stand within their interventions in relation to their client’s 
and own risk identities. Thus while the preceding chapter addressed practitioners 
questioning, ‘What will I do, given the moral dilemmas of my practice?’, this chapter 
engages with social workers’ reflections upon the question ‘Why did I take the stand I 
assumed in my intervention in relation to the client’s and my risk identities and how 
does it reflect upon me as a moral subject in my work?’. 
 
  
195 
The significance of this question becomes apparent in view of practitioners having 
reported that they felt incredibly fearful within their practice situations. As discussed 
in Chapter 5 fear was a prevalent emotional response in social workers’ reflective 
accounts. This was especially the case when practitioners spoke about clients as ‘a 
risk’ and themselves as ‘at risk’. Risk was also spoken of in Chapter 5 as a negative 
construct. Thus it could be argued that fear and this negative conceptualisation of risk 
had the potential to act as a conservative force within social workers’ deliberations 
about how they would respond to the moral dilemmas posed by risk identity conflicts. 
That is, practitioners could have acted out of a sense of self-interest and ensured their 
own ‘safety’ within their interventions, and a small number of practitioners did this. 
Alternatively they could have become transfixed by fear, particularly the fear of 
doing the ‘wrong’ thing, which also occurred. However, a greater number of 
practitioners’ interventions were grounded in them taking a stand for their clients in 
some way. The reflective narratives of these practitioners signified their sense of 
having achieved a moral resolution to their risk identity dilemmas and in turn they 
appeared reconciled with their moral identities as social workers. Accordingly, this 
chapter identifies what practitioners identified as important to them when confronted 
by the pervasive force of fear and a determined will to enact a moral response to their 
risk identity dilemmas. 
 
This chapter comprises of a presentation of the five primary reference points that 
social workers used to orientate their stand in their interventions. This presentation 
includes an examination of the substance of each reference point and how these 
reference points directed attention towards a stronger or lesser regard for social 
workers’ and clients’ ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities. The chapter concludes with a 
review of how these reference points were assimilated by practitioners in the stances 
they adopted in their interventions.  
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Social workers’ reflections on the veracity of their responses to the moral dilemmas 
attendant to their risk identity dilemmas reveal that their interventions comprised a 
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complex interplay of emotion, conscience and context. Five primary reference points, 
singularly and in combination, were used by social workers as a ‘moral compass’ to 
guide their practice, being: ethics, morals, and values; re-contextualised meanings and 
qualities attributed to risk; the situated contexts of practitioners; social workers’ 
beliefs in the possibility of change for clients; and theoretical and practice 
frameworks. These reference points were spoken within social workers’ narratives as 
justifications for their actions. They formulated the basis of their ‘good reasons’ for 
doing what they did, and in so doing, provided a framework for social workers to 
speak about their moral agency in their interventions. These reference points and their 
composite dimensions are presented in Table 6 below. This table provides an 
overview of how many practitioners within each practice standpoint, and in total, 
referred to the various dimensions of each reference point. Total numbers are greater 
than the total number of participants, as practitioners on occasion referred to more 
than one dimension of each primary reference point. 
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Reference Points Total 
 
 
n=17 
Stand for 
Client 
 
n=7 
Stand for 
Client and 
Self 
 
n=5 
Stand 
Against 
Client/ 
Colleagues 
and Self 
n=2 
Unreconciled 
 
 
n=3 
The moral 
emotions of 
compassion and 
empathy 
13 6 4 0 3 
Sense of 
responsibility 
and obligation 
11 4 4 1 2 
Professional 
ethics and 
values 
10 4 4 1 1 
Ethics, Morals and 
Values 
n=44 
Personal morals 
and values 
 
10 6 4 0 0 
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The ‘reality’ of 
risk 
11 6 3 0 2 Re-Contextualised 
Meanings and 
Qualities of Risk 
n=22 The degree of 
risk 
11 5 5 1 0 
Organisational 
contexts 
12 4 4 2 2 Situated Contexts 
of Practitioners 
n=19 
Personal 
contexts 
7 2 2 2 1 
Possibility of 
change 
7 5 2 0 0 
Impossibility of 
change 
2 0 0 1 1 
Belief in the 
Possibility of 
Change for Clients 
n=10 
Uncertainty of 
change 
1 0 0 0 1 
Theoretical 
framework 
4 4 3 1 0 Theoretical and 
Practice 
Frameworks 
n=9 
Practice 
framework 
5 4 0 1 0 
 
This table clearly demonstrates that ‘ethics, morals and values’ were prominent in 
practitioners’ reflections. The remaining four reference points were referred to less 
regularly, particularly practitioners’ beliefs about the possibility for change for their 
clients and their theoretical and practice frameworks. Each reference point will now 
be addressed in detail. 
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Given the moral significance of their risk identity dilemmas, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the most commonly-referred-to reference point that orientated the 
direction of social workers’ interventions was ‘ethics, morals and values’. This was 
particularly the case for those social workers who determined to take a stand for their 
clients but not for themselves and those social workers whose interventions reflected 
their taking a stand for clients and themselves. In particular social workers spoke of 
the influence of the moral emotions of compassion and empathy, their sense of 
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responsibility and obligation, professional ethics and values, and their personal moral 
and value perspectives.  
 
Table 7 presents the practitioners and their number who referred to each of the 
dimensions of ‘ethics, morals and values’ as a reference point in their interventions. 
The last column summarises how these dimensions served to emphasise and de-
emphasise client and social worker risk identities within practitioners’ interventions. 
Once again total numbers are greater than the total number of participants, as 
practitioners on occasion referred to more than one dimension of ‘ethics, morals and 
values’. The table is followed by a detailed presentation of how ‘ethics, morals and 
values’ were constitutive of the moral stand which social workers assumed in their 
interventions in regard to their client’s and own risk identities. 
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Ethics, Morals and Values 
 
n=44 
Stand for 
Client 
 
n=20 
Stand for 
Self and 
Client 
 
n=16 
Stand 
against 
Client/ 
Colleague 
and for Self 
n=2 
Unreconciled 
 
n=6 
Influence upon 
Client and 
Worker Risk 
Identities 
Compassion and Empathy 
n=13 
Frances 
Josephine 
Kaitlin 
Peter 
Petra 
Sebastian 
Mark 
Moira 
Narelle 
Zoe 
 Elaine 
Graham 
Maggie 
Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
 
 
Sense of Responsibility 
and Obligation 
n=11 
Josephine 
Kaitlin 
Linda 
Peter 
Geraldine 
Mark 
Moira 
Zoe 
Joseph Elaine 
Maggie 
Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
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Professional Ethics and 
Values 
n=10 
Kaitlin 
Linda 
Peter 
Sebastian 
Geraldine 
Mark 
Moira 
Zoe 
Jenny Maggie Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
Personal Morals and 
Values 
n=10 
Frances 
Josephine 
Kaitlin 
Linda 
Peter 
Sebastian 
Geraldine 
Mark 
Moira 
Narelle 
  Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
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Thirteen of the 17 practitioners who were confronted by the challenges of risk 
identity dilemmas spoke of compassion and empathy as a personally meaningful 
emotional and reflective response to their client’s situations. Compassion and 
empathy in this instance then acted as a ‘moral emotion’. When practitioners engaged 
in a compassionate and empathetic stance, their attention was directed towards their 
client’s ‘at risk’ identities.  
 
For many practitioners the circumstances of their client’s lives had a profound 
emotional impact upon them. Accordingly these practitioners often spoke of their 
clients in positive terms and/or expressed a deep-seated sentiment towards them. For 
example, Frances said of her work with Julianna, ‘It was lots of hard work and I came 
to really care about her’. Kaitlin also expressed feelings of care. Kaitlin said of her 
feelings for the young boy she was working with, who had been physically and 
emotionally abused and neglected, that: 
I get really emotional when I even think about that poor little fellow. As a 
human being and at a heart level I could not walk away regardless of the 
consequences. I could not walk away from this child…and I know I 
showed that child love and acknowledgement and affection… 
Similarly Zoe recalled how her decision not to remove a child from the care of his 
parents was influenced by her sense of compassion for the parents. Zoe recalled: 
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It got to my heart strings so much that I felt that I really – I said – I think 
I said it to my colleagues, ‘I really don't want to remove this kid. I really 
don't want to’, and that wasn't based on the head stuff. That was purely 
based on in here stuff [points to heart] – that humanity for people – for 
parents and for the mum and for the child as well.   
 
Given this emotional connection, social workers were often quick to anger at the 
injustices that their clients had faced or were experiencing. For example, Josephine 
said that she was really angry that other professionals saw her young client in a 
negative light and had essentially ascribed a ‘problem identity’ to him. As Josephine 
explained: 
I get angry that he is kind of persecuted at school and other places. I 
have read some of the case notes and they think he is – and yes, he has 
broken windows of the phone boxes and he has pissed off with other kid’s 
property, but by God he is a hurting kid… 
Sebastian was also angry at how an anonymous person’s abusive phone call 
undermined the work that he and Trevor had done together. He stated: 
I was just so bloody mad, just so fucking angry with this, that this person 
could do this and that I’d worked with this person and I’d seen this 
person just, you know, in terms of their own sense of self just bring it 
together for themselves so beautifully and just go places in terms of who 
Trevor was in terms of his own identity and his own confidence and self 
respect...The anger was very powerful. I don’t think I’ve ever been that 
angry with someone. Someone I don’t know.  
Thus compassion and empathy were integral to how these social workers positioned 
themselves in relation to their clients. As Elaine explained, her ability to empathise 
with her client’s circumstances generally was fundamental to her work, and certainly 
came to the fore in her reflections about the impact of her unannounced home visit:  
I guess I am always thinking of the other person and probably not that 
much of myself, if you get what I mean. I think that I am able to 
empathise with people. I can put myself in their shoes, certainly not in all 
cases but as close to it, if you get what I mean…if you place that back on 
yourself you think, ‘Well if this is me and this person was coming in and 
doing that, how would I feel? Would I be feeling disempowered or would 
I be feeling OK about that?’. And I suppose it is kind of like reflecting on 
yourself, reflecting on someone else… 
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However, compassion and empathy did not always facilitate a straightforward 
response from practitioners in their interventions. It appears that compassion and 
empathy accentuated the moral dilemmas faced by some practitioners (Graham, 
Maggie and Narelle) whose clients had been identified as being both ‘at risk’ and ‘a 
risk’. While these practitioners could appreciate the hardships faced by their clients 
and felt quite deeply about their circumstances, they were also conflicted about how 
they should morally align themselves with them, given their clients were also 
considered to have done something wrong. The turmoil arising from this situation 
was captured in Narelle’s comments where she said:  
that sort of brought up the whole sort of thinking of who is a victim and 
who is at risk and all that sort of stuff. So it is a really big question, I 
think. I think we could spend a lot of time just on that…she is a perp but 
she is still a victim because she is in a minority group and she is a victim 
of patriarchy. So you know, how far do you go? Do you know what I 
mean? It is such a huge… because she is transgendered and she is 
always going to be at risk but because she is a violent person, I was at 
risk as well so we were both at risk. I was at risk from her...  
 
It is also important to note the absence of compassion and empathy as a dominant 
theme in the narratives of those social workers who took a stand against their 
client/colleagues and for themselves. Jenny’s and Joseph’s practice narratives were 
noteworthy for their lack of reflection upon their emotional engagement with their 
client and colleagues. For example, Jenny reflected that she could have responded to 
her young client’s recent suicide attempt by going to see her in hospital. However, 
Jenny noted: 
That would be my immediate reaction until I need to stop and think, 
‘Hang on’, and just reflect on that…I weighed it up against the whole 
situation…and at the end of the day I think, ‘Tough. I am sorry. I am one 
person in one little agency and it is not my problem’. 
Thus the reflective narratives of practitioners who took a stand for their clients and 
against themselves, and practitioners who took a stand for their clients and 
themselves, indicate that compassion and empathy prompted and supported them to 
emphasise their client’s ‘at risk’ identities in their interventions. In turn, the focus of 
their responses was directed outwards towards their clients, as opposed to inwards 
towards attending to themselves and their ‘at risk’ practitioner identities. 
Furthermore, it legitimated the moral rectitude of social worker’s actions. However, 
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while feelings of compassion and empathy for clients was enabling for many 
practitioners in terms of how they might respond to their client’s ‘at risk’ identities, it 
served to confound how Elaine, Graham, Maggie and Narelle would respond to their 
clients. For these social workers it appears that their feelings of fear and the sentiment 
of compassion were experienced in equal measure so that the tensions between their 
own and their clients’ risk identities compounded. Thus compassion and empathy 
alone were not able to provide these practitioners with a resolution to the moral 
dilemmas of their practice. 
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‘A sense of responsibility and obligation’ towards clients was also an important 
reference point for orientating the direction of social workers’ interventions. The 
passages in their narratives where ‘responsibility and obligation’ were mentioned 
indicate that these practitioners had a heartfelt commitment to their clients and their 
‘cause’. Thus this commitment appears to have emanated from practitioners’ 
compassionate engagement. Hence these social workers spoke of their sense of 
responsibility and obligation as a moral response to their client’s suffering as opposed 
to deriving from a sense of professional duty. For many practitioners accepting that 
they had a moral responsibility to their clients was instrumental to taking a stand for 
their clients in their interventions. This point is exemplified in Kaitlin’s reflection 
about her practice with her young client who had been physically and emotionally 
abused and neglected. Kaitlin remarked that: 
To me the risk to the client was real. It was happening and I believed I 
was doing the right thing and I still believe that and I believed that I had 
a moral responsibility to protect him. So that is, I guess, what fuelled me 
to continue, to go on…I believe that morally all adults have a 
responsibility to protect children in our society. So outside of social 
work, outside of the profession, I believe I have a moral obligation to do 
that in any case. So I guess what that did was I thought I was right in 
what I was doing. 
Similarly Linda noted that her efforts to reconnect with a story of hope in her work 
with her client following a suicide attempt were grounded in the belief that she had a 
moral obligation to meet her client’s need. In turn this inspired her to do all that she 
could for her client. Linda said she could remember thinking: 
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I gotta do the best here, to the best of my capability…I’m one small part 
of this woman’s life and that’s enough of a part in terms of a circle, but 
I’ve got to not do just a little bit in that circle, but reach my limits as 
much as I can…It’s almost like I even…it probably sounds a bit weird but 
I took my job really, really seriously in that hour…I was thinking, ‘I have 
an obligation here and yeah, sure it’s only one small part, but it, it can 
have an effect, it can have power. I have a certain amount of power and 
influence in this situation and I’ve got to utilise and facilitate that as best 
as I professionally, humanly can…And I can’t stop the world from 
making people cruel to each other or sanctioning violence or anything 
like that but I can do something in this little hour of my day. So that kind 
of clarified, made more concrete my obligation rather than I’ve got to 
change the world and all that you know [laughs]. 
 
In contrast, Joseph and Maggie spoke of responsibility and obligation in different 
terms to these practitioners. Joseph, whose intervention was indicative of his having 
taken a stand for himself, spoke about his response to the fear of the ‘wilfulness’ of 
others as indicative of having taken personal responsibility for his own actions. 
Joseph explained that his decision to confront his team mates who were ‘doing a 
number’ on him was sound because: 
There’s been an exchange between us and it might well be your 
wilfulness but now instead of just copping it and submitting to it I will 
now want to decide whether it’s mine or whether it’s yours and if it’s 
yours I have gotta give it back. 
Thus, while Joseph spoke of responsibility as a moral stand, in a point of difference to 
other practitioners whose sense of responsibility and obligation directed them towards 
emphasising their client’s ‘at risk’ identities, Joseph’s ‘at risk’ practitioner identity 
was highlighted and his colleagues ‘a risk’ identity re-emphasised within his practice 
narrative.  
 
Maggie’s perspective of responsibility and obligation was complicated. It had the 
effect of reinforcing several of the risk identities in operation in her work with a 
person convicted of child sex offences. On the one hand Maggie felt protective of the 
client as he needed to be given a chance and Maggie thought she was responsible for 
facilitating this. However, Maggie also felt obligated to protect children from him. As 
Maggie explained: 
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they [colleagues] treat this person like the enemy, which I can 
understand and accept that he is…but it almost turns into – you almost 
become his protector, or that is how I feel. Like I feel like I am warding 
off all the shots that are going towards him…but this fellow – the harm 
he apparently has done and has the potential to do is very scary and you 
almost take on that responsibility because I haven’t got a clue what to do 
with him…I feel responsible if he re-offended.  
Thus Maggie remained in a double bind about how to attend to the client’s ‘at risk’ 
and ‘a risk’ identities, as well as her own ‘a risk’ identity. It appears, then, that 
Joseph’s and Maggie’s expressions of responsibility and obligation were also 
connected to their feelings of fear. However, for the other practitioners mentioned 
here their reflections indicate that their sense of responsibility and obligation directed 
them towards an emphasis of their clients ‘at risk’ identities in their interventions.  
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Regard for the purpose of social work, the profession’s core values and social 
workers’ ethical responsibilities as stated in the AASW Code of Ethics (2000) were 
evident in 10 practitioners’ reflections about the moral impetus and legitimacy of 
their interventions. These encoded aspects of practice resonated strongly as grounding 
influences for many practitioners. Accordingly social workers spoke with a strong 
sense of certainty about their intervention choices when referencing the constitutive 
effect of professional ethics and values upon their practice. For example, Mark 
explained that he decided to assume an advocacy role with his client in spite of 
feeling fearful of him and thus was able to take a stand for him. Mark reflected that: 
I was thinking if I took a stand on this, before I took the stand I thought 
I’m really putting myself on the line here, but then I decided to take a 
stand and advocate for him… We – we’re not sitting on the fence; we’re 
taking a stand when we’re advocating for someone against 
oppression…It’s the nature of a lot of our work in social work, working 
with abuses in life and oppression.  
Mark and Sebastian noted that this advocacy role in social work necessarily 
positioned social workers as ‘at risk’ within their work. Thus Sebastian explained that 
placing oneself ‘at risk’ as a practitioner simply needed to be seen as an inherent part 
of the social work role. Sebastian explained:   
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social work is a very much a risk-taking job…Particularly in the 
advocacy role because I think we are invited to take a clear stance on the 
situation…Yeah so when it becomes advocacy work and when it becomes 
work advocating for people who are already at risk I think there is a 
whole realm of risk there – risk to you as a worker…but you have to, you 
couldn’t do that work. You couldn’t do that if you didn’t put yourself at 
risk. So there is for me part of the social work role is very much that 
almost owning that vulnerability I guess and taking that on board and 
working with that. That you’re going to put yourself in lots of different 
situations where you are going to be really vulnerable and that’s OK 
’cause it’s a choice – that we are choosing to do, yeah, for a purpose. 
 
The constitutive influence of professional ethics and values upon social workers’ 
practice was also evident in Geraldine’s reflections about her decision not to sign the 
non-disclosure policy in her work place. Geraldine noted that she believed her 
organisation’s requirement of her not to discuss her sexuality with clients was 
antithetical to the social work value of human dignity and worth. Geraldine 
commented that: 
Social workers are for me about working for social justice and they have 
an obligation to work towards social justice and look at different types of 
discrimination they are imposing on people…I have a human right to self 
identity and not have other people’s definitions imposed on me and that’s 
what they wanted to do. They wanted to impose their heterosexual 
definition on me. I had to be assumed to be heterosexual like all of them 
and that was them imposing their definition on me. So I don’t think their 
stance was ethical, in fact I think it was very unethical especially 
considering the diverse range of clients who had equal rights to access 
the service.  
Accordingly, then, most practitioners privileged their client’s ‘at risk’ identities in 
some way when they referred to professional ethics and values. This was the case 
even for Maggie who said her social work values told her that she had to ‘give this 
person a chance, even if it meant stuffing up’. However, an exception to this rule was 
Jenny’s decision not to intervene when her ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ client attempted 
suicide. Jenny reasoned she could justify her non-response on the grounds that the 
client was ‘self determining’. This view seemed to allay Jenny’s dilemma as to 
whether she should have done more for her client, commenting that: 
I think, at the end of the day, morally and ethically I would have done the 
right thing and I feel very settled and secure in that because I used client 
self-determination. I can say, ‘You still provided a certain amount but it 
has been up to the family and up to the young person to take that and do 
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what they want with it’. A part of me also says, ‘You can’t spoon-feed 
people all the time. They need to grow and nurture themselves. You can 
give them a push along, but I think they need to do something’. And I 
think some families need to take responsibility for themselves… 
Thus professional ethics and values had the effect of decreasing social workers’ sense 
of their being ‘at risk’ in their practice. Apparently their sense of fear was mitigated 
by their commitment to and understanding of their professions’ ethical standards.  
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Nearly all social workers who took a stand for clients and not for themselves and a 
stand for clients and themselves in their interventions reflected upon the influence of 
their personal moral and value frameworks upon their interventions. These belief 
systems mostly created surety for practitioners about how to respond to the tensions 
between their own and their clients’ risk identities – they attended to their clients’ ‘at 
risk’ identities in some measure. For example Petra said: 
there was, I realised in hindsight, it was not from a social work 
perspective that I made that decision. It was my own sense of what I 
believed would be most useful for that young person...it was quite clear 
and it feels quite clear to me what I needed to do – where I come from. 
Personal values and morals were also important to Moira as she pondered upon what 
would be the ‘right’ thing to do with her client whom she knew to have been 
physically violent towards his partner. Moira explained that her sense of moral 
agency as a practitioner was important to how she conceived of her decision to refer 
him to another worker within the organisation. Moira stated that: 
I think it is a core belief about what I think is right and wrong or ethical 
or unethical for me to do as a worker and I know that if I had done 
something unethical or something that I thought was morally not OK like 
shown him the door, I probably wouldn’t have been able to. I can’t even 
conceive that as being a part of who I would like to be as a worker…I 
think that the risk needs to be acknowledged and not ignored and you 
have to do something about it and there were several courses that I could 
take and I took the one I thought was right at the time…philosophically I 
couldn’t support a victim/survivor and the person who was perpetrating 
violence at the same time.  
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And Narelle explained how her personal moral framework was an important 
reference point for her deciding to help her client even though it was against agency 
protocol. Narelle said: 
I still did as much as I could and I didn’t tell the other workers this…So 
there was still that part of me that wanted to help her but I knew as a 
professional that I wasn’t supposed to but as an individual I could still do 
this which is maybe resisting a little bit to those formal policies. And I 
did feel bad because I hate going back on my word. 
 
Peter was an exception amongst this group of practitioners. While Peter believed that 
the outcome of his interventions was good for his client and in this respect his 
practice was ‘good’, he had a small, but persistent lingering sense of disquiet about 
having not shared all the information he had about his client when advocating on his 
behalf for him to access public housing. Peter thought he had compromised his 
personal value system by not being totally honest with other agencies about his client. 
Peter said: 
I realised that I was acting on behalf and being really supportive, for my 
client and that’s my primary goal but by the same token I recognise that I 
didn’t – may not have told the whole truth…if I’d told the whole truth of 
it, it probably wouldn’t have happened…and sort of that decision was 
acting on behalf of the client, but it wasn’t actually being true to who I 
am. 
Nonetheless it is apparent that social workers’ personal moral and value frameworks 
primarily helped to support them implement interventions that were attuned to their 
client’s ‘at risk’ identities.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, risk was spoken of in largely de-contextualised terms by 
practitioners as they ascribed risk identities to clients and themselves – it was 
everywhere and it was only spoken of in negative terms. While risk was spoken of as 
an embodied concept, generally speaking there was little critical distinction made 
about the nature and extent of risk as it pertained to clients and practitioners. 
However, in reflecting upon how they had responded to the moral dilemmas of risk 
identities within their interventions, a significant cohort of practitioners spoke of how 
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they re-contextualised their initial ideas about the ‘reality’ of risk and reassessed the 
degree to which it was present for clients and themselves. Table 8 presents the 
practitioners and their number who referred to ‘re-contextualised meanings and 
qualities of risk’ as a reference point for their interventions. The last column 
summarises how these ideas served to emphasise and de-emphasise client and worker 
risk identities within social workers’ interventions. Total numbers are greater than the 
total number of participants in places, as practitioners on occasion referred to more 
than one dimension of thinking about risk. The table is followed by a detailed 
presentation of how this reference point was constitutive of the moral stand that social 
workers assumed in their interventions in regard to their client’s and own risk 
identities. 
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Re-contextualised 
Meanings and Qualities of 
Risk 
 
n=22 
Stand for 
Client 
 
n=11 
Stand for 
Self and 
Client 
 
n=8 
Stand 
against 
Client/ 
Colleague 
and for Self 
n=1 
Unreconciled 
 
n=2 
Influence upon 
Client and 
Worker Risk 
Identities 
The ‘reality’ of risk 
n=11 
Frances 
Kaitlin 
Linda 
Peter 
Petra 
Sebastian 
Geraldine 
Moira 
Zoe 
 Graham 
Maggie 
Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity and 
decreased 
emphasis on 
worker ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
 
The degree of risk 
n=11 
Frances 
Kaitlin 
Peter 
Petra 
Sebastian 
Geraldine 
Mark 
Moira 
Narelle 
Zoe 
Jenny  Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity and 
decreased 
emphasis on 
worker ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
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Reconsidering the contexts within which risk identities had been ascribed to clients 
and social workers was important to the resolution of practitioners’ risk identity 
dilemmas. The reflective narratives of these social workers suggest that at some point 
they asked themselves, ‘How real is the risk we face or pose?’. What seems important 
about the asking of this question is that it prompted social workers to reconsider how 
the risk identities of their clients and selves had been constructed. For example, the ‘a 
risk’ identities of Frances’s, Moira’s, Peter’s and Zoe’s clients were destabilised 
when they asked themselves this question. As Frances explained, her thoughts about 
the client’s ‘a risk’ identity changed after hearing about how she had reacted to her 
child being removed from her care. The client was being prevented from having 
access to her child partly on the basis of the neglectful state of her unit. However, 
Frances recounted: 
She told me the story of her [child] being taken into care and she said, ‘I 
have trashed the place since Ellen was taken from me. I was OK before 
that’. So she said that and I wrote it down – ‘I trashed the place since 
Ellen was taken from me. I was OK before that’. To me this was very 
significant. 
Having gained this insight Frances was able to place a context around Julianna’s 
behaviour that had supported the ascription of her ‘a risk’ identity. In turn Frances 
began to doubt the validity of this identity. Thus by re-contextualising their client’s ‘a 
risk’ identities Frances, Moira, Peter, and Zoe were able to re-engage with their 
client’s ‘at risk’ identities, and concomitantly disengage with being pre-occupied with 
their ‘at risk’ practitioner identities. 
 
Clients’ ‘at risk’ identities were also reaffirmed in a number of cases (Kaitlin, Peter, 
Petra and Sebastian) when practitioners reflected upon the ‘reality of the risk’ their 
clients faced. Kaitlin provided a very vivid account of how her reassessment of her 
young client’s circumstances reaffirmed his ‘at risk’ identity. Kaitlin spoke about her 
thoughts about risk in the following terms: 
My ideas about how risk applied to my client in this particular 
intervention, the risk to him was continued abuse and violence at all 
levels – emotional, physical, psychological and spiritual – and what I 
was sort of witnessing in him, I think, was a death of him, of his soul.  
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However, considering the contextual aspects of her client’s ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ 
identities proved a fruitless exercise for Maggie – she simply couldn’t make a solid 
judgement about him. His identity, be he ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’, was an enigma for her.  
 
Geraldine’s reflections about her ‘at risk’ identity as a practitioner remained intact 
after considering the ‘reality’ of the situation she was confronting. In her case there 
were no mitigating factors that would undermine the negative consequences of any of 
the positions she could have adopted within her situation. As Geraldine explained: 
signing the policy I knew that I would lose my job if I didn’t sign it. They 
[the organisation] told me that. So there was the risk of losing my job. 
There was also a risk to my integrity if I did sign, to my integrity as a 
person that I wasn’t prepared to go back on that journey of being 
accepting of myself and as principles of social justice that I saw for 
myself. By signing it I would have kept my job, but to me that was, it was 
like giving myself an irrational message that I was somehow bad or 
perverted because I wanted to say I was a lesbian. And I wasn’t prepared 
to do that. 
Geraldine didn’t sign the non-disclosure clause. She lost her job and was suicidal for 
three months afterwards. However, she reflected that she was proud of her actions in 
spite of the havoc that was wreaked upon her personally and professionally by her 
practice stance.  
 
On the whole (the exceptions being Geraldine and Maggie), practitioners’ reflections 
of the ‘reality of risk’ tended to reaffirm their client’s ‘at risk’ identities and 
destabilised their client’s ‘a risk’ and their own ‘at risk’ identities. Thus re-
contextualising risk provided practitioners with a reasoned approach to resolving the 
moral dilemmas of risk identity conflicts in their practice.  
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Commonly, risk identity conflicts and the moral dilemmas attendant to them derived 
from both clients and social workers being ascribed ‘at risk’ identities within the one 
practice situation. Thus there was a question around whose ‘at risk’ identity would be 
attended to – the client’s or the social worker’s? One means of addressing this 
conflict was for practitioners to reflect upon the degree of risk which they and their 
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clients faced. That is, social workers conducted a comparative assessment of who was 
at greater risk in their practice situations – clients or themselves and/or others. 
Practitioners who engaged in this process, whose interventions reflected taking a 
stand for their clients but not for themselves, noted that they thought their client’s 
level of risk was greater or more extreme than their own. Accordingly these social 
workers de-emphasised their own, and privileged their clients’, ‘at risk’ identities 
within their interventions. For example, when reflecting upon her sense of being ‘at 
risk’ in her work with Julianna, Frances said:  
the risk to me seems rather small in comparison and I sort of thought 
about that and I thought, ‘Well I don’t think I felt that much at risk’…so 
if there was any risk to me it would have been that somebody would have 
got upset with me…so it wasn’t much of a risk to me to take this stand. 
Kaitlin said of her decision to continue hugging her young client when he was crying 
that: 
It was like the child’s need for love from me over-rode that this may not 
be appropriate or whatever…the risk was much more associated with the 
client than with myself. There was much more risk that he was 
experiencing and what I thought I ought to do was driven by a 
professional code of ethics so I didn’t have a doubt either morally or 
ethically that I was doing the right thing…because to keep him safe over-
rode the risk to myself at all times. 
Similarly Petra realised that her concerns about how she might be disciplined by her 
organisation if she did not follow agency protocol in her intervention were not as 
great a concern when compared to what would happen to her client if she did. Petra 
remarked:  
In balance there was a young person’s life and well-being at stake. I am 
older and I have a degree and I have a job, a partner. I have a house, 
money, all those things and in balance she had none of those, least of all 
experience, confidence, any of that, and this to me was very minimal in 
comparison to where it was for her. 
 
This comparative assessment did not yield such a clear result for those social workers 
whose interventions reflected having taken a stand for clients and themselves. Each of 
the practitioners grouped as having taken this practice stand judged their clients and 
their own ‘at risk’ identities to be commensurate with the other, though qualitatively 
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different. As Narelle said of her client’s and own ‘at risk’ identities, ‘she is 
transgendered [and] she is always going to be at risk, but because she is a violent 
person I was at risk as well so we were both at risk’. Similarly Zoe noted that when 
she was determining whether to remove a child from the care of his parents she 
reported to her supervisor that:  
it was going to be really difficult and really hard for the family and us if 
we removed this child. So we entered into discussion with her 
[supervisor] about if the risk of removing was higher than the risk of 
leaving the child there. 
Jenny, whose intervention intimated that she took a stand against her client and for 
herself, noted that her practice was influenced by her consideration of whether her 
young client’s level of risk was greater or less than other clients on her caseload. 
Jenny commented that in making her decision not to respond to a suicide attempt by 
the client she thought: 
you have to weigh against the organisation, your case load – other 
people and case loads and all that sort of stuff. It comes down to 
structures that are placed around you. I mean, I could get my teeth right 
into this family and really try and assist them and move them and 
whatever but then I have got clients who are really suicidal, depressed, 
anxious, so why shouldn’t I give my time to that as well? I really have to 
weigh up what is the best use of time.  
Accordingly, Jenny’s comparative risk assessment acted as an impetus for de-
emphasising her young client’s ‘at risk’ identity. Thus it can be seen that re-
considering the degree of risk faced by clients and social workers engendered a 
rationalised and pragmatic response by practitioners to the moral dilemmas 
incumbent to their risk identity dilemmas.  
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The organisational and personal contexts of practitioners also acted as reference 
points for directing the focus of their interventions. Table 9 demonstrates that the 
situated contexts of practitioners were spoken of within practitioners’ reflective 
narratives in fairly even numbers across each practice stance, though in far less 
numbers overall compared to ‘ethics, morals and values’. The table denotes the 
numbers and names of practitioners whose practice narratives indicate that the 
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personal and professional dimensions of their lives oriented the moral stand they 
occupied in relation to their client’s and own risk identities in their interventions.  
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Situated Contexts of 
Practitioners 
 
n=19 
Stand for 
Client 
 
n=6 
Stand for 
Self and 
Client 
 
n=6 
Stand 
against 
Client/ 
Colleague 
and for Self 
n=4 
Unreconciled 
 
n=3 
Influence upon 
Client and 
Worker Risk 
Identities 
Organisational Contexts 
n=12 
Kaitlin 
Josephine 
Petra 
Sebastian 
Geraldine 
Moira 
Narelle 
Zoe 
Jenny 
Joseph 
Graham 
Maggie 
In some 
instances 
mediated worker 
‘at risk’ identity. 
In others 
exacerbated it. 
Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity in some 
cases. 
Personal Contexts 
n=7 
Peter 
Sebastian 
Geraldine 
Moira 
Jenny 
Joseph 
Elaine Emphasised 
worker ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
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The informal and formal aspects of social workers’ organisational settings provided 
an important context for supporting or undermining which risk identities were 
emphasised within their interventions. Josephine, Petra and Sebastian said that their 
sense of being ‘at risk’ in their work was mediated by their organisational contexts. 
For example, Josephine mentioned that she felt like she could act with confidence in 
her work with her young client because of the willingness of her colleagues to share 
information and debrief with her. Josephine said ‘this is hugely important so I don’t 
act alone’. Sebastian said the inspiration he drew from his workplace helped to 
combat his feeling of being ‘at risk’ after being threatened during an anonymous 
phone call. Sebastian remarked: 
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this job is really, really needed and is so important…and this whole role 
in social work is so critical right now…It was kind of…cutting edge stuff. 
That sustained me as well and it was kind of, it had an element of 
inspiration about it. 
Petra, who had acted against agency protocol as a means of supporting her ‘at risk’ 
client, said that the ‘grey areas’ in her organisation’s policies provided her with a 
‘safety net’ so that her sense of being ‘at risk’ was diminished. Petra explained that: 
professionally…there is some room to move…there are grey areas and 
people don’t always fall neatly into these categories and decisions have 
to be made about complex contributing issues and social workers…have 
training and qualifications to take responsibility and weigh up those 
balances… 
 
In contrast, Kaitlin and Moira said their organisational contexts served to increase 
their sense of being ‘at risk’ in their practice. Kaitlin said her organisation had clear 
guidelines about physical contact with children, given the growing concern of 
professional misconduct or the possibility of being accused of such. In turn this 
impacted on her sense of being ‘at risk’ when she hugged her client when he was 
distraught. In Moira’s instance the informal culture of her organisation to ‘not ask for 
help’ amplified the sense of risk she felt when she did not want to work with a client 
who had physically assaulted another client. Moira explained: 
I felt vulnerable as far as my position in the organisation…I guess I 
thought at the time that they wouldn’t be terribly tolerant of the situation 
that I thought I found myself in…It is subtle, kind of unwritten policy that 
you get told that this is the way you have to practice…I guess it is taken 
as a given that you will deal with whatever people tell you. Whatever 
situation they are in, and I thought other people had been in awful 
situations where people had gotten really angry at them and the workers 
had been in tears, and I guess that I don’t think that they got a lot of 
sympathy from people…So it wasn’t terribly supportive in that respect, 
not as far as the team went. 
 
Finally, Graham, Jenny, Narelle, and Maggie spoke of how their organisational 
settings limited their ability to respond to their client’s ‘at risk’ identities. For Graham 
and Maggie, lack of resources within and outside of the organisation were considered 
an impediment to their being able to address their respective clients’ needs. In 
addition Graham noted that his organisation required him to demonstrate that his 
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intervention with a homeless man was ‘value for money’. In Narelle’s instance her 
agency’s criteria for eligibility for service restricted her ability to respond to her 
transgendered client’s request for help. And Jenny noted that having a high caseload 
meant that she had to ‘weigh up’ which clients would receive service from her. Thus 
organisational contexts either exacerbated or mediated the fear that was attendant to 
social workers’ ‘at risk’ identities. Furthermore in a number of instances 
organisational contexts frustrated social workers’ attempts to respond to their client’s 
‘at risk’ identities and in this respect inflamed the moral dilemmas they faced within 
their practice situations. 
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The most commonly-referred-to personal context that social workers mentioned when 
speaking about their ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities was their status as a new graduate 
(Elaine, Peter, Moira and Sebastian). This was particularly acute for Elaine who 
mentioned that her decision to do an unannounced home visit was prompted by her 
thinking that she should defer to the advice given to her by more experienced 
workers. Elaine recalled that how she thought about herself at that the time: 
had to do with the fact that I’d been in the job for five minutes and you 
certainly feel, oh well, I felt that should, not do as I was told – that 
sounds silly – but I should follow other people’s advice until I found my 
own feet. And I was able to sort of make better decisions on what I 
know…And then there’s that whole, you know, that student on prac thing 
that you don’t give yourself enough credit to be able to maybe somehow 
muddle your way through it yourself. If I had a choice I wouldn’t 
have…But like I said because other people had sort of said this is 
probably the best thing to do, this probably is what you need to do. 
Similarly Moira explained that she realised that: 
being a fairly new worker in that area, it did impact on what I felt at the 
time. I am not now saying that I have a wealth of experience behind me 
by any means but I think that that little bit of extra experience that I have 
in the field would enable me perhaps to behave in a different manner now 
and perceive the risk as perhaps not being so high as I did then. 
 
Geraldine, Narelle and Sebastian said their ‘non-hetero’ sexualities were significant 
in terms of how they engaged with their ‘non-hetero’ clients’ ‘at risk’ identities. For 
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Jenny, being ‘tired’ and ‘worn out’ in her work, along with a penchant for wanting to 
‘fix things’ and feeling dispirited when she was not able to ‘fix’ her client, 
contributed to emphasising her ‘at risk’ practitioner identity. And Joseph 
acknowledged that his reaction and subsequent intervention to his colleagues’ 
‘wilfulness’ was grounded in a long and tumultuous personal history. For Joseph, 
then, ‘the personal and the professional [were] intimately connected’ and ‘could not 
be separated.’  
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Social workers’ belief in the possibility of change for clients was strongly aligned 
with the hope that things could be different for their clients. While expressions of 
hope and the belief in an alternative future for clients were only expressed by several 
workers, interestingly it was a common narrative amongst those practitioners who 
took a stand for clients in their interventions. This is clear from Table 10 which 
illustrates the numbers and names of practitioners who mentioned how their belief in 
the possibility or impossibility of change was a meaningful reference point for them. 
This table illustrates that a belief in the possibility of change for clients engendered 
actions directed towards clients’ ‘at risk’ identities. Thus where there was hope there 
was action. In the absence of hope, the withdrawal of service can be noted. And 
where there was uncertainty about the possibility of change, the indeterminacy of 
practitioners’ responses is apparent. 
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Belief in the Possibility of 
Change for Clients 
 
n=10 
Stand for 
Client 
 
n=5 
Stand for 
Self & Client 
 
n=2 
Stand 
against 
Client/ 
Colleague 
and for Self 
n=1 
Unreconciled 
 
n=2 
Influence upon 
Client and 
Worker Risk 
Identities 
Possibility of change 
n=7 
Frances 
Josephine 
Linda 
Peter 
Petra 
Geraldine 
Zoe 
 
  Emphasised 
client ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
Impossibility of change 
n=2 
  Jenny 
 
Graham Emphasised 
client ‘a risk’ 
identity. 
Uncertainty of change 
n=1 
   Maggie Uncertain which 
identity to 
emphasise. 
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A belief in the possibility of change for clients directed social workers to focus upon 
their client’s ‘at risk’ identities. In keeping with their positive feelings towards their 
clients, these practitioners expressed a belief that change was possible for them. 
Change was spoken of in terms of clients having the potential to realise ‘alternative, 
strengths-based’ identities (Frances, Josephine, Linda, Peter, Petra and Zoe), to live 
lives outside of the influence of problems (Frances, Linda and Peter) and the capacity 
to incorporate new information into their lives (Geraldine). For each of these social 
workers, then, their moral commitment to address their clients’ ‘at risk’ identities was 
embedded within stories of hope. The power of hope as a motivator towards working 
for change in client’s lives was given forceful expression in Frances’s recollections of 
her practice with Julianna. Frances described her work with Julianna as: 
the sort of work where you plough on…in the belief that if you keep 
ploughing on you keep storying – alternative stories – and that would 
give her something one day, but you don’t see the results now. It was that 
sort of work. It was lots of hard work...this young woman has, I know, so 
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much beauty inside her and a different kind of strength that can be found 
that I had worked really hard to locate and get in touch with, without any 
amazing stories of success, but that I just insisted on believing in.  
Belief in the possibility of change for clients, then, was a core component of many of 
these social workers’ practice frameworks. For example, Josephine emphasised that 
her work with her young client who was both ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ was guided by: 
a belief in the capacity for goodness in people, regardless of what you 
have heard…it is absolutely pointless me going and working with a kid 
that is all that those reports were. I mean it is pointless. I am not going to 
be able to make any difference so there has to be something else and it is 
that belief that there is another story and that is about the goodness in 
people. 
Thus, as Zoe surmised of her decision to leave a child with his parents after 
allegations of physical abuse had been substantiated, ‘It was a risk giving change a 
chance’. Accordingly, belief in the possibility of change and the hope of an alternate, 
more positive future for clients appears to have invigorated the moral commitment of 
these social workers to take a stand for their clients by attending to their clients’ ‘at 
risk’ identities. 
 
		
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Belief in the impossibility of change appears to have provided an impetus for two 
practitioners to emphasise their client’s ‘a risk’ as opposed to ‘at risk’ identities. This 
was particularly evident in Jenny’s narrative about her decision not to respond to 
telephone calls from her client following a suicide attempt. Jenny explained: 
I didn’t buy into it because there is a long history and I thought that if I 
hook into this young person, they will just come down here and we will 
go around in circles once again. So that is why my intervention has been 
nothing…I think at the end of the day I thought that I can pump so much 
of my time, resources, energy into a family that is dysfunctional, not 
going to change…I have written down ‘inter-generational’ and you are 
looking at a family – this has probably happened through the generations 
and you think, ‘Well, what can I possibly do in a short intervention 
anyway?’ 
When asked if she had much hope for her client and her family, Jenny replied: 
No, I don’t because I think in the past we have done what we can…She 
will just wander through life and mum will just – mum will reach a point 
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when she is an adult I suppose, that it will not be her responsibility. But 
in the end the community will have to pick it up, be it the police or 
hospitals or whatever. 
Thus Graham and Jenny’s interventions were directed away from their clients’ ‘at 
risk’ identities. However, while Jenny felt at ease with the morality of her 
intervention, Graham was concerned that he had contributed to his client being ‘at 
risk’. 
 
*
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Maggie was undecided whether her client was capable of change. While Maggie said 
that he was doing all the things he was supposed to be doing and saying the ‘right’ 
things, she basically did not trust him. Nor did she trust her own judgement of him. 
Maggie explained her indecision about the possibility of change for her client in the 
following terms: 
You are told they are smart…and if you say, ‘Could you do a juggling act 
for me?’ they will do a juggling act for you because that’s the way they 
operate…perhaps he is trying to please me. Perhaps he’s trying to do the 
right thing – so for God’s sake, Maggie, stop being so bloody suspicious 
of his motives! 
Accordingly, Maggie remained undecided which of her client’s risk identities she 
should have given precedence to in her intervention – his ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’ 
identities. 
 
	
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The final reference points which social workers referred to as a basis for constituting 
a moral stand in response to risk identity conflicts was their theoretical and practice 
frameworks. However, rather than acting as an impetus for practice, social workers 
spoke of theoretical and practice frameworks as philosophical justifications for the 
stance they had adopted in their interventions after the event. Table 11 presents the 
number and names of practitioners who referred to theory and practice frameworks in 
their reflective accounts about how this reference point supported their stand in their 
interventions.   
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Theoretical and Practice 
Frameworks 
 
n=9 
Stand for 
Client 
 
n=7 
Stand for 
Self and 
Client 
 
n=1 
Stand 
against 
Client/ 
Colleague 
and for Self 
n=1 
Unreconciled 
 
n=0 
Influence upon 
Client and 
Worker Risk 
Identities 
Theoretical Frameworks 
n=4 
Frances 
Petra 
Sebastian 
Geraldine 
 
  Emphasised 
client and 
worker ‘at risk’ 
identities. 
Practice Frameworks 
n=5 
Frances 
Josephine 
Kaitlin 
Linda 
 Jenny 
 
 Emphasised 
client and 
worker ‘at risk’ 
identity. 
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A small number of practitioners referred to how an organised belief system or world 
view was able to give their practice theoretical coherence whilst simultaneously 
supporting the virtue of their interventions. Frances spoke of this in terms of 
Foucaultian theory. In Geraldine’s case it was feminist theory. For Petra it was an 
existential philosophical perspective. And Sebastian spoke of his ideas about 
heterosexual dominance, which resonated with queer theory. In each instance, the 
theoretical perspectives of these practitioners directed their attention towards social 
theories of oppression and social injustice which they then claimed were in evidence 
at the micro level of their practice dilemmas. Thus each of these social workers 
attended to their client’s and their own ‘at risk’ identities.  
 
,	
Practice frameworks were expressed as formal intervention models that guided the 
general practice orientations of Frances, Jenny, Josephine, Kaitlin and Linda. 
Common to the approaches of Frances, Josephine, Kaitlin and Linda were narrative 
and strength-based models of practice. In addition, Kaitlin also clarified that her 
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intervention with her young client had been informed by practice experience that had 
taught her the importance of ‘survivors of abuse’ having a significant adult in their 
lives who believed them. Jenny’s discussion of her practice framework differed from 
these practitioners, articulating her practice framework in terms of her preferred 
‘modus operandi’. This was spoken of as being results focused, as opposed to 
reflecting a formal practice framework. Jenny explained: 
I am really into results. This is what is going to happen and this is what I 
will see, be it a year or two months, whatever, however long it takes. So 
this is just a frustrating one for me because all the things I have tried in 
the past have seen no change…it comes back to the fact that I need to 
have the answer; I need to be able to help people; I need to be able to fix 
things so that they can move on. That would be it. I use the word ‘fix’ 
because that is what I think at times. That is what I am like and that is 
when I have interventions, I have it planned. I have worksheets and a 
sense of where I need to be.  
Hence part of Jenny’s frustration with her client was that she had not had results in 
her work with the client. Accordingly Jenny spoke of her client as a ‘problem client’ 
(a risk) and herself as a ‘vexed worker’ (at risk). Thus Jenny’s stance in her 
intervention reflected Jenny positioning herself against her client. 
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Having considered each reference point in isolation, this final section of the chapter 
considers which reference points in combination were used by practitioners to 
comprise the moral stand evident in their interventions. This is illustrated in the 
following table. Reference points are ranked according to the frequency of their 
mention, and numbers of practitioners who referred to them are also noted. This table 
also includes the risk identities that these commonly-referred-to reference points 
emphasised and de-emphasised. While those practitioners who were unreconciled 
about the morality of their interventions have not been considered to have ‘taken a 
stand’, I have included them within this table as a means of capturing the reference 
points that were important to them.  
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Stand taken in 
Intervention 
Emphasised Risk 
Identities 
De-Emphasised 
Risk Identities 
Reference Points 
Stand for the Client but 
not for Self 
(n=7) 
Client ‘At Risk’ Worker ‘At Risk’ 
Client ‘A Risk’ 
• The moral emotions of compassion and 
empathy (n=6) 
• Personal morals and values (n=6) 
• The ‘reality’ of risk (n=6) 
• The degree of risk (n=5) 
• Belief in the possibility of change for clients 
(n=5) 
• Sense of responsibility and obligation (n=4) 
• Professional ethics and values (n=4) 
• Theoretical framework (n=4) 
• Practice frameworks (n=4) 
• Organisational contexts (n=4) 
• Personal contexts (n=2) 
Stand for Client and 
Self 
(n=5) 
Client ‘At Risk’ 
Worker ‘At Risk’ 
Worker ‘A Risk’ • The degree of risk (n=5) 
• The moral emotions of compassion and 
empathy (n=4) 
• Sense of responsibility and obligation (n=4) 
• Professional ethics and values (n=4) 
• Personal morals and values (n=4) 
• Organisational contexts (n=4) 
• The ‘reality’ of risk (n=3) 
• Theoretical framework (n=3) 
• Personal contexts (n=2) 
• Belief in the possibility of change for the 
client (n=2) 
Stand against 
Client/Colleagues and 
for Self 
(n=2) 
Client/Colleagues 
‘A Risk’ 
Worker ‘At Risk’ 
Client ‘At Risk’ • Organisational contexts (n=2) 
• Personal contexts (n=2) 
• Sense of responsibility and obligation (n=1) 
• Professional ethics and values (n=1) 
• The degree of risk (n=1) 
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• Impossibility of change for clients (n=1) 
• Theoretical framework (n=1)  
• Practice framework (n=1) 
Unreconciled morality 
of interventions 
(n=3) 
Worker ‘A Risk’  • The moral emotions of compassion and 
empathy (n=3) 
• Sense of responsibility and obligation (n=2) 
• The ‘reality’ of risk (n=2) 
• Organisational contexts (n=2) 
• Personal contexts (n=2) 
• Professional ethics and values (n=1) 
• Impossibility of change for clients (n=1) 
• Theoretical framework (n=1) 
• Practice framework (n=1) 
 
It is apparent from the above table that ‘ethics, morals and values’, ‘re-contextualised 
meanings and qualities of risk’ and the ‘belief in the possibility of change for clients’ 
were important reference points for social workers who took a stand for clients, either 
independently or in addition to taking a stand for themselves. Thus these reference 
points supported a focus upon clients’ ‘at risk’ identities. It is difficult to make claims 
regarding those practitioners who took a stand against their client/colleagues and for 
themselves and those practitioners who remained unreconciled with the morality of 
their interventions. The small numbers of social workers in these two groups of 
practitioners precludes such claims. However, given the predominance of ‘a risk’ 
identities within these two groups it may be that fear, in one of its guises, exerted its 
influence upon practitioners’ interventions in their instances. Certainly those social 
workers who were unreconciled about the morality of their interventions spoke of 
being plagued with the doubt that they had somehow harmed their clients and that 
they were fearful that the negative repercussions of their actions would repeat over 
time. It seems nothing was able to assuage this fear. Accordingly these social 
workers, in point of difference to other practitioners, remained deeply troubled about 
how this reflected upon them as moral subjects within their work. 
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This chapter has considered what was important to practitioners as they oriented a 
moral stand for themselves in their interventions in response to the dilemmas 
presented by their clients’ and their own risk identities. Chapter 6 explored how 
practitioners were faced with a choice about whether they would direct the focus of 
their interventions towards their clients, colleagues or own interests. Faced with this 
predicament, social workers confronted questions about their integrity as moral 
agents in their practice. This chapter has explored what practitioners identified as 
important to them as they faced this difficult circumstance. Each of the five reference 
points that were mentioned by practitioners intimated a specific focus for their 
interventions, be it towards the client’s or their own ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’ identities. 
Nonetheless the reflective passages presented in this chapter indicate that resolving 
how to respond to the moral dilemmas attendant to risk identity conflicts was a 
complicated process for practitioners and no one reference point provided them with 
the definitive ‘answer. ‘Ethics, morals and values’ and ‘re-contextualising meanings 
and qualities of risk’ were important considerations for those practitioners who 
responded to their clients’ ‘at risk’ identities in their interventions. Those practitioners 
whose interventions indicate that they took a stand for their clients spoke about how 
these two reference points assisted them to allay the fear that had become embodied 
in their client’s ‘a risk’ identities and their own ‘at risk’ identities. Other reference 
points seem to have been important for those practitioners who gave greater attention 
to their own ‘at risk’ identities in their interventions. And finally, those practitioners 
who were unreconciled with the morality of their interventions spoke of the futility of 
reference points, singularly or in combination, to allay their concerns. For these 
practitioners the fear of having done, or potentially doing, the ‘wrong thing’ remained 
a dominant and pervasive concern.  
 
This concludes the presentation of results in this thesis. The following chapter 
discusses what these results suggest about the operations of risk in social workers’ 
practice, with particular attention being given to the meaning, emotion and morality 
of risk. 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Political urgencies come and go, but it’s a fair enough vocation to strike 
one match after another against the dark isolation, when spectacular 
arrogance rules the day and tries to force hope into hiding (Kingsolver 
2002, page unknown). 
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The focus of this thesis has been upon how risk operates in social workers’ practice. It 
has questioned how ideas about risk are constituted and integrated into social 
workers’ interventions. My research has explored whether risk is necessarily as 
totalising of our practices and professional identities as the ‘catastrophe story’ of risk 
contained within the critical social work literature presented in Chapter 3 suggests. 
With a desire to identify how we might ‘speak back’ to the conservative impetus of 
risk, my research aimed to identify how social workers resist invitations into the 
moral conservatism of negative constructs of risk. I determined to conduct my 
explorations of the operations of risk in social work by considering how risk was 
spoken of by social workers within reflective accounts of interventions that were 
significant to them.  
 
The findings of the study indicate that risk operated as a complex and discursively 
persuasive concept within social workers’ reflective accounts of their practice. Most 
significantly, risk operated as a powerful constituent of client and practitioner 
identities within these stories. In this chapter I discuss the significance of this finding 
in relation to how risk identities were an integral dimension of how social workers 
spoke about their interventions. This discussion explains that social workers were 
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active agents in the generation of meanings of risk and the ascription of risk identities 
within the context of their face-to-face work with clients and colleagues. Their 
intellectual, emotional and moral presence is foregrounded throughout the chapter as 
an argument against the narrative of practitioner passivity that seems to feature in 
recent theorising of the social, political and cultural dimensions of risk in social work.  
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The findings of this research indicate that risk did not operate as an abstract, 
theoretical or philosophical concept in social workers’ reflections of their 
interventions. Risk was embodied. Risk was integral to how practitioners recognised 
their clients and themselves. Risk was intimately and intricately connected to 
practitioner and client identities. Clients, colleagues and social workers were spoken 
of by all but one practitioner (Craig) as being ‘at risk’ and/or ‘a risk’. The ascription 
of risk identities meant that for these social workers risk became inseparable from the 
identities of people when practitioners narrated a risk story. Following the logic of 
‘storyline’ analysis (Søndergaard 2002, p. 191), it seems apparent that when 
practitioners identified a risk plot within their interventions risk-based 
characterisations invariably ensued. Extrapolating from Dean’s (1999, p. 131) 
suggestion, then, that ‘the significance of risk does not lie with risk itself but with 
what risk gets attached to’, risk can be understood from the results of this study as an 
identity defining concept (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006); risk was attached to 
‘characters’ rather than contexts. It was fundamental to how social workers 
recognised and positioned clients, colleagues and themselves as well as the ambit of 
the parameters of their interventions. Hence while risk may have been spoken of as 
being ‘everywhere’ by these practitioners, the focus of their interventions was their 
clients, colleagues and themselves, as opposed to the broader contexts within which 
they were all located.  
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There is general recognition within the critical social work risk literature that client 
and practitioner subjectivities are mediated by notions of risk – and to ill effect for 
both groups. ‘At risk’ clients are characteristically spoken of in this literature in terms 
of their vulnerability and/or dependence (Furedi 2003; Kelly 2001; Kemshall 2002; 
Sharland 2006). In either case, ‘at risk’ clients are said to be subject to intense 
scrutiny, paternalism, excessive control and social exclusion (Kelly 2001; Kemshall 
2002; Sharland 2006). ‘A risk’ clients are spoken of as dangerous, be it in terms of 
their posing a specific physical threat or as a consequence of their high dependency 
upon welfare services (Culpitt 1999; Kemshall 2002; Rose 2000; Warner 2006). ‘At 
risk’ practitioners are similarly positioned as vulnerable within this literature on the 
basis of them being under increased surveillance, regulation and their consequent 
identification as targets of blame when things go wrong (Craddock 2004; Green 2004; 
McDonald 2006; Parton 1996, 2001; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Webb 2006). 
Social workers are spoken of as ‘a risk’ to clients by virtue of incorrect or 
overzealous risk assessment and management, given an increased reliance upon 
actuarial practices (Craddock 2004; Goddard et al. 1999; Munro 1999; Warner 2003; 
Webb 2006). The risk identities attributed to clients, colleagues and practitioners 
within my research reflect these general ways of comprehending client and 
practitioner subjectivities. The vulnerability of clients and social workers pervaded 
practitioners’ narrations of their clients and own ‘at risk’ identities. ‘A risk’ clients 
were ‘violent’ and/ or ‘problematic’, and in this regard their identities correspond 
with notions of dangerousness and the pejorative depiction of clients who are welfare 
dependent. And ‘a risk’ practitioner identities, whether they were reflexively 
generated or ascribed by others, resonated as presentations of social workers 
operating in difficult circumstances within their workplaces which were largely 
beyond their control.  
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Contrary to the fatalistic narrative that seems to underscore many aspects of the 
critical social work risk literature, the generation of client, colleague and practitioner 
risk identities occurred through active and conscious processes on the part of 
practitioners in this study. While risk identities were often spoken of as ‘naturalised’ 
or indigenous identities (Søndergaard 2002; Taylor & White 2000), the discussions of 
practitioners during their reflective interviews indicate their presence as active agents 
in the inscription or rejection of identities. Hence social workers were active agents in 
the creation and maintenance of identities.  
 
Consistent with the results of researchers whose focus is the ‘subjectification’ of 
groups of people such as social workers and/or clients (Craft & Willis 2005; Fook & 
Napier 2000; Juhlia 2003; Juhlia et al. 2003; Moffat 1999; Taylor & White 2000; 
Watkins 2006; White 2003), this study demonstrates that social workers enacted 
considerable power in attributing the discursive significance of risk to people and 
events. However, the results of my research indicate two further points. First, multiple 
rather than singular risk identities were in operation during practitioners’ 
interventions. Clients, colleagues and practitioners more often than not were ascribed 
both ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities to the point that each person involved in the 
intervention was recognised as having several identities. The complexity of this 
context was recognised by practitioners within their reflective narratives and serves as 
a sobering reminder of the intricacies that underscore social workers’ ethical and 
moral dilemmas in these situations. Second, practitioners’ reflective accounts of their 
interventions indicate that client, colleague and their own risk identities did not 
operate in simple terms as fixed identities. Whereas various studies have considered 
how client and practitioner identities are constructed, this generative process is 
spoken of as a fait accompli in the sense that once spoken, these identities ‘become 
more fixed and durable over time’ (Taylor & White 2000, p. 138). My study indicates 
a more complex understanding of this process. In the context of there being co-
existent multiple risk identities in operation, practitioners spoke of needing to make a 
choice about which risk identities they would attend to in their interventions. In this 
active, difficult process of resolution, the morally conservative potential of risk was 
able to be resisted in the majority of situations. Thus while risk remained core to 
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identities throughout social workers’ accounts of their interventions, certain risk 
identities were emphasised over others as social workers determined the moral stand 
of their interventions. 
 
The objectification of risk through the ascription of risk identities thus reverberates as 
a reflection of the agency of social workers in their generation of the meaning of 
events. Craig’s alternative conceptualisation of risk also stands as a testimony to this 
claim. Craig’s was the ‘maverick’ storyline (Søndergaard 2002) amongst the 
reflective narratives of practitioners in this study. In a point of difference from the 
other practitioners who participated in this study, he argued against the presence of 
risk within his intervention. This alternative narrative disrupts both the naturalised 
assumption that risk is a ubiquitous feature of social work practice and that risk has 
an essentialised meaning. Craig spoke fluently and coherently about the meaning of 
risk within his practice. Within this generation of meaning, Craig was able to isolate 
and contextualise his understanding of risk so that he could bracket out its negative 
features from his intervention. Accordingly Craig recounted how he felt freer to 
follow other creative ways of assisting the young woman he was working with. His 
denial of the presence of a negative construct of risk within his intervention intimates 
that its inevitability as a feature of practice is not a foregone conclusion and that 
practitioners can take active steps to prevent this from being the case. Whether or not 
we agree that Craig’s approach was appropriate to the circumstances of his 
intervention is a separate matter. What is important in the context of this discussion is 
that even though Craig told a different ‘risk story’ to other practitioners, it supports 
the finding of this study that social workers were able act with discursive power in the 
generation of meanings about risk within their interventions. Thus the deterministic 
conception of risk that pervades the critical social work risk literature – that it is 
always a dominant and negative presence – can be disputed.  
 
As risk is discussed within this literature it could have been assumed that each of the 
practitioners who participated in my study would have spoken a fatalistic narrative in 
their reflections about their interventions – that there was little point in their trying to 
escape from the pervasiveness of risk. However, practitioners did not present 
themselves as duplicitous or as acting out of a sense of compulsion. They inscribed 
themselves as active agents within their reflective accounts as they wrestled with their 
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risk identity dilemmas. Though they may not have spoken of themselves as 
consciously engaging with the discursive realm of risk, they took great pains to 
present themselves as having acted for good reasons when confronted by the moral 
dilemmas of their practice. Thus practitioners did not present themselves as ‘victims’ 
of a larger discourse or mentality of risk. Risk was personal – and hence it was within 
their sphere of influence to have an effect upon it. 
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Social workers created risk-based identities in very intimate spaces within their 
practice contexts. They were created in conversations between workers, in their cars, 
during telephone calls, in people’s homes and in their offices, as they encountered 
children and adults who had known the terrors of abuse, were affected by mental 
illness or who had been socially displaced in other ways. Client risk identities were 
thus created in the context of practitioners’ relationships with clients during ‘face 
work’ (Webb 2006). The reflective accounts of practitioners of their face-to-face 
encounters with clients are thus a testimony to the inter-subjective processes involved 
in formulating risk identities (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006). In this space social workers 
constructed identities by reflecting upon their relationship with clients and colleagues 
often, though not exclusively, within the context of the implied question of ‘Are you a 
risk to me and/or am I a risk to you?’. Accordingly, risk was often personalised as a 
matter between clients, colleagues and practitioners.  
 
This is an important finding, given that Webb (2006) and others (Culpitt 1999; Dean 
1999; Green 2004; Parton 1996; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 
1997) claim that risk has seriously undermined the face-to-face encounter between 
clients and practitioners. Overtaken by the ethos of ‘short termism’ evident in the 
increased reliance upon case management, care contracts and empirical practice 
strategies, Webb (2006) argues that the quantity and quality of direct work with 
clients in social work is in decline. However, the findings of my study indicate that 
even where social workers’ practice contexts were overshadowed by legislative and 
policy requirements that foreshadow a preoccupation with risk, relationships between 
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clients and practitioners operated as a significant medium in which identities were 
negotiated. When actuarial assessments were done, practitioners often disputed their 
significance, foregrounding instead their more subjective understanding of events. 
Thus face-to-face work existed as a space in which social workers were able to enact 
their agency in the constitution and integration of ideas about risk within their 
interventions.  
 
Lending further support to this claim is that although practitioners spoke of feeling as 
if they were under ‘the gaze’ of colleagues and other professionals, for the majority of 
social workers their face-to-face work with clients was done in the presence of 
minimal or negligible supervision. The critical moments when practitioners faced 
their difficult choices about how to respond to the dilemmas posed by the tensions 
between client, colleague and their own risk identities often occurred when they were 
on their own or in the company of clients. Thus there is a sense within this data that 
practitioners were able to exert significant influence upon how the discursive space 
between their clients, colleagues and selves would be used in the creation and 
emphasis of their risk identities. However, it is also important to recognise that the 
discursive power of risk pervasively and insidiously invited practitioners to monitor 
and regulate their behaviour according to the all seeing eye of others. During the 
critical junctures of their interventions practitioners were not asking themselves, 
‘What would others think of me if I do well here?’. Instead practitioners questioned, 
‘What would happen to me if I do something wrong?’ or ‘What can go wrong?’. Thus 
the forensic operation of risk (Douglas 2003) as a stratagem of self-surveillance was 
starkly apparent within practitioners’ reflective accounts as they grappled with which 
risk identities they would emphasise within their interventions – their clients and/or 
their own. The implications of this for their interventions was that it contributed to 
them questioning what would be the focus of their interventions – safety and or issues 
of justice and need; who would be the focus of their interventions – the client or 
themselves; and, in turn, what kinds of interventions would be initiated – 
interventions of care or control. 
 
In summary, my research indicates that the discursive power of risk to act as a 
morally conservative impetus in social work practice was not fully realised within 
practitioners’ reflective accounts of their significant interventions in this study. While 
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technical, legalistic and calculable models of risk may have featured in their 
workplaces, and social workers felt that risks hovered over them in the disembodied 
gaze of others, they were able to act with purpose in the generation of ideas about risk 
and how these ideas operated in their interventions. The inter-subjective processes 
involved in the constitution of risk identities indicate that direct client work is a 
powerful discursive site in which practitioners enact considerable discursive power. 
While the circumstances in which practitioners worked were difficult and they were 
at times faced with ‘win-lose’ or ‘lose-lose’ situations, their passive acceptance of a 
fatalistic outcome for their clients and/or themselves is missing from their reflective 
narratives. Practitioners spoke of themselves as active agents in the constitution of 
ideas about risk and their integration into their interventions. These operations of risk 
involved a complex interplay of meanings of risk and the constitutive elements of 
emotion and morality. Each of these dimensions of the operations of risk in social 
workers’ interventions will now be discussed. 
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A significant proportion of the socio-cultural and social work risk literature is devoted 
to exploring contestations regarding the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
that underpin realist and objectivist risk paradigms. The ‘nature of risk’ is the pivotal 
focus of these often polarised debates (Houston & Griffiths 2000). In their attempts to 
answer the question ‘What is risk?’, theorists have engaged in a heated exchange over 
whether risk is inherent to events or a product of social, political and cultural forces 
(Adam & Van Loon 2000; Lupton 2004). That is, it is disputed whether risk is 
‘natural’ or constructed. In view of the answer to this question a further question is 
asked, that being, ‘How we can know risk?’. That is, can it be objectively measured 
or should our investigations centre upon the construction of meanings of risk (Shaw 
& Shaw 2001; Webb 2006)? These questions, it is argued, are important for 
conceiving of how we practice as social workers, for it suggests that in the case of the 
former our practices would be based upon actuarial models of risk assessment, whilst 
in the case of the latter notions of subjectivity and contingency would guide practice 
(Croft 2001; Goddard et al. 1999; Houston & Griffiths 2000; Webb 2006). What is 
not disputed in this literature is the dominance of risk as a central preoccupation for 
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orienting social work practice in the contemporary era. Houston and Griffiths (2000, 
p. 1) claim that in this respect the ubiquity of risk ‘can be likened, in psychological 
terms, to a first-order construct – or a totalizing schema – against which other 
constructs (such as client need) are processed or rationed’. Similarly Giddens (2003a, 
pp. 123-124) in arguing that late modern societies are risk societies has stated that: 
[It] is not that day-to-day life is inherently more risky than was the case 
in prior eras. It is rather that, in conditions of modernity, for lay actors as 
well as experts in specific fields, thinking in terms of risk and risk 
assessment is a more or less ever-present exercise… 
 
Social workers’ engagement with this most fundamental of theoretical problems was 
spoken of by them in terms of the qualitative values they ascribed to meanings of risk 
within their practice – it was ‘real’, ‘everywhere’ and it was unanimously considered 
a ‘negative construct’. Consistent with the literature, social workers in this study who 
spoke of its presence within their interventions emphasised that it presided as an ever- 
present force during the history of their interventions. Thus risk was not only 
everywhere in the sense that it transgressed the domains of individuals, organisations 
and communities, it was largely constant in its duration. In certain respects, then, risk 
had a limitless dimension to it. It would seem that, once narrated, the plot of risk was 
inescapable as a defining context for social workers speaking about their practice.  
 
Risk was objectified – it was made real – through the ascription of risk identities. 
Risk was located in, and synonymous with, how social workers recognised clients and 
themselves. The dominance of risk identities as a primary source of recognition 
within practitioners’ narratives of their interventions can be understood as having had 
a profound impact on how social workers constituted their ideas about risk. Given 
that these identities existed only as problem-based identities (DeJong & Berg 2002; 
Milner & O’Byrne 2002; White 1995), the nature of risk seemingly could only be 
conceived by social workers as a negative construct. Parton (2001, p. 69) argues that 
within the context of a ‘blame’ culture the dominance of this ‘negative interpretation 
of risk’ is expected. Nonetheless, Parton (2000, 2001) and Green (2004) state that this 
construction of risk is problematic, as it limits how social workers can imaginatively, 
creatively and holistically respond to client need. Thus Parton and Green advocate the 
benefits of adopting a more positive view of ‘risk taking’ (Titterton 2006). However, 
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this more positive reading of risk as a liberating concept offering opportunities for 
change or personal growth was not initially available to or entertained by the majority 
of practitioners within my study as they engaged with their risk saturated intervention 
contexts.  
  
Nonetheless, despite their overwhelmingly negative constructions of risk and their 
sense of risk being deeply embedded and constant to events and people, risk was not 
spoken of by the participants in this study as a static concept. While risk was noted as 
a constant presence in their practice, many practitioners’ conceptions of risk changed 
over time, often in quite subtle ways. Thus it can be noted that there was a contingent 
quality to risk as it was spoken of within social workers’ reflective narratives which 
was not always initially recognised by them. Croft (2001) has argued that adopting a 
contingent understanding of risk enables a distinction to be made between ‘risk 
events’ and ‘risk consequences’; between ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ risks. Croft (2001, 
p. 751) states that: 
The theoretical conceptualisation of risk as a fixed entity is unhelpful, 
given the complexities involved, but when conceptualised as a position 
over time, risk can be understood as a process of some fluidity where 
different stages intermingle across the life course with varying degrees of 
control of and by those affected. 
That this contingent understanding emerged in many practitioners’ stories makes 
sense within the context of the findings of my research that practitioners were 
required to make a choice about which risk identities they would give greater 
emphasis to when faced with various risk identity dilemmas. In reconciling these 
dilemmas practitioners re-evaluated their understandings of risk and their ideas about 
their clients and themselves. Risks that had been previously understood in de-
contextualised terms were re-contextualised, as practitioners resolved how to act with 
integrity in their work. This in turn reflects that the risk identities that had been 
spoken of, though having the potential to operate as totalising identities (White 1995), 
were not necessarily fixed. Given that risk had been objectified through client and 
practitioner risk identities, the concept of risk itself became a revisable construct for 
social workers.  
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The risk society thesis posits that late modern life is dominated by a preoccupation 
with safety and security (Beck 1994, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c, 2003d). According to Furedi (2003, p. 1), ‘Safety has become the 
fundamental value of our times’. In keeping with this focus, Culpitt (1999, p. 3) has 
argued that risk has become ‘integral to the idiosyncratic knowledge of who we are’. 
As a ‘category of fear’ (Culpitt 1999, p. 93), then, risk positions individuals and 
governments and citizens in relationships dominated by suspicion, and attitudes and 
moralities of protectionism and responsibilisation (Dean 1999; Ewald 1991; Leonard 
1997; O’Malley 1996; Parton 1999, 2001; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Rose 
1996a, 1996b, 2000; Webb 2006). Thus how we view ourselves and others, be it in 
the context of personal or social relations, has become dominated by the legions of 
polarised identities that cumulate around notions of risk – dangerousness and 
vulnerability, independence and dependence, responsibility and irresponsibility, 
trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, culpability and innocence. Within the context 
of neo-liberal risk society, then, how we experience ourselves in relation to risk is 
intensely personal. Accordingly Beck (2003, 2004) and Giddens (2003a, 2003c) 
claim the reflexive generation of personal biographies has become a central project 
for individuals confronting anxieties that have their genesis in people’s knowledge 
about and experience of risk, whilst the ‘making up of people’ (Hacking 1991, p. 4) 
through classification and codification is spoken of as a key strategy of neo-liberal 
governments (Culpitt 1999; Dean 1999; O’Malley 1996; Parton 1999; Rose 1996a, 
1996b; Webb 2006). Within this analysis, overwhelming fear operates as a core 
constituent for defining the personal experience of risk within contemporary society. 
 
The findings of my research reflect this general understanding of the primacy of fear 
as an emotional response to risk. Fear sat at the heart of practitioners’ tales as they 
spoke about the moral quandaries posed by risk identity dilemmas. However, more 
specifically, fear was a major constituent of client and practitioner risk identities. In 
this sense it was generative of how practitioners viewed their clients and themselves, 
and was intricately interwoven into the client and practitioner relationship. This was 
particularly the case for clients and colleagues ascribed as having an ‘a risk’ identity 
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and where social workers spoke of themselves as ‘at risk’. They feared their clients 
and colleagues. However, some social workers also spoke of themselves as ‘a risk’ 
when they feared that their actions would harm or had harmed clients or others. These 
practitioners spoke of this identity in tandem with an ‘at risk’ identity in view of the 
burden they correspondingly felt. Thus social workers’ fears were very specific. And 
in this regard this study offers important insight into the operations of fear in the 
context of risk in social workers’ practice, as very little research has been conducted 
regarding social workers’ experiences of fear (Smith, McMahon & Nursten, 2003; 
Smith, Nursten & McMahon 2004). 
 
Social workers in my study most commonly feared the negative reactions of 
colleagues and others. The dominance of this form of fear strongly reflects literature 
themes that critique the ‘culture of blame’ (Parton 1996) that has intruded into social 
workers’ practice domains alongside increased regulation of their work practices to 
minimise opportunities for error (Kemshall 2000, 2002; Goddard et al. 1999; Green 
2004; Lymbery 2004; Parton 1996, 2001; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997, Webb 
2006). It also supports the results from Taylor’s (2005) and Smith, McMahon and 
Nursten’s (2003) studies in which employees reported that they feared being blamed 
by colleagues and managers in their workplaces (cf. Smith, Nursten & McMahon 
2004). In addition to fearing negative judgements of their practice, social workers in 
my study feared they might be subjected to some form of violence within their 
practice situations, most often by clients whom they knew had committed a violent 
act in the past. Social workers who participated in Smith, McMahon and Nursten’s 
(2003) research also reported fear of violence as a dominant concern. However, what 
is important to note in my study is that social workers spoke of the latent potential of 
their clients to be violent towards them – none of their clients had previously been 
violent toward these practitioners. In this regard the de-contextualised conception of 
risk can be understood as having impacted upon the construction of clients’ ‘a risk’ 
identities. Finally, social workers feared they would cause harm to clients or others by 
not being effective helpers. They doubted their skill levels and that their interventions 
would effect change. In this sense, social workers doubted their capacities to achieve 
good outcomes for their clients. This was spoken mostly as an ethical concern of 
practitioners. However, it often corresponded with their fear of being negatively 
judged by others. Thus fear of clients and colleagues was pivotal in how risk was 
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experienced personally by practitioners and instrumental in how they recognised the 
identities of clients, colleagues and themselves. Accordingly, this finding is consistent 
with the social work risk literature that emphasises the centrality of fear as a ‘category 
of risk’ (Culpitt 1999) that is instrumental in the constitution of fear-based risk 
identities.  
 
Fear had the potential to act as a morally conservative influence upon social workers’ 
practice – it could have influenced them to retreat from the challenges presented in 
their practice situations and take actions that would have made them feel ‘safe’. That 
is, practitioners could have privileged their ‘at risk’ identities within their 
interventions, amplified their client’s and colleague’s ‘a risk’ identities and/or de-
emphasised their client’s and colleagues ‘at risk’ identities. The social work risk 
literature is littered with the suggestion that this defensive approach to practice has 
become typical of social work interventions. Faced with the overwhelming fear 
generated by a preoccupation with safety and security as opposed to need, being 
overly regulated and viewed with distrust by managers and the public, it is claimed 
social work practice has become ‘very defensive, overly proceduralised and narrowly 
concerned with assessing, managing and insuring against risk’ (Parton & O’Byrne 
2000, p. 1). According to this narrative Sebastian could have referred Trevor to 
another social worker. Josephine and Mark could have decided not to work with their 
‘challenging clients’. Kaitlin could have left her young client to cry in his seat or 
unattended in her office. And so on. But they didn’t. Indeed, the majority of social 
workers’ actions indicate that they took a stand for their clients – sometimes quite 
selflessly, it would seem, given the types and levels of fears they had. This result 
contradicts literature which suggests that the ‘terrible fear that is driven by 
overwhelming risk’ (Culpitt 1999, p. 132) has succeeded in estranging us from one 
another (Furedi 2003, p. xvi) so that self-protection from risk overrides an ethical 
concern for the ‘other’ (Culpitt 1999, p. 14). However, my study indicates that the 
conservative morality of risk is neither as totalising nor the foregone conclusion that 
this literature suggests. It can be resisted. This is discussed in the following section of 
the chapter, which focuses specifically upon how risk operated as a moral force in 
social workers’ interventions. 
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Risk operated as an intensely moral site in social workers’ interventions. Contrary to 
claims that morality is extrinsic to risk (Giddens 2003a) the results of this study 
support the literature that highlights ‘the myriad ways in which risk and morality are 
intertwined’ (Ericson & Doyle 2003, p. 3). As Ericson and Doyle (2003, p. 2) argue: 
Assessment of the chance of adverse consequences also depends on 
morality. Identification of a threat or danger, and of adverse 
consequences, is based on judgements about ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ 
and distinctions between right and wrong. 
The morality of risk was spoken of most clearly in my study through the moralisation 
of client and social worker risk identities, in practitioners’ reflections about the moral 
dilemmas they faced within their interventions, and in their efforts to construct a 
morally justifiable response to the moral dilemmas posed by their risk identity 
conflicts. In this sense, then, risk operated as a construct imbued with moral 
significance. Risk was moral. Risk operated at a conceptual level to define the 
landscapes of being and action (White 1995) for clients and practitioners in terms of 
what was right, wrong, good, bad, innocent and culpable. Hence, given the 
attachment of risk to identity, risk identities were moral identities. They operated as 
judgements of the ‘moral adequacy’ (Taylor & White 2000) of clients, colleagues and 
practitioners. Given that social workers faced competing and conflicting moralised 
risk identities within their intervention contexts, their choices about which risk 
identities they would emphasise or de-emphasise in their interventions can be 
understood as moral choices. Similarly, their decisions to take a stand for or against 
their clients and/or themselves can be understood as moral decisions. Accordingly, 
practitioners’ interventions can be understood as moral responses to risk. Thus not 
only was risk deemed to be ‘everywhere’ by practitioners in their practice, its 
distinctive moral presence can also be understood as ubiquitous in their interventions.   
 
The critical social work risk literature accepts that ‘discourses and practices of risk 
are always imbued with moral language and ethical clauses’ (Ericson & Doyle 2003, 
p. 1). However, the morality of risk is rendered problematic within this literature 
(Culpitt 1999; Garland 2003; Kelly 2001; McDonald 2006; Warner 2006). Risk is 
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positioned in these arguments as a wholly morally conservative force in social work 
practice and in the welfare sector more generally to ill effect for clients and 
practitioners. However, the findings of my research suggest that this macro analysis 
of the morality of risk bears only a slight resemblance to the full force of the moral 
operations of risk that were enacted between clients and practitioners in this study 
within the context of their face-to-face encounters.  
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It is argued that a determination of the moral value of citizens within the context of 
neo-liberal risk society has become a matter for public audit (Culpitt 1999; McDonald 
2006; Webb 2006). This process relies upon the objectification of individuals through 
their enumeration according to various risk factors (Green 1997; Houston & Griffiths 
2000; Kelly 2000, 2001; Moffat 1999; Parton 1999). Within this context risk operates 
as a moral calculus for judging individuals according to how ‘risky’ they are which in 
turn supports the kinds of interventions that are conducted and types of services that 
are provided (Dean 1999; Green 2004; Kemshall 2002; Lupton 2004; Moffat 1999; 
Parton 1999; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000; Warner 2006). As such, people’s identities 
have become entangled, perhaps some would argue overtaken, by the conservative 
ethos of neo-liberal rule, so that people’s identities are constructed in terms of moral 
deficits (Culpitt 1999). Thus the project of social work has become the remoralisation 
(Culpitt 1999; Green 2004; Kelly 2001; Rose 1996a, 1996b, 2000) of people with 
‘flawed identities’.  
 
Elements of this analysis are reflected in the results of my study. The ascription of 
risk identities to clients and social workers can be seen as a process of objectification. 
Here, the ‘making up of people’ (Hacking 1991) occurred through the discursive 
influence of risk. Thus people’s identities were conflated with risk; risk acted as a 
lens through which practitioners recognised themselves and clients. However, the 
objectification of persons within this context did not occur through processes of 
enumeration in a formal assessment process, which is the primary focus of 
commentary in the social work risk literature (Webb 2006). Client and practitioner 
risk identities were conferred and negotiated in the discursive spaces of their 
relationship in their face-to-face encounters. Nonetheless, these identities were 
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‘counted’ in a sense within these encounters; practitioners narrated a moral 
accounting of risk identities in terms of their ‘moral adequacy’ (Taylor & White 
2000) – people were good and/or bad according to their propensity to do harm and/or 
be harmed by others. Thus ‘at risk’ clients and ‘at risk’ social workers were primarily 
moralised as innocents by virtue of their ‘victimhood’. The exception to this was 
Jenny, who moralised her young clients’ dependency as problematic. In doing so, 
Jenny’s moral accounting of her client reflects how her client and family were 
responsibilised (Kelly 2001) for their troubles. ‘A risk’ client identities were mostly 
considered to be at fault. However, a number of social workers were able to balance 
the moral deficits of their clients by recasting them within the spectre of their 
‘victimhood’. And finally, practitioners were able to redeem the virtue of their own ‘a 
risk’ identities by pointing to their actions having unintended negative consequences 
for clients.  
 
These results are consistent with Taylor and White’s (2000) analysis of practices of 
professional speech, where moral judgements about clients are generated in 
professionals’ talk which then becomes a source of professional knowledge. In the 
case of my research, moral audits conferred positive and negative moral identities on 
clients and practitioners based upon very fundamental criteria – vulnerability and 
dangerousness. The critical social work risk literature argues that the provision and 
withdrawal of health and welfare services has become intricately bound to each of 
these risk-based characterisations. Increasingly, reduced safety net provisions mean 
that only the ‘most vulnerable’ whose ill fortune is ‘no fault of their own’ are entitled 
to welfare services (Culpitt 1999; Davis & Garret 2004; Kemshall 2002; Lymbery 
2004). Concomitantly, those who are considered to be a danger to themselves and/or 
others face increased regulation and control of their behaviour (Rose 1996a; 1996b, 
2000; Warner 2006). Thus the schism in service provision between protection and 
punishment is inextricably connected to how these risk states are moralised and 
conferred. Hence practitioners’ risk identity dilemmas in this study reflected the 
moral quandary of the long-standing tension between ‘care and control’ that has 
persistently troubled the profession. In the crudest of terms, then, practitioners viewed 
harmed clients as ‘good’ clients who were deserving of care. However, harming 
clients were ‘bad’ clients who needed to be controlled or ignored. The difficulty for 
practitioners in this study was that more often than not clients were ascribed both ‘at 
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risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities. In addition, many practitioners also saw themselves in 
these terms. Thus practitioners faced a dilemma over which identities they would 
recognise in their interventions.  
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The finding of this study of the presence of co-existing, multiple risk identities within 
a single intervention offers a new insight into the operations of risk in social work. 
Discussions of risk in the social work literature have a tendency to present ‘risky’ 
individuals as belonging to the discrete categories of the ‘at risk’ (such as children 
and elderly people) and ‘a risk’ (such as people with specific mental illnesses and 
people who have committed sex offences). Furthermore, such discussion focuses 
almost exclusively upon clients; little attention is given to the ‘at risk’ social worker 
and even less to the ‘a risk’ social worker. However, beyond this understanding of the 
presence of co-existing, multiple risk identities, this study offers an alternative 
perspective upon the nature of the moral dilemmas that risk presents to social workers 
in the micro aspects of their practice. In the presence of co-existing, multiple client 
and practitioner risk identities, social workers in this study faced the quandary of 
which of these identities they would emphasise within their interventions and how 
they would reconcile the tensions between their own and clients’ identities. That is, 
practitioners were confronted with having to primarily make one or both of two 
choices: first, which client risk identities they would give greater attention to – their 
clients’ ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk identities’ – and, second, whose interests they would 
respond to – their client’s or their own. Practitioners spoke of the moments in their 
practice where they faced these choices of how to engage and respond to their clients’ 
and their own risk identities as moral dilemmas. 
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The construction of client identities by social workers is a relatively new focus of 
study within social work research (Juhlia et al. 2003; Taylor & White 2000). Juhlia 
and colleagues (2003, p. 11 – 14) claim that although clients are central to social 
work, the machinations of how ‘clienthood’ is constructed through particular 
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conceptualisations and by discrete social work practices remains under-examined in 
social work theory and research. They note that: 
clienthoods are always ultimately produced in local negotiation. This is 
why it is necessary to study in detail the practices in which this 
negotiation takes place and to present interpretations on how the partners 
together construct the realities and clienthoods of social work…It matters 
how client categories are constructed in social work interaction: 
categories have real consequences for people’s lives (Juhlia et al. 2003, 
pp. 18 & 19).   
Client risk identities can be understood as categories of clienthood in social work. In 
the context of this study it is also clear that the categories of clienthood were moral 
categories (Juhlia 2003; Taylor & White 2000) – being ‘good’ and ‘bad’ clients. 
However, it is important to note that for the majority of social workers in this study it 
was not immediately clear which risk identity category was the more pertinent or 
‘truthful’ client identity – their ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’ identities. In narrating their clients’ 
multiple risk identities, social workers’ practice narratives indicate that until the 
critical moment where their categorisation was complete, clients’ moral identities 
existed in a liminal space. I suggest that recognising the liminal quality of client risk 
identities offers a means of understanding why this struggle over which risk identities 
social workers emphasised in their practice was a source of unease for them. 
 
According to Lupton (2003, p. 133), ‘The liminal is that which represents a 
transitional, middle stage between two distinctly different entities, identities or sites. 
It thus cannot be categorised into either: it is ‘in-between’ ’. Following this, Bauman 
(1995) argues that the ‘stranger’ exists within the liminal space of blurred boundaries. 
Lupton (2003, p. 134), discussing Bauman (1991) comments that these ‘strangers’ or 
‘undecidables’ ‘paralyse knowledge and action’. It is not clear to us whether the 
stranger or ‘undecidable’ is friend or foe. A similar process may well have been in 
operation for the participants of this study as they spoke of their clients straddling 
both ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identity categories. As Lupton (2003, p. 136) notes, ‘Those 
things that are not easily categorised, that fail to stay in their categories, or that 
simply are too different from the self, tend to arouse anxieties and fears’. Certainly 
fear, anxiety, doubt and heartache troubled social workers as they confronted the 
moral dilemmas of their client risk identity conflicts. Following from Honneth’s 
‘ethics of recognition’ (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006), those practitioners whose clients 
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were both ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ faced a moral struggle over which of these identities 
they would ‘recognise’ in their interventions. Their choice would be one that would 
commit them to a particular form of ethical relationship with their clients and, in turn, 
shape the interventions they conducted. Hence practitioners spoke of questioning 
whether they would take a moral stand for or against their clients. Thus client risk 
identity conflicts bespeak the potency of those moments in our intervention histories 
where we confer the status of a client’s moral identity not only because of the power 
that is incumbent to naming the ‘other’ (White 1995), but also because of the 
ramifications of that naming in terms of its impact on the client/practitioner 
relationship and the kinds of services that are provided. 
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All but one practitioner (Linda) who had narrated a risk story within their practice 
account spoke of themselves as ‘at risk’ in some way. Of this group all but one 
(Joseph) had identified their clients/colleagues as having an ‘at risk’ identity, either 
singularly or in combination with an ‘a risk’ identity. These practitioners thus faced a 
tension between their own and their client’s ‘at risk’ identities. Theirs was a conflict 
over whether they would give greater emphasis to their client’s need for ‘safety’ or 
their own. In this respect this tension reflects the claim made by a number of theorists 
that security has supplanted need as the core concern of governments, professionals 
and individuals in neo-liberal risk societies (Culpitt 1999; Furedi 2003; Kemshall 
2002; Parton 1999, 2001; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam 1997; Rose 1996a, 1996b; 
Waterson 1999; Webb 2006). In their presentation of this dilemma practitioners spoke 
of their concern for their physical and emotional ‘safety’ as well as wanting to keep 
their professional reputations and esteem intact. In Bauman’s (2000) terms, this 
moment reflected social workers confronting their moral responsibility as their 
‘brother’s keeper’. According to Bauman (2000, p. 10), ‘Being one’s brother’s keeper 
is a life-sentence of hard labour and moral anxiety’, and ‘The uncertainty which 
haunts social work is nothing more nor nothing less than the uncertainty endemic to 
moral responsibility’. Thus it is evident that client and practitioner ‘at risk’ identities 
were presented as polarised identities, intimating that a choice needed to be made 
about which identity would be responded to – that of the client or the social worker. 
Accordingly, this struggle is another indication that risk identity conflicts can be 
understood as ‘struggles over recognition’ (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006). However, the 
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polarisation of risk identities also reflects the polarisation of risk and need – it 
supports them being seen as oppositional elements of social work practice, with the 
consequence that social workers seem necessarily faced with a choice about which to 
focus on and which to exclude in their interventions.  
 
What is abundantly clear is that the moral dilemma between client and practitioner ‘at 
risk’ identities was fuelled by fear. This particular risk identity conflict reflects the 
intersection of practitioners’ sense of the meaning, emotion and morality of risk. 
Practitioners were frightened. The risks they had identified for the client and 
themselves were ‘real’ and they were presented with a choice about whose ‘risk’ 
would be attended to in their interventions. It is in the construction of this particular 
moral dilemma through the conflation of these operations of risk that the potential for 
practitioners to have acted in morally conservative ways could have been realised. 
Practitioner’s concerns for themselves could have been given primacy in their 
practice stances. They could have claimed that in these instances they had reasons not 
to act as their ‘brother’s keeper’ (Bauman 2000). However, my study indicates a 
result contrary to the dominant catastrophe narrative of the critical social work risk 
literature. In most cases practitioners spoke of having taken a stand for their clients. 
Some also took a stand for themselves in their interventions and thus demonstrated a 
shared concern for themselves and clients. Or, in other words, they attended to both 
need and risk within their interventions. Jenny and Joseph were the only two 
practitioners who were reconciled to having taken a stance that attended to their own 
well-being, subsequently reinforcing the problematic moral identities they had 
ascribed to their client/colleagues. Elaine, Graham and Maggie remained 
unreconciled with the stand they had taken in their interventions. How practitioners 
spoke of their own and their clients’ moral identities and agency, as they reflected 
upon the stances they had taken, is discussed in the following section. 
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Webb (2006) argues that a ‘practice of value’ is necessary in social work to respond 
to the politics of neo-liberal risk society. He claims that: 
In a society that narrowly pursues material self-interest and individual 
choice adherence to an ethical stance is more radical than many people 
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realise…the legitimacy of social work rests on exhortations that betray an 
ethical intent rather than a set of empirical or outcome-based possibilities 
(Webb 2006, pp. 7-8). 
Webb (2006) and others (Bauman 1995, 1997, 2000; McBeath & Webb 2002; Parton 
& O’Byrne 2000;) optimistically position social work ethics as having the capacity 
‘to counter the hegemony of neo-liberalism’ (Webb 2006, p. 233). While this thesis 
has not put these claims to the test, it has demonstrated that risk operated as a highly 
moralised construct in social workers’ interventions and that engaging with its 
presence in their practice imbued practitioners’ interventions with moral significance. 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that ethical and moral concerns were core elements 
of the deliberative processes that social workers spoke about when accounting for 
how they resolved their risk identity dilemmas. Specifically social workers spoke 
about the importance of being able to reconcile their moral subjectivity as 
practitioners, the interconnection between risk taking and evaluations of the moral 
worth of clients, and the irresolvable nature of the moral dilemmas faced by several 
practitioners. Each of the dimensions that were articulated by practitioners as 
comprising their efforts to enact a moral response to the dilemmas posed by risk 
identities will now be discussed.  
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Webb (2006, p. 204) in discussing Taylor (1989), states that ‘the self is constituted in 
and through the taking of moral stances’. That is, our moral identities are formed 
through how we position ourselves in relation to what is ‘good’ and how we 
‘negotiate and move in the ethical space we inevitably find ourselves in as human 
agents’ (Webb 2006, p. 204). Accordingly, how practitioners reflected upon the moral 
problems posed by risk identity conflicts speaks of how they constructed themselves 
as moral agents in their interventions. However, given that practitioners had also 
attributed a moral value to their clients’ risk identities, their reflective comments also 
bespeak the moral agency that practitioners finally resolved to bestow upon clients – 
that they were ‘at risk’ (good) or ‘a risk’ (bad).  
 
The reflective narratives of the social workers in this study indicate that their 
commitment to do ‘good’ was a concern for them. What is important to note, then, is 
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that practitioners not only wanted to do what was ‘right’, it was important for them to 
reconcile their subjectivity as moral agents so that they could say they had been 
‘good’ practitioners who had done ‘good’ social work. According to Webb (2006, p. 
203), social workers have ‘an ethical disposition to do the best for clients and insofar 
as they have the resources to do so, they try to use these to maximise ethical ends’. 
Thus Webb (2006, p. 203) claims social workers have a particular kind of ‘ethical 
will’ that is disposed to doing ‘good’; a bold claim indeed. However, the choice for 
social workers in my study was not as clear as Webb’s (2006) commentary intimates. 
The dilemma that social workers in my study faced was that ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ 
identities and client and practitioner ‘at risk’ identities were positioned as 
oppositional to each other. According to Banks and Williams (2005, p. 1011) this 
situation reflects a pure ‘ethical dilemma’, as practitioners confronted ‘a situation 
where there [was] evidence for and evidence against what an agent ought to do…’ 
and there was nothing in and of the situation itself which clarified what the 
practitioner ‘should’ do. In this instance it is possible to see how practitioners’ moral 
dilemmas reflected the confounding enmeshment of risk and uncertainty in the risk 
society (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003c; Parton 2001; Webb 2006). Thus 
any action taken on behalf of the practitioner was considered by them to incur a 
‘cost’, given that they had in the majority of instances positioned themselves as ‘at 
risk’ in some way. Spoken in other terms, in order for practitioners to resolve the 
moral dilemmas of their interventions they were required to ‘take risks’.  
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Titterton (2006) argues that the concept of risk taking has not received proper 
attention in the health and welfare risk literature. In the context of welfare debates 
this can perhaps be understood as a result of the largely negative construction of risk 
as a problematic concept referring to threats and dangers that ‘will result in adverse 
consequences for a specified party’ (Ericson & Doyle 2003, p. 2). However, Titterton 
(2006, p. 25) claims that risk is equally concerned with the likelihood of something 
good happening. Thus he states that: 
risk taking is a course of purposeful action based on informed decisions 
concerning the possibility of positive and negative outcomes of types and 
levels of risk appropriate in certain situations (Titterton 2006, p. 25).  
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Building on this argument Green (2004) argues that ethical practice in the community 
care sector requires agencies to support staff to take risks. Green (2004, p. 11) states 
that:  
Just as surgical and procedural medicine is based on legitimate risk 
taking and risk avoidance, so is the skilled but less ‘scientific’ work of 
professionals in the community. Risk minimisation and risk taking must 
be seen as equally legitimate and sometimes competing objectives in 
decision making about practice. 
However, how social workers resolve this tension between risk taking and risk 
avoidance or minimisation when faced with welfare dilemmas in the micro aspects of 
their practice is recognised as a significant gap in the social work risk literature 
(Titterton 2006). This study goes some way to exploring this unexplored territory. 
The findings of my research indicate that in considering whether or not they would 
take certain risks in their interventions (such as giving greater attention to the client’s 
as opposed to their own ‘at risk’ identity) practitioners considered whether their 
clients were ‘worthy’ of their risk taking actions. That is, having moralised their 
clients’ risk identities in terms of them being innocent and/or at fault, good and/or 
bad, social workers considered whether their clients were deserving of them taking a 
stand on their behalf.  
 
The majority of practitioners in this study did take risks in their interventions, though 
determining the moral value of clients in terms of their worth would, at least on the 
surface, appear to be a morally ambiguous foundation for practice. Nonetheless this 
seems to have been the case to some degree for many practitioners, as they faced the 
moral conflicts generated from their feelings of fear for themselves and their 
determination to do what was right. However, the notion of the ‘deserving client’ was 
not the straightforward or vacuous conceptualisation of clienthood (Juhlia et al. 2003) 
that this analysis would initially imply.  
 
For those social workers who took a stand for their clients in some way, and for those 
who were unreconciled regarding their client’s identities, compassion and empathy 
acted as the emotive moral impetus (von Dietze & Orb 2000; Fox 2006) for them to 
do what would be good for their clients. In addition, ethical, moral and value 
standpoints were a major reference point for orienting the moral responsiveness of 
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their interventions. This is of little surprise, given that risk operated as an 
overwhelming moral construct in social workers’ practice. In combination with their 
reassessments of their ideas about risk, the extent to which they felt supported by 
their organisations and their belief in the possibility of change for clients, the majority 
of practitioners were able to resolve their risk identity dilemmas by attending to their 
client’s ‘at risk’ identities. Clients’ identities at this point became fixed as 
practitioners committed themselves to an ethical recognition of their moral 
responsibilities to them. In these moments, then, social workers’ actions and their 
relationships with clients can be understood as their enactment of an ethics of care 
(Banks 2006; Hugman 2003; Meagher & Parton 2004; Webb 2006), facilitated by the 
moral emotion of compassion (von Dietze & Orb 2000; Fox 2006) and their 
willingness to revisit their initial conceptualisations of risk. Thus, in combination, 
these dimensions of social work practice appear to have enabled social workers to 
recognise the ‘other’, that is their clients, as morally significant within their 
interventions, or in other words to acknowledge they were worthy of having risks 
taken for them.   
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These decisions concerning risk identity dilemmas were difficult for practitioners. 
They struggled, sometimes long and arduously, through the unforgiving quagmire of 
their risk-based moral dilemmas. For some, the residue of these dilemmas lingered 
long after the ‘closure’ of their interventions. This was particularly evident in the 
reflections of Elaine, Graham and Maggie, who remained unreconciled with the 
morality of the stand they had taken within their interventions. Banks and Williams 
(2005, p. 1012) note that feelings of regret are common following the resolution of a 
moral dilemma, given that by definition moral dilemmas involve having to make an 
agonising decision between two equally unwelcome alternatives. However, Elaine’s, 
Graham’s and Maggie’s unreconciled stand in their practice can be understood as 
indicative of a qualitative difference of their risk identity dilemmas. For them, ‘the 
moral loss or cost’ (Banks & Williams 2005, p. 1012) of their decisions was great and 
hence their risk identity dilemmas can be understood as resembling Hursthouse’s 
(1999, cited in Banks & Williams 2005, p. 1012) conceptualisation of ‘irresolvable’ 
or ‘tragic’ dilemmas.  
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This chapter has discussed how the results of this study indicate that risk is 
constituted and integrated into social workers’ interventions through the creation and 
ascription of client and practitioner risk identities. These identities operated within 
social workers’ interventions to constitute specific meanings of risk within their 
practice. Thus social workers acted as powerful narrators of the meanings of risk as 
they spoke constructions of their own and their clients’ identities into existence. In 
addition, fear operated as a major constituent of client and practitioner identities, 
thereby serving as an important constituent in defining the context within which risk 
identity conflicts and dilemmas were experienced. It has also been demonstrated that 
the risk identities that were spoken into existence within social workers’ practice 
narratives were moral identities. Thus risk operated as an intensely moral concept in 
social workers’ interventions, signifying social workers’ decisions and practices as 
matters of ethics and morality.  
 
Importantly, given the aims of the study, the results indicate that social workers can 
resist invitations into morally conservative and defensive practice when facing 
fearsome risks. Ethical, moral and value standpoints, as well as the capacity to reflect 
upon core assumptions made about the nature and extent of risks, were spoken of as 
invaluable reference points to orient the ‘ethical will’ of social workers as they 
struggled to do ‘the right thing’ in their interventions. When faced with the 
uncertainty generated by risk identity dilemmas these standpoints operated as 
powerful grounding influences for supporting social workers in taking a stand for 
clients. While it has been noted that this was not the case for all practitioners, the 
result nonetheless supports a new story of hope for social work practice as we 
continue to face the challenges posed by the social, political and cultural conditions 
generated within the context of neo-liberal risk society. My study indicates that our 
commitments to justice and care, and responsiveness to need can still be realised even 
though we experience, in a very personal sense, the presence of risk. The implications 
of these results for social work education, practice and research are discussed in the 
following and final chapter of this thesis. 
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As the title of this final chapter intimates, the main conclusion of my study is that 
there are opportunities within social workers’ interventions to resist the ‘culture of 
low expectation’ (Furedi 2003) that has become synonymous with theorising social 
work practice in the context of neo-liberal risk society. Social workers’ conflation of 
negative constructs of risk with their own and their clients’ identities resulted in risk 
operating as a significant and specific form of moral dilemma for practitioners. 
Practitioners faced the uncertainty of which risk identities they would respond to 
within their interventions. Described in other terms, they faced the moral dilemma of 
whether they would respond to their clients’ and/or their own needs within the 
context of each having been ascribed risk identities. In facing this dilemma, 
practitioners confronted the conservative impetus of risk that supports a focus on 
practitioner ‘safety’ as opposed to client needs (Gillingham 2006; Green 2004; 
McDonald 2006; Mullaly 2001; Parton 1996, 2001; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Webb 
2006). However, in this study, practitioners’ feelings of fear did not necessarily 
operate as the predominant impetus for their interventions. Instead, moral, ethical and 
value imperatives, alongside re-contextualising the nature and extent of risk, enabled 
the majority of social workers to take a stand for their clients as opposed to ‘playing it 
safe’.  
 
In taking this moral stance I conclude that these social workers were able to enact a 
particular form of moral agency which incorporated a concern for the ‘other’ – their 
clients. This enabled them to resist the morally conservative and repressive impetus 
of risk that has been theorised within social, political and cultural theories of risk 
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(discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). I consider the knowledge, educative and practice 
implications of my conclusion in this final chapter. I also reflect upon the limitations 
of the study which intimate the need for further research in specific areas of social 
work. These reflections mark the end of the thesis. 
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This study has demonstrated that spaces do exist within our practice contexts which 
enable us to resist invitations into the moral conservatism engendered by negative 
constructs of risk. Faced with the moral dilemmas posed by the tensions and conflicts 
attendant to the presence of co-existing, multiple risk identities, social workers in this 
study engaged in the difficult process of determining a moral response within their 
interventions. For most practitioners, a moral response was one in which they 
attended to their client’s ‘at risk’ identities. Some social workers also managed to 
attend to their own ‘at risk’ identities, but not, it would seem, at the expense of their 
client’s needs. While the empirical focus of the study has provided insight into how 
the moral conservatism of risk was resisted by these practitioners, the question that 
remains is how it is possible to minimalise opportunities for these risk-based moral 
dilemmas to occur in the first instance. On the basis of the findings of this study into 
the operations of risk in social work it would seem that there is scope to provide some 
tentative answers to this question. However, in order to answer this question two 
further subsidiary questions need to be considered.  
 
The first question concerns how it might be possible to narrate practice contexts in 
other terms than negative constructs of risk. As discussed in Chapter 8, when 
practitioners identified a risk plot, risk operated as a constituent of identities as well 
as the focus of practitioners’ interventions. While it is not clear from the data whether 
an acceptance of the ‘reality’ of risk preceded the ascription of identities in a linear 
development of plot and characterisation, the important point is that if the reality of 
risk is left uncontested a focus on problem identities can be established as the focus 
for interventions. It follows, then, that an alternative storyline might support the 
creation of alternative client and practitioner identities and thus open the realm for 
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other forms of social work actions. This is not to suggest that risk wouldn’t 
necessarily be referred to, but it wouldn’t stand alone as the only option for defining 
the storyline of social workers’ interventions.  
 
The second related question needing consideration is how might the polarised 
thinking that featured in the construction of client and practitioner identities be 
interrupted or resisted from the outset of social workers’ interventions. Risk identities 
were divisive. They positioned clients, colleagues and social workers in oppositional 
terms in which there was a struggle of recognition (Culpitt 1999; Webb 2006) over 
which risk identities would be emphasised within social workers’ interventions. 
Framed in these terms the personalisation of risk became exacerbated. Risk was a 
matter between clients and practitioners, as opposed to it being a matter requiring 
thought and action in relation to broader systemic and structural issues. Furthermore, 
the polarisation of client and practitioner risk identities supported the polarisation of 
other issues within social workers’ practice, particularly the competing imperatives 
between ‘care versus control’ and ‘risk versus need’. Entertaining the possibility of 
doing ‘care and control’ and ‘risk and need’ was at least initially obfuscated by the 
dynamic of oppositional thinking. Accordingly, reflecting upon strategies to disrupt 
this binarised way of thinking might assist efforts to resist invitations into morally 
conservative and timid social work practice. 
 
I suggest that the findings of this study offer a valuable starting point for responding 
to each of these questions. In most cases, social workers were able say what helped 
them to resolve the difficult moments of their practice dilemmas in which they 
determined whether to take a stand for and/or against clients and for and/or against 
themselves. Utilising these findings, I present responses to each of the questions 
raised here to clarify the implications of my research and the attendant 
recommendations for social work knowledge, education and practice. 
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As discussed in Chapters 5 and 8, risk was spoken of as an embodied construct in 
social workers’ practice narratives. In speaking of risk in these terms, ideas about risk 
became ‘real’ for them. Risk was regarded by practitioners as being pervasive, 
negative and intimately connected to people, not events. In their consideration of 
what supported them taking a stand for clients in their interventions, practitioners 
stated that further reflection upon their understanding of what was ‘real’ about risk 
was helpful. That is, they were able to re-contextualise their understandings of risk, 
which primarily served to reaffirm their clients’ ‘at risk’ identities and destabilised 
their own ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ identities. This has important implications for social 
work practice. It alerts us to the need to thoroughly examine how we make sense of 
risk within our practice. This reflective process requires us to question the 
assumptions, feelings and motivations that contribute to our understandings of the 
meanings and qualities we ascribe to our embodied conceptualisations of risk. In a 
sense it means that we question our initial assessments – formal and informal – over 
time not because they are necessarily wrong, but because by doing so the story we are 
narrating about our clients, ourselves and our practice becomes more substantial. 
Utilising the critical reflective process and questions implemented in this study would 
be a means of achieving this. As mentioned in Chapter 4, many social workers 
undertook considerable preparation for their interviews, especially for the second 
interview. Hence the critical reflective process used in this study can be undertaken 
independently by practitioners. However, the method and type of questions used in 
the study are well suited for implementation in professional supervision sessions.  
 
Reflecting upon how we generate our understandings of risk in specific interventions 
would also require us to engage with risk as a contextualised concept during our 
initial and subsequent assessments; we need to identify the concrete circumstances in 
which a concern for risk is generated, sustained or disregarded. Croft’s (2001) 
conceptualisation of risk events and risk consequences could be helpful here. Firstly 
practitioners would identify the specific ‘risk events’ that have occurred and then 
theorise their possible ‘risk consequences’. Tracing the link between both would be 
important. We would need to ask ourselves, ‘Are my theories about risk 
consequences for clients, myself and other invested parties directly related to the 
circumstances in which the risk event occurred? What are the points of connection 
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between them and where are the gaps? How can I make sense of this?’. This is 
essentially the process adopted by practitioners who re-contextualised their 
understandings about the reality and degree of risk for clients and themselves. This 
suggests that the process of assessment and critical reflection needs to be ongoing, 
with practitioners and agencies remaining open to revisable understandings of the 
operations of risk. However, focusing on contexts also means that the constitutive 
effect of negative constructs of risk upon client and practitioner identities could also 
be undermined. That is, the personalisation of risk could be limited. This would be a 
powerful means of interrupting the moral conservatism of negative constructs of risk 
upon social workers’ interventions. Thus the first recommendation of this thesis is 
that ongoing, critical reflection of the meaning and qualities of risk that are embodied 
in risk identities be the focus of social work supervision. 
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A second recommendation of this thesis is that practitioners remain sensitive to the 
possibility that alternative conceptualisations of risk could also be considered within 
their interventions. Risk could be considered as having positive as well as negative 
dimensions. As noted in Chapter 5, risk was spoken of by practitioners within this 
study as meaning a threat, harm, abuse or violence towards self or others, as danger 
and more generally as negative consequences. More positive meanings of risk were 
absent from social workers’ reflective statements. However, several authors suggest 
that positive understandings of risk would enrich the landscape of social work 
interventions (Green 2004; Parton 2001; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Titterton 2006). 
Following their suggestions, risk could be understood as a source of motivation 
towards change; as an opportunity for improved life circumstances; and as an 
opportunity to showcase strength of character, resourcefulness and ability.  
 
These alternative conceptualisations of risk are reflective of the ideas that underpin 
‘Strengths’ (Saleeby 2006a, 2006b) and ‘Solutions’ (DeJong & Berg 2002; Milner & 
O’Byrne 2002; O’Connell & Palmer 2004) approaches to working with clients in 
crisis and involuntary settings. Shared understandings and commitments to change 
are the focus of interventions within these models of practice, as opposed to a focus 
on problems, negative conceptualisations of crisis and the deficits of clients and their 
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environments. As discussed in Chapter 7, belief in the possibility of change inspired 
seven practitioners to take a stand for their clients in their interventions. That is, these 
practitioners spoke of their hopes for their clients. In the presence of hope 
practitioners were prepared to ‘take risks’ for their clients. In its absence, practitioners 
remained unconvinced of the necessity for such action. Thus there is value in 
considering the intersection between risk, change and hope.  
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In Chapters 7 and 8 I made the point that social workers aspired to do the ‘right’ thing 
when faced with risk identity dilemmas, particularly in view of the tensions and 
conflicts between their own and their clients’ risk identities. However, aspiration 
alone was not the mainstay of what characterised the actions of those social workers 
who took a stand for clients in their interventions. They took risks. These risks often 
involved them acting in ways in which their vulnerabilities were laid bare. 
Acceptance of the necessity to take risks in order to be an effective advocate for 
clients was common to these practitioners. In addition, supportive organisational 
contexts were noted as vital to mediating practitioners’ concerns. This finding has 
several implications. First, it suggests the need to reinforce risk taking as an integral 
dimension of social work practice throughout undergraduate social work education. 
Undergraduate social workers not only need to understand that the purpose of the 
profession is to effect social and personal change but that their capacity to resolutely 
act with purpose as agents of change involves taking risks. In this sense they enact 
their responsibility as their ‘brothers’ keeper’ (Bauman 2000). In the absence of such 
practice it is not difficult to surmise that changes in peoples’ lived experiences of 
inequality and inequity will be slow to actualise. Thus a recommendation of this 
thesis is for undergraduate social work education to include curricula that explores the 
connections between risk taking and direct service delivery as a strategy of change. 
  
Second, in a related sense there is a need to develop more generally our 
understanding of how change happens in social work practice. The results of this 
study indicate that our theories of change in social work need to incorporate an 
understanding of the moral operations of risk. While various critical theories of social 
work emphasise the importance of taking a stand on certain aspects of marginalisation 
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and discrimination, these theoretical arguments rarely consider risk taking as a form 
of direct practice behaviour. This could be useful in making clearer the connections 
between theories of change and practices of change in social work. Thus a 
recommendation of this thesis is for further research to be undertaken that explores 
how social workers facilitate change through their capacity to take risks in their 
practice. In addition further research needs to be undertaken to develop greater 
understanding of the internal and external conditions that support practitioners to take 
risks. 
 
Third, the comments of social workers in this study indicate the importance of 
organisational support for social workers to take risks in their interventions. 
Reflecting the observations of various writers (Green 2004; Smith, McMahon & 
Nursten 2003; Smith, Nursten & McMahon 2004; Taylor 1995), practitioners in this 
study spoke of their concern for feeling ‘unsafe’ at work. Invitations to adopt 
defensive and morally conservative practices beckoned when a sense of ‘safety’ was 
absent. Organisations thus need to consider their responsibility to interrupt the 
conservative ethos of negative constructs of risk through a variety of measures aimed 
at supporting social workers in their direct service roles. Social workers’ sense of 
their own vulnerability in their practice dissipated when they knew their work was 
valued, when they had been positively acknowledged by managers and colleagues, 
and where fellow practitioners were prepared to offer them emotional and practical 
support. In the absence of this support, practitioners’ sense of themselves as ‘at risk’ 
remained a key concern for them, thereby exacerbating their risk identity dilemmas. 
Thus a recommendation of this thesis is that social work managers exert their 
influence in creating organisational systems, management practices and team climates 
that enable staff to take risks in the service of clients. 
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The results of this study suggest that ideas about risk were constituted and integrated 
into social workers’ interventions through the ascription of ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ client 
and practitioner risk identities. As Chapters 5 and 8 discuss, social workers in most 
instances actively participated in ascribing these risk identities to themselves and their 
clients. Risk identities were the predominant subject positions available within the 
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context of risk ‘plots’. However, many social workers also spoke of their clients’ 
strengths, resourcefulness and capacities. These characterisations of clients resonated 
in practitioners’ compassionate and empathetic responses to their clients’ situations. 
As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, ‘compassion and empathy’ was the primary moral 
reference point spoken of in social workers’ reflections on their actions. Within these 
statements it is possible to distil identities that were separate from those 
problematised risk identities that had been noted. These alternate client and 
practitioner identities coalesced around statements of care, hope and change. Clients 
were recognised in these statements as people of strength and resilience. Practitioners 
can be recognised in these statements as optimistic and committed to practices that 
were ethical and moral.  
 
This observation has important implications for social work education and practice. 
First, it indicates the value of incorporating ‘Strengths’ (Saleeby 2006a, 2006b) and 
‘Solutions’ (DeJong & Berg 2002; Milner & O’Byrne 2002; O’Connell & Palmer 
2004) models of practice in teaching. These two models offer clear strategies for 
developing hopeful client and practitioner identities, and avoid the ‘problem’ 
identities that were typical of the risk identities identified in this study. Second, 
opportunities for recognising and ‘growing’ these strengths-based identities need to 
be cultivated by practitioners and organisations. These identities offer us a direct 
connection to embodied aspects of hope, and, as this study has demonstrated, ascribed 
identities are powerful constituents of social workers’ interventions having profound 
ramifications for practitioners and clients. A focus on hope in social work practice 
would seem a necessary antidote to the despair and despondency that is said to plague 
our profession (Charles & Butler 2004; Lymbery & Butler 2004; Lymbery 2004; 
Mullaly 2001). Recognition of hope and the possibility of change, alongside a 
commitment to care therefore need to become directives, as opposed to incidentals, of 
practice. Supervision is a site in which this orienting framework could be mutually 
explored and supported by managers and practitioners. Critical reflections of 
interventions could be used to support this process. Thus a recommendation of this 
thesis is that critical reflection be integrated into social work supervision as a means 
of connecting to practitioners’ stories of hope in their practice.  
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On the basis of the findings of this study it seems necessary to (re)assert and 
(re)envisage ‘social work as care’ and social workers as ‘doing caring’ as a means of 
speaking back to the moral conservatism of the neo-liberal rhetoric of risk. This 
suggestion has strong support in the literature (Banks 2006; Green 2004; Hugman 
2003; Meagher & Parton 2004; Parton & O’Byrne 2000; Taylor & White 2000; Webb 
2006). Webb (2006) notes that ethical practice is radical practice within the politically 
and morally conservative confines of neo-liberal risk society. Care, grounded in our 
compassionate recognition of others, thus could become an organising framework for 
practice within which our moral identities as social workers would be clearly defined.  
 
A surprising result in this study was how little practitioners referred to social work 
theory as a reference point for their stances within their interventions. Ethics, morals 
and values were primary to social workers’ thoughts about their practice. Yet theory 
commands significant attention in the social work literature and as a pedagogical 
focus of social work education. ‘Connecting theory to practice’ is somewhat of a 
mantra of undergraduate social work education. Yet the results of this study indicate 
that ethics, morals and values were a more pressing concern than theory for 
practitioners as they engaged with risk identity dilemmas. Indeed, practitioners stated 
that ethics, morals and values were helpful in directing them towards a resolution of 
these dilemmas. If we are to accept the warning of the critical social work risk 
literature that social work is in danger of losing its emancipatory agenda in the face of 
overwhelming risk, then the results of this study suggest that we need to make ethics, 
morals and values central to our understanding of practice.  
 
If the purpose of social work is to ‘take a stand’ rather than ‘play it safe’ then an 
ethics of care needs to be incorporated as a central organising concept for social work 
practice. This implies the need to refocus social work education towards a concern 
with ethics in practice, not as a subsidiary element of undergraduate education but as 
a core subject. It also seems important that we develop models for critically 
examining the operations of ethics, morals and values within social workers’ risk 
stories. This could be easily integrated into supervision practices. Finally, 
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foregrounding ethics as the centre of social work practice has dramatic implications 
for how accountability could be configured in organisational contexts. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, it has been argued that the ‘culture of blame’ endemic to risk society has 
meant that social workers have become subject to increasing demands for perfection 
in risk assessment and risk management interventions (Craddock 2004; Green 2004; 
Kemshall 2000, 2002). In the conditions of uncertainty that are said to be endemic to 
the ‘risk society’ (Beck 2003, 2004; Giddens 2003a, 2003b, 2003c), identifying 
evidence of ‘good’ practice in the moral sense, as opposed to ‘right’ practice in the 
calculative sense, seems not only a more noble aim, but a more realistic one. 
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
In Chapter 3 I noted that the critical social work risk literature is characterised by a 
‘catastrophe’ narrative in which social workers are presented as despondent and 
despairing. In Chapter 8 I discussed that while risk identity dilemmas were a source 
of despair for practitioners, and a lingering one for a minority, despondency was not 
their response. Social workers were committed to constructing a moral response to 
the moral dilemmas of their practice even as they faced the paucity of external 
resources to support them in these endeavours. This is an important finding. It 
confronts the characterisation of social workers’ passivity in the face of the political 
and moral conservatism of neo-liberal risk society. Social workers spoke of being 
able to enact their moral agency within the context of their face-to-face encounters 
with clients and colleagues. The implication of this is profound. It means that while 
neo-liberal risk society might be a defining context for contemporary social work, its 
effects are not necessarily total – there are spaces in which social workers can enact 
their influence upon their practice. This is a valuable source of empowerment for 
social workers who confront the widening gulf within the context of neo-liberal risk 
society between the ideals of their ‘mission’ in social work and the ‘realities’ of their 
practice (Lymbery & Butler 2004). As educators and managers we can use this 
knowledge to inspire our students and employees towards inspired, creative and 
contextually sensitive practice to facilitate opportunities for demonstrations of care 
and responsiveness to need. It is a source of hope and a source of power in social 
work practice.  
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I suggest that the findings of this study offer a valuable starting point for responding 
to each of these questions. In most cases, social workers were able say what helped 
them to resolve the difficult moments of their practice dilemmas in which they 
determined whether to take a stand for and/or against clients and for and/or against 
themselves. Utilising these findings, I present responses to each of the questions 
raised here to clarify the implications of my research and the attendant 
recommendations for social work knowledge, education and practice. 
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The strength of this thesis is its empirical exploration of the operations of risk in 
social work. While risk has recently become a topic of theoretical interest in social 
work, few attempts have been made to develop empirical links between these 
arguments and direct, front-line practice. As noted in Chapters 1 and 3, a key focus of 
the emergent critical social work risk literature is a concern for the propensity 
towards morally conservative social work practice as our profession becomes 
increasingly subject to the social, political and cultural conditions of neo-liberal risk 
society. Against this theoretical backdrop I questioned if there are spaces within our 
practice contexts where social workers can resist invitations into the moral 
conservatism engendered by negative constructs of risk. I sought to answer this 
question by asking how risk is constituted and integrated into social workers’ 
interventions.  
 
The means by which I investigated this question was to speak with social workers 
about an intervention which they had implemented that was significant to them. 
Having a single focus enabled me to gather detailed, nuanced data of the operations 
of risk within the context of the meaning, emotion and morality of risk identities 
within social workers’ practice. However, this purposefully narrow focus to the study 
has also been its limitation. This study shares the limitation common to qualitative 
research with regard to generalisability (Alston & Bowles 2003). The study sample 
was small and drawn from one state in Australia. Participants in the study worked in 
diverse work places, with differing organisational mandates, and in rural and urban 
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areas. So while the research has proven valuable in generating an overview of the 
theory and practice of risk, as well as substance to support the importance of social 
work ethics, morals and values in speaking back to the conservative ethos of neo-
liberal risk rhetoric, further empirical, in-depth research needs to be undertaken to 
consider the operations of risk in specific social work contexts. 
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The possibilities of such a research agenda are exciting. With few empirical studies 
having been conducted in the area there is much to capture the research imaginations 
of social workers. Consideration of the specificity of the operations of risk in social 
work could be conducted in statutory and non-statutory practice settings, according to 
specific fields of practice and/or with regard to a particular client group. Comparisons 
to identify similarities and differences between these defining contexts of practice 
could also be undertaken. Developing this suggestion, differences in regional 
practices could be subjected to research. This has the potential to yield a complex 
understanding of the constitutive effect of differing structures of governance and how 
this might be linked to day-to-day encounters between social workers and clients. On 
a grander scale, a close examination of the specific contexts and practices of social 
workers according to the countries they work in would be important. Given that the 
conservative politics of neo-liberal risk society has become a core concern in welfare 
literature, a study that identifies how social workers resist its influence in embodied 
social work interventions within an international context would undoubtedly operate 
as a powerful and instructive story for developing future social work practice. 
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Developing the idea of increasing depth of understanding of the operations of risk 
through a specific focus, consideration could also be given to research that 
incorporates a mixed methods approach. This type of study could look at the 
intersecting domains of social and organisational policy, legislation and practice. This 
type of research lends itself to some form of discourse analysis. However, it would be 
  
262 
important in the construction of such a project to remain committed to achieving 
depth of understanding by grounding data collection in embodied aspects of social 
work practice. 
 
0	
	

		




	

As a new research agenda develops in social work regarding how we come to 
construct various ‘clienthoods’ in our interventions (Juhlia et al. 2003; Taylor & 
White 2000; White 2003), the negotiated space where risk identities are ascribed, 
rejected and utilised becomes a focus for future research. This study has focused upon 
how practitioners constituted and integrated ideas about risk in their interventions. 
Clients’ and other stakeholders’ perspectives are missing from this investigation. 
Tracking how each ‘voice’ speaks of risk, and how risk identities are negotiated 
between clients, practitioners and other stakeholders, would enable a more nuanced 
understanding of how ideas about risk shape client futures.  
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Building upon the results of this study, further research in social work needs to be 
conducted into what helps us resist invitations into the moral conservatism of 
negative constructs of risk. Current literature has generated important understandings 
about the problems of risk in social work – few have considered solutions. This is a 
research agenda that requires practitioner and academic researchers to harness their 
commitment to developing a hopeful narrative of social work practice. It means 
standing against invitations into cynicism and simplistic notions of pragmatism. The 
ideals of social work practice may not be wholly possible within the contemporary 
context of neo-liberal risk society where fear is utilised to dampen ambitions towards 
‘radical practice’. Within this context, social change can be viewed as an aspiration 
rather than a possible reality of practice. However, the ideals themselves are no less 
important or meaningful. And as this study has demonstrated, they are not in hiding: 
they are evident in day-to-day, face-to-face social work interventions. 
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This thesis has considered a growing concern expressed in contemporary literature 
that social work is in peril of losing sight of its capacity to resist the morally 
conservative influence of the rhetoric of risk contained within neo-liberal discourse. I 
have argued that the moral agency of practitioners is largely obscured within this 
narrative. When our presence is noted we are essentially characterised as hapless 
‘victims’ of the systemic violence of regulatory bureaucratic and government systems 
whose function is aimed at eliminating risk and maximising security. This literature 
has been criticised for positioning social workers as overly passive agents amidst the 
structural impediments of their practice contexts. This thesis speaks back to this 
narrative. This thesis has concluded that there are spaces within practice contexts 
where social workers can resist invitations into the moral conservatism of negative 
constructs of risk.  
 
Risk was fearsome for social workers. Social workers felt this personally, as it was 
inscribed into their own and clients’ identities. It was a source of consternation for 
them as they faced a decision about which risk identities they would recognise within 
their interventions – their clients’ and/or their own? While the enmeshment of risk 
with identity created a landscape of consciousness (White 1995) within which 
practitioners initially assumed the ‘reality’ of their own and their clients’ risk, steered 
the focus of their work toward matters of ‘safety’, and inscribed the dualism of their 
own and their clients’ welfare, this did not preclude their expressing and enacting 
compassion and care. Thus an emphasis upon fearful identities and the proclivity 
towards defensive and morally timid practice were on the whole resisted by 
practitioners in this study through their contemplation of the ethical, moral and value 
imperatives of their practice and the re-contextualisation of their ideas about their 
own and their clients’ risk.  
 
While ethical problems and dilemmas have been discussed generally in the social 
work literature, the specificity of the context of risk for making ethical decisions 
remains under-explored. Thus an important contribution of this study has been to 
present evidence of the centrality of the social work practitioner as an active ethical 
and moral agent in their practice deliberations in the construction of, and response to, 
  
264 
risk identity dilemmas. Furthermore, this study has demonstrated that the moral 
conservatism of risk is not an inevitable feature of social work practice. The face-to-
face encounter between client and practitioner has been shown in this study to be a 
space where social workers can act with discursive persuasion in the formation of 
identities and the enactment of micro practices. Thus this study has demonstrated that 
the relationship between the ‘self and other’ – practitioner and client – can be 
recognised as a relationship of compassion and care, even in the presence of fearsome 
risks.  
 
  
265 

)+	
&	

_____________________________________________________________________ 
School of Sociology and Social Work 
University of Tasmania 
Locked Bag 1340 
Launceston, TAS 7250. 
 
23rd February 2004 
 
Dear Reader, 
 
My name is Sonya Stanford and I am a PhD student in Social Work. I am writing to you to 
invite you to participate in a study I am conducting for my degree. The title of the research 
is “Risk and Social Work Practice”. I am very interested in the idea of risk in social work 
and in particular how it influences practitioners’ interventions. The project provides an 
opportunity to explore the tensions, contradictions and accommodations social workers 
make between formal social work knowledge and the influence of risk when deciding 
upon and implementing social work interventions. 
 
I have enclosed an Information Sheet that provides details about the study and what your 
participation would involve. I have also detailed how I intend to promote your anonymity 
and confidentiality should you choose to participate. If you are interested in the study I 
would appreciate you contacting me at your earliest possible convenience. I intend to run 
an Information Session in the next couple of weeks about the study that you would be 
welcome to come along to. However, your attendance at this session does not commit 
you to participating in the study. You can either let me know on the day or sometime after 
this session if you would like to be a participant. Alternatively I could meet with you 
privately to explain the study and answer any questions you may have. If you are 
interested in either of these options could you please let me know before the 13th of 
March 2004. I will then be able to let you know when and where the Information Sessions 
will be or arrange a date for a private meeting. 
 
Please note that while your participation would be gratefully appreciated you are 
absolutely under no obligation to do so. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you 
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may withdraw from the study at any time. There will not be any consequences for you if 
you decide not to participate. 
 
This research has been approved by the Northern Tasmanian Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Tasmania. Thank you for taking the time 
to read and consider this material. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
______________________________ 
Sonya Stanford (BSW [Hons] MSW) 
PhD Student and Investigator  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
This Information Sheet has been produced to outline for you what the research project 
“Risk and Social Work Practice” is about and what your participation would involve. The 
Information Sheet is for you to keep. 
 
1. What is the focus of the research? 
This study is being undertaken by myself, Sonya Stanford, to fulfil the requirement for a 
Doctoral degree in Social Work. The research is exploring how ideas about risk are 
incorporated into social workers’ practice. Risk is being used in a broad sense. I am 
interested to know what risk means for you within the context of an intervention and how 
these ideas play a role in the kinds of things you do. 
 
2. What benefit will the research have? 
This project provides an opportunity to explore the tensions, contradictions and 
accommodations social workers make between formal social work knowledge and the 
influence of risk when deciding upon and implementing social work interventions. This will 
provide an insight into what informs social work practice.  
 
At a broad level, the value of this research project is that it could contribute to deepening 
an understanding of how the theory/practice nexus in social work may be being facilitated 
and/or interrupted. Specifically, the benefit of the project is that it may clarify whether an 
alternative social work education curriculum is required to address how practitioners 
actively engage with decisions about their practice. In a similar vein, models of social 
work supervision might benefit from insights into influences upon social workers decisions 
about their interventions. 
 
3. Who can participate in the research? 
3 groups of people are being sought as participants for the research: 
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Social workers with less than 2 years practice experience 
You would be a member of this group if you are eligible for membership with the AASW 
and have worked for less than 2 years in the welfare industry since obtaining your 
qualification. You may have been employed on a permanent or casual basis, full-time or 
part -time. Your position may have been a designated social work position or classified as 
something else, e.g. counsellor, mediator, project officer, educator, manager etc. 
Whatever your employment circumstances your participation would be greatly valued.  
 
Social workers with between 2 and 4 years practice experience 
You would be a member of this group if you are eligible for membership with the AASW 
and have worked between 2 and 4 years in the welfare industry since obtaining your 
qualification. You may have been employed on a permanent or casual basis, full-time or 
part-time. Your position may have been a designated social work position or classified as 
something else, e.g. counsellor, mediator, project officer, educator, manager etc. 
Whatever your employment circumstances your participation would be greatly valued. 
 
Social workers with greater than 5 years practice experience 
You would be a member of this group if you are eligible for membership with the AASW 
and have worked in the welfare industry for 5 or more years since obtaining your 
qualification. You may have been employed on a permanent or casual basis, full-time or 
part-time. Your position may have been a designated social work position or classified as 
something else, e.g. counsellor, mediator, project officer, educator, manager etc. 
Whatever your employment circumstances your participation would be greatly valued.  
 
4. What does being a participant in the research involve? 
Agreeing to be a part of this study would mean agreeing to participate in a series of 1-1 
interviews based upon an example of your practice. It will work similarly to a supervision 
session. We will meet and I will conduct a reflective interview with you about what you did 
and why. I will have some prepared questions to ask and I will also ask you some 
spontaneous ones. Your participation would involve you engaging in an unravelling of the 
thoughts, feelings and situations that you found yourself in when implementing your 
example of an intervention. It is important that you realize my role in the interview is not to 
be critical or judgemental of your actions. It is to work with you to come to an 
understanding of the types of things that were influential in your decision making process. 
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After the first interview I will think about what you spoke about and then develop some 
more questions to deepen my understanding of the various elements that featured in your 
initial account of your practice. I will send these questions to you by mail and then re-
interview you. We will repeat the process if this seems necessary. So in total you would 
be interviewed a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 3 times.   
 
You could expect each interview to last for about 1 to 11/2 hours. The venue for the 
interviews would be your choice, be it at work, on one of the University campuses or in 
your home. I am happy to travel to you wherever you may live in the State. The time and 
date of the interview will be negotiated with you when you contact me to say you are 
interested in being a part of the research.  
 
5. Am I expected to do anything else as a participant in this study? 
While there is no obligation for participants to be involved in other aspects of the 
research, ideally I would like to check out some of the ideas that emerge in my analysis 
after all the interviews are completed. You simply need to let me know if you would want 
to do this. 
 
This would involve the following:  
• I would send you a written copy of my analysis of what you had said; 
• You would read this; 
• You would make any corrections to the accuracy of the information, provide 
suggestions or additional information in writing, over the telephone or in person; then  
• You would send your contribution back in a pre-paid envelope. 
 
Apart from this, your contact with me is at your discretion. I am very willing to discuss any 
aspect of your participation in the research at any time pre and/or post interview. My 
contact details are provided on the back page of this Information Sheet.  
 
6. How will the interviews be recorded? 
With your permission, the interviews will be tape-recorded. I will be transcribing the taped 
sessions. I will also make notes and diagrams as we speak to assist in my understanding 
of what you are saying. These notes will omit any identifying information. 
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7. How will confidentiality and anonymity be promoted? 
I am very aware of the importance of Confidentiality and Anonymity for participants in the 
study.  
In this study confidentiality and anonymity need to be extended to meet your own as well 
as those that feature in the interventions you would be discussing with me.  
 
The following procedures have been put in place to respect your right to confidentiality 
and to enhance anonymity: 
• Certain details about your particular circumstances (i.e. years of experience, type of 
work and your gender) will need to be included in the study. However, I intend to 
describe this type of information according to grouped identities. For example, a 
participant might be described as having greater than 5 years practice experience 
with statutory responsibilities and male. Other demographic details such as where 
you work, your specific job title, age, where you live etc. will not be actively sought. 
However, they are likely to emerge through the course of talking about your ideas 
and experiences. This type of detail will be omitted in the transcriptions, data analysis 
and the reporting of findings. This will mean that you should not be identifiable in any 
written or spoken documentation that results from the research. 
 
• Tapes will be kept in a lockable filing cabinet in my office on the Launceston campus 
of the University of Tasmania. As these tapes constitute the ‘raw data’ of the study 
they have to be kept for 5 years. They will be kept in lockable filing cabinets at the 
Launceston campus of the University of Tasmania and at my home in Launceston for 
the required 5 years. 
 
• The transcriptions, data analysis and the results will be kept on the hard drive of my 
computer in my office on the Launceston Campus of the University of Tasmania 
during the course of the study. I am the only person who uses this computer and I 
also have a password on it. My office is locked when unattended. 
 
• Back up copies of transcriptions, data analysis and the results will be kept on floppy 
discs at my home in Launceston. They will be stored in a lockable filing cabinet. 
 
• Disc copies of data have to be kept for 5 years. These will be kept in lockable filing 
cabinets at the Launceston campus of the University of Tasmania and at my home in 
Launceston. 
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• The results of the study will be collapsed into themes rather than presented as case 
studies of individuals. This will reduce the likelihood of your information being 
identifiable. 
 
• Pseudonyms will be given when the reporting of findings requires a source, e.g. 
‘Practitioner 1 said that…’ or ‘Practitioner 2 from group 3 noted…’ and/or you may 
want to choose an alias for yourself. 
 
• I will not disclose information given to me other than for the agreed purpose of the 
reporting of results in my thesis, journal articles and conference proceedings. 
 
• Confidentiality is a primary value and ethical obligation amongst social workers. By 
agreeing to participate in the research you will be agreeing to respect the privacy of 
the details associated with other individuals who feature in your practice example. 
This means that you make an undertaking not to reveal the identity of people who 
feature in your practice example or use information that is in any way identifying. This 
would include information about clients, agencies, other social workers etc. 
 
• Accordingly the standard of confidentiality outlined in the AASW Code of Ethics 
applies to your conduct in these interviews. A copy of the Code of Ethics is provided 
for your benefit. 
 
• If identifying information is accidentally presented, I will ensure that it is omitted from 
the transcripts, analysis and results. 
 
• The importance of confidentiality and its practice in this study is reinforced by clauses 
4, 7, and 9 of the Consent Form. 
 
You can be assured that every precaution will be taken to guard against your responses 
from the interviews being identifiable to others. 
 
8. What happens if I have strong feelings when I participate? 
It is possible that in the course of discussing your experiences you might feel 
embarrassed or feel uncertain about the significance of public and personal influences 
upon your work. You could also feel tired from the interviews. You might find it useful to 
know that I have had 13 years post-graduate experience as a social worker. I have 
worked in crisis and trauma counselling, conducted supervision sessions with social 
workers and have also conducted research interviews before. This means that I am 
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skilled at responding to strong emotional feelings on a 1-1 basis. We can pace the 
interviews to accommodate your needs around maintaining your energy levels.  
 
It is also important for you to note that I am not acting as an evaluator of your practice. I 
will not be making judgements about the worth or appropriateness of your decisions and 
actions. What I am really interested in are the factors that influenced you in the situation 
and how you have made sense of your experiences. 
 
It is also important that you understand that participation in this study is voluntary and you 
will not be reproached or disadvantaged in any way if you decide not to participate. 
  
9. What happens if I begin to feel tired when being interviewed? 
I understand that being involved in reflective exercises can be quite tiring. To minimize 
the possibility of this you can name the time of day that would suit you best to be 
interviewed. I will be monitoring the pace of the interview and checking out how you are 
feeling as we progress. However, you are able interrupt or end the interview if you are 
feeling tired. You can also say how long you would like the intervals between your 
interviews to be. 
 
It is also important that you understand that participation in this study is purely voluntary 
and you will not be reproached or disadvantaged in any way if you decide not to 
participate. 
 
10.  What happens if I start and then want to stop being involved in the 
research? 
You can withdraw from the study at any time and may request that any material you have 
supplied be excluded from the study. You will not be reproached or disadvantaged in any 
way if you do this. 
 
11. Do I get to see the results of the study? 
I intend to send interested participants a copy of the result section of the thesis. If you 
would like to receive the results, simply circle ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the Consent Form when we 
meet for our first interview. You are also most welcome to a copy of the complete thesis 
after it has been examined. 
  
273 
12. Who do I contact if I have any concerns or complaints about the 
study? 
The study has been approved by the Northern Tasmanian Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Tasmania. However, If you have any 
concerns of an ethical nature or complaints about the manner in which the study is 
conducted, you may contact: 
 
Prof. Roger Fay    Ph: 63 243576 
Chair Northern Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee 
or 
Amanda McAully    Ph: 62262763 
Executive Officer Northern Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics 
Committee 
 
13. What do I do if I want to participate? 
All you need to do is contact: 
 
Sonya Stanford 
PhD Student and Investigator 
Work:  63243657 
Mobile:  0417 265755 
Email:  Sonya.Stanford@utas.edu.au 
 
I will be more than happy to answer any questions you may have about the study and 
once it is clear you would like to be a part of it, we can arrange a time and a place that is 
suitable to you for us to do the first interview. When we meet you and I will sign a 
Consent Form. The Consent Form clarifies that you are making an informed decision to 
participate in the study. We will both have a copy of this Form once signed.  
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Alternatively you can contact:  
 
Prof. Robert Bland 
Chief Investigator 
Head of School of Sociology and Social Work 
Work:  63243946 
Email:  Robert.Bland@utas.edu.au 
 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this study and for taking the time to read this 
Information Sheet. Please contact me if you have any questions or are interested in 
participating. Remember that you can keep this Information Sheet. 
 
 
Sincerely 
 
______________________________  ______________________________ 
Prof. Robert Bland                            Sonya Stanford 
Chief Investigator      PhD Student and Investigator 
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Consent Form 
“Risk in Social Work” 
 
1. I have read and understood the ‘Information Sheet’ for this study. 
 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
 
3. I understand the study involves being asked a series of reflective questions in the 
course of 2 or 3 interviews about what informed decisions I made in an intervention I 
implemented. 
 
4. I understand tapes may be transcribed by somebody other than the researcher 
 
5. I understand that the following risks are involved: 
• I could potentially be identified in the research; 
• I may feel embarrassed talking about my work; 
• I may feel strong emotions when talking about influences upon my work; 
• I may feel tired in the course of participating in the interviews. 
 
I understand that a number of precautions have been taken to avoid these risks. 
 
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises for a period of 5 years. The data will be destroyed at the end of 5 
years. 
 
7. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
8. I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I 
cannot be identified as a subject. I understand that measures have been taken to 
ensure this. 
 
9. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw at any 
time without effect to:  
• My employment 
• My professional reputation 
 
10. I understand I am obligated to respect the privacy of the identities and information of 
people and agencies that feature in my practice example. 
 
 
11. I am aware that my interview may be transcribed by somebody other than the 
researcher. 
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Name of 
participant______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature of participant____________________________________Date_____________ 
 
12. I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer 
and I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the 
implications of participation. 
 
Name of investigator______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature of investigator___________________________________Date_____________ 
 
I would like to receive a copy of the results of the study   Yes   No 
 
cc. Investigator 
Participant 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 

I would really like to thank you for agreeing to meet today and to participate in this 
study. I am excited about us working together and am so looking forward to hearing 
about your work. 
 
I wondered if I could take a little time before we start to chat about a couple of things. 
 
You might find it useful to keep in mind that all practice stories are of equal value to 
me as I see each story as an opportunity for us to explore the meanings within them. I 
am not focusing on the specifics of practice. I am keen to explore meanings.  So if 
you were to find yourself wondering whether your story was ‘good enough’, 
remember the exploration is about unravelling how you have made, or come to make, 
sense of what happened in your story. There will be opportunities to make sense of 
what happened all the way through your story and this is what we will look at 
together. 
 
Similarly, if you are concerned that your practice may be judged in some way on the 
basis of your story, remember that the specifics of whatever action you took are not 
the focus of the research. This means that the ‘rightness’, or ‘appropriateness’ or any 
other kinds of evaluations of your work or yourself do not have any relevance to the 
research and so I will not be looking to make such judgements myself or to invite you 
to make them for yourself. Instead how you understood what took place is what I will 
be wanting us to talk about.  
 
Does this make sense? 
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So hopefully this will create a space for us to talk where you can feel as free as 
possible to tell your stories and to ‘speak the unspoken’ if you like. 
If at anytime you are wondering about any of these things let me know so we can talk 
about it. OK? 
 
Having said this, there is one limit I should mention which is pretty standard in social 
work contexts, which has to do with being at risk of harm to yourself or others. There 
is a limit to confidentiality within the research, which is that if you were to tell me 
that you had the intention to, or already had, hurt someone I would need to tell 
somebody about it. So you may like to keep this in mind if you think it might impact 
on what you would like to talk to me about today? OK? 
 
Do you have any questions you would like to run past me before we begin? 
 
	

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



• Check out how participants are generally feeling through the interview. 
• Check out if feeling vulnerable in any way. 
• Remember to be gentle in the way that I ask questions. 
• Rely on recursive questioning that is situated in reflections of meaning, 
content and feeling. 
• Keep focused on decision-making process in terms of decisions made, what 
influenced the decisions and the consequences of decisions for participants.  
• Keep an ear out for any information that suggests risk played a role in 
decision-making contexts.   
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Question 1: What is the significant intervention you would like to discuss? 
 
Prompts: 
Rely on recursive questions that cover the following areas. The questions listed below 
are a guide to the material to be covered and should not be asked in a literal manner: 
• When did it occur? 
• How long did it take? 
• What was it like being in this situation? 
• What did you feel? 
• What do you think influenced you feeling this way? 
• What sorts of things were you thinking about? 
• What do you think was influencing your thinking? 
• What were your physical responses in the situation, e.g. what language did 
you use, how did you stand, did you limit conversation, make eye contact, 
blush, turn your back to someone etc.  
 

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Question 2: How did you come to an understanding about what you would do?  
 
Prompts: 
Rely on recursive questions that cover the following areas. The questions listed below 
are a guide to the material to be covered and should not be asked in a literal manner: 
• What options did you think you had in the situation? 
• What seemed important or significant to you when deciding what to do? 
• Why were these things important or significant to you? 
• How do you think you present yourself in your account? Why? 
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• How does this representation compare to how you generally view yourself 
both professionally and personally? 
• How do you think you present the client/agency/colleague in your account 
Why? 
• How do you think this scenario has impacted on you? 
• How do you think it has impacted on others? 
• How do you think and feel about the decision in retrospect? 
 

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Question 3: What is important that I understand about the meaning of this story for 
you?  
 
Prompts: 
Rely on recursive questions that cover the following areas. The questions listed below 
are a guide to the material to be covered and should not be asked in a literal manner: 
• What is the core meaning of the story you have told today? 
• Why is this story significant to you? 
• How have you come to understand what happened so far? 
• What kinds of tensions, paradoxes, ambiguities etc. seem evident when you 
think about what we have spoken about today? 
• What seems unresolved, unknown or unclear or ‘un-understood’? 
• Is there anything else I should understand or know? 
• What has it been like talking about this today? 
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Today I would like to try and understand some specific aspects of the intervention 
you talked to me about last time we met. You might remember that last time you 
spoke to me about … (fill in specifics of person being interviewed). During the 
interview we explored a whole range of details and pathways that were important to 
your decision-making and my understanding of what was happening for you.  
 
I’m going to start today with some information about what I would like to cover with 
you in this interview. Please feel free to stop me and ask questions as I explain things 
to you.  
 
	



As you know, I am particularly interested in the idea of how risk comes to play a part 
in how practitioners make certain decisions about how to intervene in situations. So I 
guess I am interested in how risk might or might not be shaping of social work 
practice.  
 
Since speaking with you I have listened to the tapes of the interviews, and in 
particular I listened for times when risk might have been present in each story. It 
seemed to me that risk was present in most of the accounts in a couple of ways. One 
way in which it was present was in terms of how clients were ‘at risk’ of experiencing 
or perpetrating some kind of harm. It also seemed that risk was an element, to some 
extent, in how practitioners were situated in the stories. It seemed to me that there 
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was a sense that social workers were experiencing particular risks in the course of 
deciding what to do in the intervention and going ahead and doing whatever needed 
or could be done.  
 
 !"	

It might be useful for you to hear about how I am using the term ‘risk’ in relation to 
clients and yourself as a practitioner.  
 
#

In talking about clients who are ‘a risk’ or ‘at risk’, I am referring to when 
practitioners were assessing the potential for harm to occur to clients or others. For 
example, clients were thought to be ‘at risk’ of harms, such as violence, suicide or 
homelessness. This is probably how ‘being at risk’ is most often talked about in the 
social work literature. Clients were seen to be ‘a risk’ when they posed a threat to 
somebody, for example of being abusive towards a partner or children. Clients were 
also seen to be ‘a risk’ if it was thought they may not do what was expected of them, 
such as failing to comply with court orders. This understanding of risk is also 
commonly written about in the social work literature. 
 

$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In talking about the place of risk as it relates to you I am referring to the anticipation 
of possible negative consequences occurring for yourself. For example, I am talking 
about the times where you might have talked about when you felt worried or scared 
about whether you were doing the right thing in your work or that you didn’t know 
what the right thing to do might be. I am talking about when you might have 
mentioned you were scared or concerned about what other people might have thought 
about you and/or your work, that the client, agency, minister or some other person 
might take actions against you, or funding for a program might be lost. I’m talking 
about the times you might have said you felt worried that you would be letting 
someone down by your actions, be it the client, a colleague or someone else who was 
meaningful to you. I’m talking about times where you might have said to yourself, 
‘My fear could have had a place in this decision’ and then you tried to work outside 
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of what fear would have said you should do. I am also talking about if you had said 
you had concerns that you could, or already had, experienced distress or harm in the 
situation you were speaking of. 
 
Many practitioners spoke of doubt, uncertainty and fear being a part of the contexts in 
their decision-making and they somehow felt ‘at risk’ in doing their work in the ways 
mentioned above. Many practitioners spoke about how they also had a sense that they 
‘took risks’ in their practice given their anticipation of possible negative 
consequences that might eventuate from them. And some practitioners spoke about 
how they had a sense that they ‘took risks’ because they were uncertain about what 
outcomes may eventuate. So in talking about risk I am focusing on how risk was 
present in your assessment of the client as well as how you experienced risk as the 
person having to make decisions about what to do.  
 
So I wondered if I might explore these ideas with you in the context of the 
intervention you spoke to me about in our first interview,  
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It might be important for you to know that the stories that I have been told by 
practitioners like yourself touched me deeply. Amongst other things, these stories 
signified to me how complex the needs of clients can be and in turn how complex 
decision-making in social work is. I was struck by how practitioner’s engaged with 
clients, how they negotiated a whole range of conditions that were specific to each 
story, how they were committed to finding the best possible solution for someone in 
need, and how each practitioner spoke with honesty about what all this meant for 
them at the time. 
 
So in part what I am saying is that I realise that each story had many elements to it, 
not all of them related to risk. In making risk the focus of the second interview I do 
not wish to over emphasise/under emphasise its place in your intervention. It is 
simply a focus of my research so I am keen to explore where it may or may not have 
played a role in the context of your decision making in the intervention. 
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And following from this I wanted to reiterate how my position in the research is not 
one of evaluating your practice. Instead I am aiming to get a more solid 
understanding of a specific context in which your decision-making and actions took 
place. 
 
Finally, I wanted to let you know that our discussion will be more structured than our 
first meeting as I have 6 main themes comprising of several questions that I want to 
explore with you. I am anticipating that the interview will go for about an hour or so. 
 
Do you have any questions about any of this?  
 
, +:	


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As mentioned above, many people in the interviews spoke about how clients were ‘at 
risk’ or ‘a risk’. Practitioners also spoke about risk in terms of the possibility of 
experiencing negative consequences themselves either at the time of, or after, the 
intervention took place.  
 
1. How do you think risk (client and self) was present in the intervention that you 
described to me? 
Consider this question in terms of: 
• Your ideas about the client; 
• How you were experiencing risk;  
• Organisational factors; and 
• Any concerns you had for others, e.g. colleagues, family, services, 
communities, etc. 
 

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1. How do you think these thoughts about risk (client and self) impacted on how you 
thought about the client?  
 
2. How do you think thoughts about risk (client and self) impacted on how you 
thought about yourself in relation to the client? 
 

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Many people have spoken about how they felt that they were being, or could 
potentially be, scrutinised by others in their work. People also talked about how they 
judged their own actions.  
 
1. How did ideas about how you saw yourself or thought others saw you feature in the 
decisions you made in your intervention? 
 
2. What kinds of evaluations were you doing about yourself, knew were being done to 
you, or thought could be done about you? 
 

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1. How do you think risk (client and self) was present in your considerations about 
what the ‘right’/’good’ (i.e. moral) thing to do in the situation might be? 
 
2. How do you think risk (client and self) was present in your thinking about what 
you thought you ‘ought’ to do (i.e. what was ethical) in the situation?  
  

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1. How did risk (client and self) play a part in what change you thought was possible 
at the time?   
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1. How would you explain how risk (client and self) shaped the intervention that you 
described to me? What kind of things, (e.g. personal, professional, organizational, 
cultural, social, global, philosophical, ideological, fiscal, theoretical, etc.), have 
helped you to make sense of the place that risk occupied in your intervention? 
 

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1. Is there anything else you think is important to tell me about the intervention in 
terms of risk or regarding other aspects of the intervention?  
 
,+0
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Thank you for your time today.  
How are you feeling after our interview? 
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